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Editors’ Note

S

ustainable Development Law & Policy publishes a
Climate Law Reporter each year with a goal of providing practitioners and academia around the world
with an accessible and concise report on the current state of
climate law. After taking stock and regrouping following the
UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen, the international community began to focus on the December 2010 meeting in Cancún, Mexico. With the continued inability of the U.S. Congress
to pass a climate bill, expectations were not high going into the
Cancún negotiations. Although Parties moved forward with the
acceptance of numerous Agreements and Decisions, a successor to the Kyoto Protocol with the continuation of a bifurcated
approach—different obligations and responsibilities for developed and developing countries—appeared even more uncertain. As the international community looks toward the 2011
negotiations in Durban, South Africa, expectations are again
increasing.
One of the major challenges to reaching an international
binding agreement over the past ten years has been the opposition by the United States. But in more recent years the international community has also come to recognize China as a
countervailing force. This issue of the Climate Law Reporter
includes proposals for climate change mitigation, as well as
shifting approaches to address climate policy and effects of climate change. One of our authors reviews the tension between
the United States and China on “green technology” and questions whether the portrayal of a “green energy race” is accurate or advantageous for either country. Other articles focus on
climate change mitigation mechanisms such as the role of due
process in the carbon markets; which metrics are best for additionality of carbon sequestration projects; the inclusion of other
ecosystems and services beyond the confines of current forestry
programs including reducing emissions from deforestation and
forest degradation (“REDD”) programs; and even if private
property monetization of carbon reduction is an approach we
should pursue. Another article performs a comparative analysis of the successes and failures of climate change litigation
tactics across venues and continents, while one author suggests that litigation and legislation might not be necessary
because the U.S. President already has authority under existing
national security laws to mitigate the threat of climate change.
Additionally, one article focuses on an aspect of human rights
challenges inherent in climate change—developing country
use of clean energy technologies that are protected by intellectual property rights, frequently held by developed countries
thousands of miles away. Two authors focus on Africa, where
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impacts from climate changes are disproportionate compared
with the continent’s contribution. These articles review the key
challenges and prospects in sustaining the outcomes of the seventh African Development Forum to address climate change,
and the effects of establishing renewable energy feed in tariffs
in South Africa.
As the climate conference in South Africa approaches
and the international community again prepares for negotiations extending into the early mornings, we must remember
that while climate change is most often seen as an international
issue, actions, agreements, and compromises at all levels are
required to succeed in our efforts to mitigate climate change.

Paulo A. Lopes		
Melissa Blue Sky
Editor-In-Chief		 Editor-In-Chief

Sustainable Development Law & Policy

About SDLP
Sustainable Development Law & Policy (ISSN 15523721) is a student-run initiative at American University
Washington College of Law published three times each
academic year, with occasional special editions and two
annual foreign language translations. The journal publishes
articles and essays that focus on reconciling the tensions
between environmental sustainability, economic development, and human welfare. It embraces an interdisciplinary
focus to provide a broad view of current legal, political, and
social developments. Our mission is to serve as a valuable
resource for practitioners, policy makers, and concerned
citizens promoting sustainable development throughout
the world.
Sustainable Development Law & Policy prints in accordance with the standards established by the Forest Stewardship Council (“FSC”) that are designed to eliminate habitat
destruction, water pollution, displacement of indigenous
peoples, and violence against people and wildlife that often
accompanies logging. Achieving FSC Certification requires
that every step of the printing process, from lumber gathering to transportation to printing to paper sorting, must comply with the chain of custody established by the FSC which
runs a strict auditing system to maintain the integrity of
their certification process.
Currently, FSC certification is one of four methods a publisher can employ to ensure its publications are being produced using the best sustainable practices. It is the method
practiced by our printer, HBP, Inc. (FSC Chain-of-Custody
Certification: SWCOC-002553).

Editors-in-Chief
Melissa Blue Sky
Paulo A. Lopes

Senior Editorial Board
Managing Editor Lauren E. Trevisan
Marketing Editor Jessica B. Goldstein
Symposium Editor Arija Flowers
International Editor Megan Chapman
Digital Editors Laura Drummond, Tina R. Goel
Senior Editors
Nick Alarif, Nickolas Boecher, Sarah Bury, Kate Halloran,
Andrea Martinez, Joe Richardson, Liesel Stanhope, Karla
Torres, Winfield Wilson

Staff
Halley Allaire, Oded Cedar, Yoona Cho, Janet A. Choi,
Serena Corbetta, Pablo Forray, Robert Foster, Kira
Hettinger, Chris Hudock, Jeremy Kelley, Shubra Ohri,
Norah Patrick, Emmett Pepper, Matt Ribe, Mona Sheth,
Aileen Thompson, Pamela Tsang, Chelsea Tu, Braunson
Virjee, Cynthia Wildfire

Advisors
David Hunter, William L. Thomas, Durwood Zaelke,
Daniel Bradlow, Marcos Orellana, Glenn Wiser, Perry
Wallace, Kenneth Markowitz, William Snape

To purchase back issues please contact William S. Hein &
Co. at hol@wshein.com. To view current and past issues
of the publication please visit our website at http://www.
wcl.american.edu/org/sdlp. Current and past issues are also
available online through HeinOnline, LexisNexis, Westlaw,
vLex, and the H.W. Wilson Company. Please note that Volume I and Volume II, Issue 1 are published as International
and Comparative Environmental Law.
Printed by HBP, Inc., Hagerstown, MD.

Green Inks

Winter 2011

2

China’s Greentech Programs and the
USTR Investigation*
by Joel B. Eisen**

S

Introduction

ince the Renewable Energy Law went into effect in 2006,
the Chinese government has implemented numerous laws
and programs designed to encourage renewables.1 While
China has made strong progress, many factors will influence the
nation’s future success in renewable energy deployment, including the need for consistent pricing policies to stimulate private
sector development and the need to upgrade the country’s transmission grid.2
The issue of China’s support for renewables has taken center stage in a United States Trade Representative (“USTR”)
complaint alleging that China unfairly subsidizes its greentech
industries, in violation of its obligations as a member of the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”).3 Well before that investigation began, numerous Americans believed the United States
was less engaged in greentech promotion than China,4 and many
feel the United States is falling behind. New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman has been perhaps the most active
proponent of this view,5 but he has plenty of company. If recent
reports are to be believed, China could be generating more electricity from renewables in 2020 than any other nation on Earth.
It has also advanced rapidly in private sector spending on renewable energy technology and research and development spending.
Many observers state that the two nations are engaged in
a new “green energy race.”6 This term deliberately invokes the
“space race” competition between the U.S.S.R. and the United
States to achieve milestones in space after the 1957 launch of the
Sputnik satellite. To simplify matters a bit, there are two related
but different arguments being made. The first is that China will
dominate the global market for greentech, diminishing American companies’ ability to compete with Chinese firms. This, of
course, is the bedrock principle of the USTR investigation, and
must be considered in the context of the complex relationship
between the two nations. The United States has departed from
its “courtship” of China, criticizing it for its currency stance and
other economic policies.7
To some, “losing” the race and falling behind the Chinese
would have serious consequences for national supremacy. Even
senior military leaders recognize that the United States is jeopardizing its future by not taking appropriate steps to address the
dire situation presented by climate change. In this view, failing
to transition to a clean energy economy would leave the United
States vulnerable to ceding its position as a major world power.
Playing into fears about China provided a convenient means
of political theater in the 2010 election season,8 but portraying
China’s ascendancy in greentech as a national threat will have
3

unacceptable costs. Given our nations’ pressing needs to address
climate change, it would be much more productive to forego the
rhetoric of the greentech war and support both nations’ greentech initiatives. Moreover, the reasons given for why China is
“winning” the “race” are not yet completely convincing.
Invoking a race metaphor may be less productive than capturing national attention in the United States with concrete, clear
domestic goals. I believe that the United States should articulate a
single, clear national goal, just as it did with space research in the
Cold War era. Elsewhere, I have argued for the creation of “solar
utilities”9 that would deliver greentech in the residential setting
by consolidating all of the functions of financing, installing, and
servicing in single entities that would ramp up to utility-size scale
in individual areas. This is the sort of idea that could capture the
popular imagination and lead to more greentech development in
the United States than casting China as a competitor.

Geopolitical Competition in Greentech?:
Suitability of the “Space Race” Metaphor
The idea that the United States and China are in a competition for greentech supremacy has many adherents. A recent
Internet search for “China” and “green energy race” yielded
over 300,000 results, with most of the top one hundred having
titles such as “Who’s Winning the Clean Energy Race?,”10 “Is
China Beating the U.S. in Green Technology Development?,”11
and so forth. The “China as green competitor” narrative has
captivated journalists,12 bloggers,13 politicians,14 environmentalists,15 think tanks,16 executives of venture capital and energy
companies,17 financial market analysts and commentators,18 and
many others. The USTR investigation is yet another measure of
* Excerpted from “The New Energy Geopolitics?: China, Renewable Energy,
and the ‘Greentech Race,’” 74 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. ___ (2011).
** Professor Joel Eisen teaches courses in Environmental Law, Energy Law,
and Law of Climate Change, and Environmental and Energy Law in China.
He also teaches the Environmental Law and Policy course to undergraduate
students in the University of Richmond’s Environmental Studies program. In
recognition of his contributions to teaching, scholarship, and service, he has
been named the University’s Distinguished Educator for 2010-2011. In spring
2009, Professor Eisen was a Fulbright Professor of Law at the China University
of Political Science and Law in Beijing, China. He has become an authority
on renewable energy law and policy in the United States and China, and has
published extensively in law journals, periodicals for general consumption, and
books and treatises. He is a co-author of the leading law and business school
text on energy law, Energy, Economics and the Environment, with its third edition published in 2010. His most recent articles on renewable energy (including two on China’s energy programs) were published in law journals at Notre
Dame, William and Mary, and Chicago-Kent. Professor Eisen is a graduate of
the Stanford Law School (J.D. 1985) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (B.S. degree in Civil Engineering in 1981).
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the strength of the race idea. Some say the race is already over.
One observer notes, “[t]he United States ceded its leadership
in the production of clean energy technologies during the past
decade of neglect.”19

What Is the “Race,” and Is China “Winning”?
In the space race, there were concrete goals in physical
space: put satellites and humans in orbit, and land a man on
the moon. Here, it is not so clear. What is the competition with
China? To have more solar panels and wind turbines in place?
More governmental and private investment in greentech? More
greentech-friendly governmental policies? All of the above?
Those writing about it often have different agendas. Companies
want more investment in greentech and more access to China’s
markets. Environmentalists want more active federal policies to
encourage deployment of renewables. Free traders want barriers
to trade removed.
Consider a threshold question: Why are we competing with
China? European nations20 have had greentech policies for many
years, have seen strong growth in greentech, and have generated
much electricity from renewables.21 Some observers note that
the race is not with one nation but many,22 yet the prevailing
comparison is to China. There is something more to the “race”
metaphor, then, than growth in greentech. As in the space race,
there is the pervasive sense that if China has more extensive
greentech investments and deployment than we do, there will be
drastic consequences for national power and wealth. Denmark
and Germany attract less attention than China because they pose
less of a threat to the United States’ superpower status.23
Evaluating the “race” claims on their merits, it is hardly
clear that the United States is “losing” to China. The differences
between the two nations are much more subtle than they appear
in the prevailing narrative.24

Growth of China’s Greentech Industry
One fear is that multinational companies will find it difficult to sell their greentech in China, and Chinese companies
will flood the United States with their products. This fear reflects
broader American unease about China’s potential for global economic dominance. In 1979, China began to experiment with the
free market, and since then, has experienced robust growth.25 In
2010, China’s economy had become the world’s second largest,
surpassing Japan’s.26 China’s “pace of industrialization is significantly faster than that experienced by other countries throughout
history.”27 So much of China’s manufacturing output is already
sold in the United States that observers believe we are “joined at
the hip economically.”28 Many believe domestic products cannot compete against those manufactured in China due to China’s
advantages in less expensive labor, more lax protections of intellectual property, fixed currency rates (until very recently), and
weaker environmental protections.29 In the depths of a recession
in the United States, descriptions of growing Chinese greentech
firms invoke images of a rising Asian industrial juggernaut.
Is greentech destined to be another area in which the Chinese overpower American firms? China’s 2007 “Medium and
Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China”
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contained an explicit goal to develop a domestic renewables sector.30 China’s wind turbine industry rose from virtual nonexistence to become a major player in the global market in less than
five years. In 2009, three of the largest wind turbine manufacturers in the world were Chinese.31 China leads the world market for solar photovoltaics (“PV”) cells and modules, producing
more than forty percent.32 Chinese firms’ share of the domestic
market has increased rapidly,33 and Chinese companies have
become major players around the globe.34
The USTR petition details a growing imbalance in “environmental goods” between the United States and China,35 but
in some categories, Chinese firms have been less successful in
the United States. Chinese firms sold only 28 megawatt (“MW”)
worth of wind turbines outside of China in 2009.36 Some predict
an upswing in Chinese greentech exports to the United States,37
and at least one high-profile proposed project involving Chinese
technology has attracted negative attention.38
Another factor cited in the USTR investigation is that the
Chinese government appears to be shutting foreign manufacturers out of its domestic market.39 Official Chinese government
policy promotes “indigenous innovation,” calling for reliance
on foreign technology to decrease to thirty percent or less.40
Foreign observers report that it has become more difficult for
foreign companies to get their technology accepted in domestic projects.41 A recent report states that thirty-six government
regulations promote domestic greentech and hamper foreign
firms’ ability to compete in China.42 The USTR investigation
petition claims, for example, that the indigenous innovation policy gives Chinese firms a five to ten percent advantage in wind
turbine procurement processes.43 Encouraging announcements
of joint ventures and other developments seem to contradict
this protectionist trend.44 China has dropped a requirement that
seventy percent of the components in wind turbines come from
domestic sources.45 Agreements between American companies
such as First Solar46 and Chinese local governments to develop
renewable energy projects point to a potentially large market for
American greentech in China.47 Perhaps ironically, however,
the USTR investigation complaint cites the First Solar memorandum of understanding to develop a 2 gigawatt (“GW”) solar
project as impermissible under the WTO because First Solar
agreed to work to support China’s domestic industries.48
The concern seems to be that Chinese firms will dominate
the global greentech market if current growth rates continue.
However, some signs in the past year point to overbuilding and
overcapacity in the wind industry, and a possible retrenchment
and consolidation. In mid-2010, concern about the failure to
agree on a climate change agreement and projections of slowing
demand in China for wind energy made for an uncertain business climate for wind energy companies.49 The top three IPOs
in 2010 in global greentech were by Chinese companies.50 Other
firms moved forward with their offerings,51 but a planned initial
public offering for one firm had to be scrapped in mid-2010 due
to unfavorable market conditions.52
There is also evidence that Chinese firms are not yet competitive in certain market segments. Some provincial utilities
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have chosen Western wind turbines due to superior control systems and longer experience with manufacturing larger turbine
sizes.53 As recently as 2009, Chinese wind turbines were less
capable than their foreign counterparts,54 as measured by lower
capacity factors (the percentage of time that turbines operate to
generate electricity).55
Chinese firms often do not hold key technology patents that
would enable them to develop more sophisticated equipment.56
Firms have grown rapidly through acquiring manufacturing
equipment and capitalizing on advantages such as their lower
cost of labor.57 As a result, they have a leadership position in
“downstream” areas of the PV production chain, but lag behind
in “upstream” areas requiring more technological skill, such as
silicon purification, ingot, and wafer manufacturing.58 In 2009,
American companies held the top ten cited patents worldwide in
solar technology.59
Many familiar with China believe that it is only a matter
of time before Chinese greentech improves through importing
foreign technology and assimilating it. Even if Chinese solar
and wind technology improves, however, the greentech industry
in the United States is growing.60 The cost advantages of Chinese firms may eventually fade,61 or the gap may close. Chinese
workers increasingly are demanding higher wages and better
working conditions.62 Some greentech, like larger components
of wind turbines, is heavy and expensive to transport.63 In the
American market, the costs of shipping large turbines from
China might outweigh higher domestic labor costs. And American greentech firms enjoy other cost advantages, such as preferential tax policies.64
On the whole, then, Chinese firms are not yet invincible juggernauts displacing their foreign counterparts. There is obvious
concern, as the USTR investigation and high-level discussions
and trade missions suggest.65 Some retort that fear of Chinese
firms is as overblown as rhetoric in the 1980s claiming that mighty
Japan was about to dominate the world economic scene.66 Setting
up China as an economic bogeyman has a potential drawback: it
could imperil the bumpy economic relationship between the two
nations. Some have argued that for this reason alone, it would be
best to drop the rhetoric about a green energy race.67

Central Government Support
Observers believe China’s national government offers consistent and committed support to the greentech sector. In this
view, a Communist nation with a central government planning
process can develop renewables far more quickly.68 However,
the reality is that China occasionally struggles to find consistency in its greentech policies. Some have led to considerable
progress,69 such as the Renewable Energy Law and the 2009
stimulus package,70 but others, including reorganizations of the
governmental energy bureaucracy, have been less successful.71
The most frequently cited instance of government support
is direct financial aid, in the form of low-interest loans, export
promotion, and other aid such as subsidized land made available to developers.72 The USTR complaint cites “prohibited
subsidies to green technology”73 that include the Ministry of
5

Finance’s “Special Fund for Wind Manufacturing,” the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Commerce’s “Export Product
Research and Development Fund,” and the provision of financing through export credits by China’s Export-Import Bank. 74
The state-owned China Development Bank made $42 billion in
loans in 2010 to solar and wind energy companies,75 a sum that
exceeds comparable financing levels in the United States.76
Yet some other policies, such as pricing for electricity generated from renewables added to the national electricity grid, have
been anything but consistently encouraging. Over the past two
years, prices in China’s feed-in tariff for solar have been inconsistent.77 A project priced in late summer 2010 involved a feed-in
tariff of 0.73 renminbi (RMB, $0.108 at 6.8 RMB to the dollar)
per kilowatt-hour.78 This was more than one-third less than a
previous project’s winning bid, which suggests the winning bidder may have been a state-owned enterprise (“SOE”) that could
undercut a private company’s bid. This hybrid system of stateowned and private companies competing for the same projects is
cited in the USTR complaint as disfavoring competition.79 It is an
ongoing challenge to China’s energy system,80 and as one report
observes, “lack of competition reduces efficiencies and innovation that come from open and competitive markets.”81
Until 2009, a bidding tender system was also in place for
electricity generated from wind turbines above 50 MW. That
system was criticized for failing to promote wind power development.82 For smaller wind installations, provincial governments set pricing policies on a project specific basis, which
provided little long-run guidance on pricing. A new system of
“zonal tariffs” largely replaced the previous pricing scheme, but
it is too early to tell whether it will encourage more wind power
development.
No fewer than nineteen governmental bodies have responsibility for some aspect of greentech policy.83 There are inevitable delays in coordination. Ambitious announcements are
not always translated quickly into concrete policies.84 National
proclamations tend to be broad frameworks requiring implementation by administrative organs of the national government.
Unlike the American system, where public involvement can help
steer actions of administrative agencies, the Chinese government has little accountability to accomplish its advertised objectives.85 Key personnel changes in the inner circle of the Chinese
Communist Party can make for policy reversals or alterations.
The Chinese government’s top-down nature creates enormous reliance on provincial and local governments to implement national policies. Robust policy announcements by Beijing
do not easily translate to the provinces,86 and coordination
between national and local officials is difficult.87 Local officials
often have incentives to prefer projects that can deliver shortterm profits,88 not renewable energy projects that might not pan
out for years.89 Some local governments have direct conflicts of
interest between responsibilities to promote SOEs and mandates
to implement national policies.90
The perception that China’s government is unwaveringly
committed to supporting greentech is often accepted uncritically, without these or any other caveats. Observers often jump
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

to conclusions that might be erroneous or oversimplified. It is
difficult to obtain accurate information from China’s national
government, which is secretive and prone to releases of propaganda (as any reader of Xinhua knows).91 Information routinely
available in the West is often protected in China as state secrets,
and recent efforts to promote a freedom of information regime92
show how difficult it is to understand governmental actions.93
According to the USTR petition, “there is a lack of official,
detailed information regarding the terms upon which financing
is provided by China ExIm Bank.”94 Thus, sweeping pronouncements about the Chinese government’s intentions and policies
should be avoided when possible.

The Results Speak for Themselves . . . Or Do They?
By some metrics, Chinese greentech progress is impressive.
In 2009, China obtained a larger share of electricity from renewable sources than the United States (17% versus 8.8%),95 but
this figure is skewed by the predominance of hydroelectric generation in China,96 especially the mammoth Three Gorges Dam
project.97 China added 13.8 GW of new wind power capacity to
10.0 GW for the United States in 2009,98 but its installed total
capacity still trailed that of the United States (35.1 GW versus
25.8 GW). Those numbers cannot be compared directly, as China’s wind projects have been less efficient.99 In 2009, China had
a mere 0.4 GW of grid-connected solar PV capacity,100 though
it pledged to meet a much higher target by 2020.101 The United
States had a larger 1.2 GW of installed PV capacity, still far less
than world leader Germany’s 9.8 GW.102
At present, then, China is not outstripping the United States
in total installed capacity, but it might if it achieves its ambitious targets for 2020—30 GW for wind (or possibly 100 GW,
according to recent reports) and 1.8 GW for solar PV (or possibly as much as an astounding 20 GW).103 However, much of
the increase will be in hydropower.104 And apples should be
compared to apples: Europe and the United States also plan to
increase installed capacity substantially above current levels by
2020.105
Some point to a different metric. Asset financing levels
in China have recently outpaced those of American firms.106
According to a recent report,107 in 2009, Chinese spending
(excluding R&D) totaled $34.6 billion to $18.6 billion for the
United States.108 As the spending levels are within the same
order of magnitude, it does not seem that this is reason for panic.
The real fear seems to be that if the United States does not adopt
progressive climate measures (including a cap-and-trade law),
it will fall further behind China.109 The market data seems to
capture the spirit of American inaction on renewables, but does
it matter, except for international bragging rights, whether the
United States or China occupies the top spot in solar and wind
investment or installed capacity?
Total investment figures or gigawatts of renewable energy
capacity installed do not tell us how China is moving toward
reducing its usage of fossil fuels and achieving climate goals.
China is adding renewable energy capacity rapidly, but is much
more dependent on conventional fossil fuel generation than the
Winter 2011

United States. Coal accounts for a staggering seventy percent
of the nation’s electricity generation capacity.110 Even large
deployment of renewables will not enable China to reduce that
number substantially over the next decade.111 And that only tells
part of the story. China’s growth and increasing appetite of its
citizens for modern conveniences has resulted in rapid increases
in energy demand.112 In 2010, China achieved the dubious milestone of surpassing the United States as the world’s largest primary energy user.113 Its industries are far less energy-efficient
than those in the United States and Japan.114 The government’s
initiatives have helped,115 but China still has a long way to go.
To satisfy its increasing energy demand, China has added
more conventional generation capacity than greentech.116 An
article on China and greentech stated that, “China’s investment
in renewable energy and other green technologies is miniscule
compared to the resources devoted to its continued building of
coal-fired power plants and efforts to secure dirty oil shale supplies in Canada and elsewhere.”117 In 2009, China began construction of a mammoth 13.6 GW power base fueled by coal in
Gansu province, the same location planned for a much-praised
10 GW wind farm.118 New investments in conventional technology made up over one-third of the 134.4 billion RMB (just
under twenty billion dollars) in the first half of 2010.119 As of
2010, China “uses more coal than the United States, Europe, and
Japan combined.”120 That context should be a central part of any
discussion that touts China’s achievements in deploying solar
panels and wind turbines or in greentech financing levels.

Invoking the Space Race Metaphor is CounterProductive for Addressing Climate Change
While many believe the United States is losing the green
energy race, the reality does not yet match the rhetoric. 121
However, there is more at stake. We need to confront a powerful reality: the United States and China are interdependent, not
independent competitors.122 We need China to take the very
actions some posit as competition. This makes the USTR investigation especially unwelcome.123 Without its greentech efforts
and other measures124 such as its announced goal to reduce the
“carbon intensity” of its economy (CO2 emissions per unit of
GDP),125 China’s increasing energy demand and spending on
conventional technology would add considerably to greenhouse
gas emissions.126
There will be no effective global reduction of emissions
that does not include the United States and China,127 because
they are by far the world’s two largest emitters of greenhouse gases.128 Failure by either nation to reduce its emissions
would imperil the entire global effort.129 We should encourage
and support China’s efforts, not consider them a threat to our
national wellbeing.130 Rather than creating the scorched earth
of a “greentech war,”131 both nations can benefit from collaboration.132 The urgency to do this is compelling. No nation has
ever had to address such daunting environmental challenges
at the same time as it has pursued such rapid growth. 133 This
poses major hurdles to tackling climate change that must be surmounted by nations working together. And there are not just two
6

nations involved, but the whole world.134 Rather than creating a
two-nation race, we should encourage China’s domestic policies
and the climate change collaborations of the “BRIC” developing
economies (Brazil, Russia, and India, in addition to China).135
Nationalistic rhetoric on climate change would be especially unfortunate for the U.S.-China relationship on climate
matters. The two nations have ongoing tensions on a whole
host of sensitive topics,136 but have worked productively with
each other to address climate change.137 In the two-year period
of international negotiations between the promulgation of the
Bali Action Plan and the December 2009 Copenhagen summit,
talks took place under the auspices of the U.S.-China Strategic
and Economic Dialogue.138 Discussions also took place during
2009 with world leaders at the Pittsburgh G-20 summit139 and
at the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate.140 The
two nations have pledged several times to take mutual action
to address climate change,141 and while the promises are often
hortatory, the ongoing discussion does have important value
in strengthening the bilateral relationship.142 Advocating competition with the Chinese undercuts these activities. Continued
antagonistic rhetoric about a clean energy race will also make
it difficult to conduct cooperative efforts in energy and environmental matters. Unlike the near-complete scientific secrecy that
marked the Cold War era,143 China and the United States are
working to develop technology together.
Some even argue that China’s programs to promote renewables can be good for the United States’ economy.144 The Council on Foreign Relations’ Michael Levi, argues that “it’s quite
possible for the United States and China both to win, with China
lowering the cost of relatively low-tech parts of the value chain,
in turn growing the market for the higher-tech parts that are still
handled by the United States.”145 Levi compares this to other
situations in which China manufactures products developed in
the United States.
Finally, greentech warring makes it more difficult to reach a
global climate agreement. According to some accounts, China’s
foot-dragging146 and refusal to adopt binding reduction targets
was in part responsible for the failure of the Copenhagen Accord
to incorporate global binding limits.147 As China’s economy
continues its rapid growth, there will be even greater demand for
it to agree to limit emissions.148 Castigating it for its greentech
policies could foster a climate of distrust and delay further progress on a post-Kyoto agreement.
For all of these reasons, the symbolism of the space race is
simply not helpful in a discussion of global climate change.

Lessons for Energy Policy From the “Space Race”
Blaming China deflects attention from our own inabilities to develop progressive policies on renewables and climate
change. Numerous observers have noted that we lack a stable set
of policies to encourage greentech research, development, and
deployment.149 While we have done well to invent new technologies,150 our efforts to advance them to the commercial stage
and promote their deployment are “fragmented,” spread among
numerous agencies, and lacking coordination.151 As many have
7

noted, “[g]overnment policies can provide a strong impetus for
constructing renewable generation facilities,” and there is a wide
variety of potential incentives, including support for research and
development, tax incentives, government procurement policies,
renewable portfolio standards (“RPSs”), carbon cap-and-trade
programs, and feed-in tariffs.152 Federal spending on renewable energy is both anemic in its overall levels153 and, even after
the added billions of dollars in the 2009 stimulus package,154
well behind that devoted to fossil fuels.155 Federal tax policy for
renewables is inconsistently supportive,156 and in some years,
many new projects come to fruition, but the pipeline often dries
up.157 The cyclical pace of support “clearly illustrates the consequences of on-again, off-again short-term federal incentives for
wind as a market signal.”158
Some Obama administration actions are similar to actions
taken in response to Sputnik, such as the creation of a Cabinetlevel position to address climate change, which echoes governmental reorganizations taken in the late 1950s. One action
that is especially comparable and noteworthy is the funding of
the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (“ARPA-E”)
with four hundred million dollars from the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act (“ARRA”) stimulus package. ARPAE’s name and mission deliberately echo that of the Advanced
Research Projects Agency (“ARPA”)159 created after Sputnik in
the Department of Defense.
The moon landing was the product of an amalgamation of
many disparate efforts to develop different types of technologies.
So too is energy research and development. Like the Apollo program, it is not clear at the outset which technology will prevail,
so we need to work on a variety of fronts over a long period of
time. Programs established in the stimulus package are temporary, not the comprehensive approach we need.160
Much of our effort to develop greentech is mired in a rut. No
climate bill, renewable electricity standard, or national feed-in
tariff is forthcoming.161 Progress toward a stand-alone national
renewable electricity standard is doubtful.162 Many have noted
the failure of federal leadership163 and the actions of progressive states that have stepped into the void with their own programs.164 These policies are not uniform throughout the country.
A national program may achieve results that piecemeal state and
regional efforts underway cannot.165
How can we make more progress? Addressing climate
change requires the kind of committed and strong support from
the federal government that the space program received throughout the 1960s.166 The race is really to meet a national goal that
we have articulated and that is in our national self-interest,
whether or not it has geopolitical significance. We put a man
on the moon in part because we were captivated by the idea of a
simple, clear goal. I have focused on one idea that could catalyze
a push toward rapidly increasing development of renewables: a
“solar utility” that would reduce the upfront cost of panels to
nearly zero by subsidizing and installing them at houses.167
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Conclusion
China has become a major player in greentech in a short
amount of time. If it could keep up its breakneck pace of
growth it might look like it has pulled far ahead of us in the new
“green energy race,” but at present the picture is more muddled.
The “space race” metaphor and the USTR investigation are

counterproductive in that they pit the two nations against each
other, when they should emphasize interdependence and cooperation. In the end, competing with China in greentech is about as
useful as “energy independence.” It may be much more productive to convince Americans that their nation’s future depends on
investment in renewables through a specific national goal.
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Due Process Rights in the Carbon Markets
by Lisa Hodes Rosen, Esq. & Adrienne Bossi, Esq.*
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Introduction

he compliance and voluntary carbon markets are facing an identity crisis. Despite minor victories following
the 16th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change in Cancun, Mexico,
the voluntary carbon markets are attempting to grow in an uncertain regulatory world where the fate of the Kyoto Protocol and
its market mechanisms hang in the balance. At the same time,
the voluntary carbon markets have been able to survive through
flexibility and strong self-governance.
Critics initially attacked the fledgling voluntary market for
its lack of conformity to rules and attentiveness to real environmental action. Now, as the voluntary markets mature, stricter
codes of conduct are emerging. Many of the almost two-dozen
carbon offset certification standards that exist in the voluntary
carbon markets today seek to establish credibility and accountability for voluntary environmental commitments. They seek to
enforce their rules through transparency and reputation to ensure
that these commitments are fulfilled in a real and verifiable way.
Indeed, social and environmental product certification systems
that include third-party auditing “are remarkable for their similarity to state-based regulatory and legal systems.”1 But are the
legal systems similar? Certainly, the successful certification
standards have “establish[ed] their own governing systems,
largely independent of state governments, with the regulatory
capacity to back up those obligations with enforceable rules.”2
But what happens when the certification standard makes a mistake in enforcement?
Several voluntary certification standards include dispute
resolution mechanisms for private parties harmed by an adverse
decision from an auditor or the standard itself during the certification process. However, these dispute resolution mechanisms
vary widely and encompass diverse degrees and notions of due
process rights. The available dispute resolution mechanisms in
the voluntary carbon markets are important because they can
serve as models for how dispute resolution will be addressed by
the compliance markets, and, in particular, the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) under the Kyoto Protocol,3 which is
currently framing its own appeals procedure for private parties.4
This article explores due process rights in the carbon markets and discusses how innovation in the voluntary markets can
set an important example for the compliance markets. This article provides an overview of the carbon markets and then examines whether the four leading offset certification standards in
the voluntary carbon markets have achieved enough credibility
and status to influence the CDM’s governance structure for the
resolution of conflicts. Finally, it outlines the appeals procedures
currently available in the voluntary market and advocates for
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their continued development in both the voluntary market and
the CDM.

An Overview of the Carbon Markets
The Compliance Carbon Markets
There are two types of carbon markets: compliance and
voluntary. Compliance markets are government-mandated capand-trade programs. The cap-and-trade programs established by
the Kyoto Protocol,5 the European Union Emissions Trading
System (“EU ETS”),6 and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) in the northeastern United States7 are examples of
compliance carbon markets. To date, the success of these markets has been mixed. Although these programs have proven that
carbon is a viable commodity that can attract significant capital,
several problems have repeatedly plagued these markets, including the ability to set appropriate caps to enable real emissions
reductions over time.8
Carbon offsets, which must be certified by a third-party certification standard, are integral to any cap-and-trade program.
“Certification standards” are independent organizations that
provide the guarantee that a carbon offset project has achieved
the promised emissions reductions.9 When a project’s emissions
reductions have been verified against a standard’s rules and
requirements, the standard will issue the project carbon credits
equivalent to the emission reductions achieved.10 The credits are
then considered “certified” and the credits can either be sold or
“retired.”11

CDM Process of Certification
The most prominent carbon offset certification standard in
the compliance markets is the CDM. The Kyoto Protocol permits Annex I Parties (developed countries) to satisfy part of their
emissions reduction targets by using Certified Emissions Reductions (“CERs”) created by registered CDM project activities. 12
The CDM is a global market-based mechanism overseen by the
CDM Executive Board (“EB”), which facilitates the creation and
issuance of CERs from eligible CDM project activities.13 Before
a CDM project can begin to generate CERs, it must proceed
through the CDM project cycle. As a preliminary matter, the
nation hosting the CDM project must belong to the Kyoto Protocol as a non-Annex I (developing) country.14 After the project
is designed using an approved methodology that quantifies the
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American University Washington College of Law, J.D. 2004; Tufts University,
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emissions reductions, a designated operational entity (“DOE”)
is appointed to act as an independent auditor to validate and
subsequently request registration of the proposed CDM project
activity.15 The DOE then submits a validation report to the EB,
thereby confirming that certain preset requirements are met.16
The EB then decides whether to formally accept the DOE’s recommendation and if so, it “must register CDM projects within
eight weeks of the [DOE’s] request unless three members of the
CDM Executive Board, or a CDM participant, require a review
of the proposed activity.”17
Once registered, the project participants implement the
CDM project. A second and different DOE is appointed to monitor the project during implementation and to ultimately confirm
that the project’s resulting greenhouse gas (“GHG”) reductions
are real, measurable, and verifiable below an approved baseline.18 This second DOE requests the EB to issue CERs after it
is satisfied that the GHG reductions are “appropriate”.19 There
is then a fifteen-day window during which time a three-member
panel of the EB or a CDM participant can request a review of the
DOE’s findings.20 However, “[b]ecause the scope of the review
is limited to issues of fraud, malfeasance, or incompetence of the
[second DOE], issuance of CER[s] by the Executive Board . . .
is almost . . . automatic.”21 If no review is requested, the CER
“issuance is considered final.”22

The Voluntary Carbon Markets
In contrast to the compliance markets, voluntary carbon
markets do not impose a mandatory cap on greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, they rely on participants’ voluntary commitments
to reduce emissions. A unique dynamic has developed between
these two types of markets in which the voluntary markets often
appear to act as a test-drive for companies facing the prospect
of the enactment of complex, and sometimes confusing, compliance markets.23 Indeed, the voluntary markets buoyed the
credibility of the overall carbon markets when the compliance
markets were most vulnerable. This was particularly evident
following the failures at the 15th Conference of the Parties
(“COP15”) where regulators hesitantly noted the Copenhagen
Accord.24 The robust growth of the voluntary markets is thus a
logical response to the Kyoto Protocol’s complex rules, disparate enforcement and inefficiencies that have resulted in CDM
capacity bottlenecks and slowed credit issuances.25
In the past, the voluntary markets were accessed through
the Chicago Climate Exchange (“CCX”), a voluntary but legally
binding cap-and-trade program, or through an over-the-counter
(“OTC”) purchase or sale. However, CCX’s emissions trading
program shut its doors at the end of 2010.26 Consequently, OTC
transactions will now dominate the market.
Most of the transactions in the OTC market involve offset
credits from third-party certification standards.27 In 2008 and
2009, more than ninety percent of the credits transacted in the
voluntary markets were certified by a third-party standard.28
Over the last few years, the following certification standards
have emerged as leaders in the voluntary market: the Verified Carbon Standard (“VCS”), the Climate Action Reserve
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(“CAR”), the American Carbon Registry (“ACR”), and the Gold
Standard (“GS”).29
The VCS was launched in 2007.30 It was founded by The
Climate Group, the International Emissions Trading Association, and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development.31 The World Economic Forum and approximately one
thousand carbon market stakeholders also assisted in developing
the standard.32 VCS issues credits called Verified Carbon Units
(“VCUs”) for carbon offset projects throughout the world that
can demonstrate emissions reductions that are real, measurable,
permanent, additional, independently verified, unique, transparent, and conservative.33
CAR, formerly the California Climate Action Registry
(“CCAR”), was established in 2001 after a group of CEOs lobbied the state of California to create a mechanism by which they
could track their firms’ early emissions reductions in anticipation of the future state and potential federal regulation.34 CCAR
was thus born from a state mandate.35 The program eventually
separated from the state to be incorporated as a nonprofit organization and, in 2009, the organization began transitioning its
tracking and inventory operations to The Climate Registry, a
national nonprofit body established in 2007 that was actually
modeled after CCAR.36 In turn, CAR flip-flopped its role as part
of CCAR to become the new parent organization focusing on
developing an offset credit, Climate Reserve Tonnes (“CRT”)
that apply to GHG reduction projects within North America.37
ACR was established in 1996 by the Environmental Defense
Fund and Environmental Resources Trust.38 It was the first of its
kind in the United States and over the last fifteen years, it has
issued over thirty million offset credits.39 These credits, called
Emission Reduction Tons (“ERTs”), are issued in accordance
with ACR’s requirement that reductions are “real, measurable,
permanent, in excess of regulatory requirements and common
practice, additional to business-as-usual, net of leakage, verified
by a competent independent third party, and used only once.”40
ACR’s reach is not limited to the United States and accepts
international projects.41 In 2007, ACR became an “enterprise”
of Winrock International, an American nonprofit organization
working globally to “empower the disadvantaged, increase economic opportunity, and sustain natural resources.”42
The GS Foundation, which manages the GS carbon certification scheme, was founded in 2003 by a network of large nongovernmental organizations (“NGO”), including the Worldwide
Fund for Nature, Helio International, and SouthSouthNorth, in
response to criticism that the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM did not adequately address sustainable development.43 These NGOs developed the GS as a complement to renewable energy or energy
efficiency CDM projects through the addition of a sustainability assessment.44 If a project proponent successfully applied the
GS’s sustainability assessment to its CDM project, then the GS
would provide the CDM project with an additional GS label.45
The project could then sell the GS-labeled CERs for an additional premium in the marketplace.46 Subsequently, in 2006, the
GS launched its voluntary standard whereby it issues GS Voluntary Emission Reductions (“VERs”) to renewable energy or
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energy efficiency projects that successfully meet the Standard’s
rigorous technical and sustainable development criteria.47
Unlike the CDM, which was born out of climate diplomacy and is therefore vulnerable to global politicking, VCS,
CAR, ACR, and GS operate in an unregulated market, free
from bureaucracy, political hostage-taking, and other possible
effects of governmental intervention. This gives VCS, CAR,
ACR, and GS freedom to respond to market demands through
innovation, limited only by their own creativity and available
resources. As such, these standards can experiment with a variety of governance, financial, and technical mechanisms. Indeed,
experiments in the voluntary carbon markets—the successes and
failures alike—can set examples for the compliance markets as
they develop over time.
These third party standards play another critical role in the
voluntary markets, acting as civil regulatory bodies to build consumer trust by ensuring a consistent level of quality. Thus, voluntary certification standards become “distinctive . . . because
they transform the global marketplace by developing ‘deliberative and adaptive governance institutions designed to embed
social and environmental norms in the global marketplace that
derive authority directly from interested audiences, includ[ing]
those they seek to regulate, [but do not derive their authority]
from sovereign states.’”48 Such non-state global governance
institutions are known as non-state market driven (“NSMD”)
governance systems.49 The application of the NSMD analysis to
voluntary carbon certification standards is appropriate because
the framework was originally developed to explain forest certification, which is similar to carbon certification.50
VCS, CAR, ACR, and GS must establish credibility, build
consumer trust, develop a strong reputation in the marketplace,
and operate with a certain degree of political integrity to be
considered as relevant and appropriate examples for the CDM.
The NSMD governance system, an academic analytical framework, provides a framework from within which to measure these
characteristics.

The NSMD Framework–
A Measure of Market Credibility
It is generally accepted that a NSMD system displays five
features.51 First, a NSMD system’s authority is not derived
from the state.52 That is, “there is no use of state sovereignty to
enforce compliance.”53 This element is arguably the most important because of the lack of a connection with the state, which distinguishes NSMD systems from public-private partnerships or,
in the case of carbon markets, the standard-setting CDM, which
derives its authority from an international agreement between
nations.54 Second, NSMD systems must have established governance mechanisms,55 whereby “NSMD institutions constitute
governing arenas in which . . . adaptation, inclusion, and learning over time occur . . . across a wide range of stakeholders.”56
At its core, this element rests on democratic ideals of fairness,
accountability and transparency, and its intent is to promote
“good practice” and “practical reason.”57 Third, the NSMD’s
authority is market-based,58 deriving its power from the market
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and civil society.59 Fourth, the NSMD is concerned with social
impacts.60 A NSMD governance system seeks to address global
issues that private firms are not incentivized to address, and
which governments may not have the capacity or, in the case
of climate change mitigation in the United States, the political
will to remedy.61 Finally, the NSMD system has enforcement
mechanisms and mandatory requirements.62 These are rules and
regulations where compliance can be verified and non-compliance can be punished.63 “Once firms sign on, they are subject to
governance, rules and enforcement that have more in common
with state regulation than standards of voluntary bodies that can
be abandoned with little consequence.”64
While the NSMD framework omits any express reference
to due process rights for the NSMD system’s constituents, it is
recognized that “entities that are affected by the decisions of a
regulatory body [should] have access to a full and fair review of
the decision in question.”65 If NSMD systems are akin to democratic regulatory bodies, then it would seem logical to expressly
incorporate the protection of individual rights into the NSMD
theoretical analysis. The exclusion of due process principles
would appear to contravene the democratic ideals upon which
the NSMD systems are founded and rely.
It is possible that the second element of a NSMD system,
related to governance mechanisms, could be interpreted to
include due process rights. Within the governance aspect, “good
practice” is defined in terms of “fairness and procedural legitimacy,” but there is no consensus as to how to achieve it.66 Likewise, “practical reason” relates to ideas of procedural fairness.
Practical reason builds on the notion that reasons derive
from interpretative and dialogical processes (e.g.,
legal processes) in which intersubjectively validated
knowledge and normative understandings of fairness
play a role. [Practical reason] . . . concerns the epistemic requirements for democratic practice, which . .
. requires “discursive validation” [and] “ideal speech”
conditions where validity claims can be assessed.67
In other words, constituents should be afforded the opportunity
to challenge validity claims and be heard.68 “Practical reason,”
however, is interpreted on a case-by-case basis in accordance
with specific historical context and cultural values.69
Status as a NSMD system is important as these certification systems pursue legitimacy as civil regulatory bodies.70
Otherwise, standards that cannot meet the NSMD test risk categorization as merely a string of coordinated activities adopted
by self-serving stakeholders. Under the existing five-part test,
three out of the four voluntary certification standards have the
elements of a NSMD system and one standard, CAR, which
has gained credibility through its connections with the State
of California, may be more aptly described as a public-private
partnership.

VCS
Under the five-part NSMD test, VCS meets all of the
requirements. As an industry-created standard, its power is
not derived from the state. It is governed by the VCS Standard
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2007.1 and Program Guidelines 2007.1,71 which outline the
rules and methodologies required of project developers, verifiers, and validators.72 VCS meets the third element of the original NSMD analysis because its authority is derived from the
market. In 2009, VCS held thirty-five percent of the transaction
volume in the voluntary market.73 VCS also meets the fourth
and fifth NSMD elements because it is concerned with the social
domain (its mission is climate change mitigation) and its rules
are enforceable. The VCS Secretariat operates the Standard on a
day-to-day basis and is responsible for, inter alia, a mechanism
to license auditors as VCS validators and verifiers.74 In addition,
“[t]he VCS Board reserves the right to sanction validators and
verifiers, project proponents and registry operators based on evidence of an improper procedure.”75

CAR
The first NSMD prong, prohibiting the standard to have
derived any power from the state, is where CAR falls short
because it was created by the State of California. Despite its
subsequent separation from the state to become an independent
nonprofit organization, CAR is still recognized and rewarded for
its early connection, and may thus be more appropriately categorized as a public-private partnership.76 In arguendo, supposing CAR did comply with the first NSMD prong, the standard
would easily satisfy the remaining original requirements: CAR
has established its own governance mechanisms with the Verification Program Manual and Climate Action Reserve Program
Manual; its power is market-based (it had thirty-one percent
of the voluntary market share in 2009);77 it is concerned with
climate change, and it has instituted enforcement mechanisms
and mandatory requirements in the form of a detailed program
schedule and penalty structure.78

ACR
Like VCS, ACR also meets the five NSMD requirements.
First, as a standard founded and owned by NGOs, its power
is not state-based. Second, it also has strict rules. Generally,
ACR’s project cycle is similar to that used by VCS.79 ACR easily meets the third and fourth elements because its authority is
market-based, with four percent of the voluntary market share,
and its mission is also to mitigate climate change. 80 ACR’s
rules are enforceable, but it relies primarily on domestic courts.
The Guidelines specifically state that any legal responsibilities or rights of ACR or parties involved (verifiers, proponents,
members, etc.) are outlined in the contractual agreements they
sign with one another.81 For example, the attestation agreement
signed by parties seeking to become ACR-approved verifiers
requires the parties to obtain their own liability insurance, agree
to limit ACR’s liability, indemnify ACR, and submit any claims
that may not otherwise be provided for in the contractual language to the courts and laws of Arkansas.82

GS
The GS also meets the five-part NSMD test. First, like ACR,
GS was founded by NGOs. Second, it has strict governance
mechanisms. The Gold Standard Requirements (“GSR”) detail
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a multi-step project cycle for its voluntary standard in which the
project proponent must first assess the eligibility of the project
against the GS’s criteria, including strict rules regarding additionality and sustainable development.83 The third NSMD factor, requiring market-based authority, is also satisfied here. In
2009, GS accounted for seven percent of the transaction volume
in the voluntary market.84 Fourth, the GS mission’s concern for
social impacts is two-fold: it seeks to promote sustainable development and mitigate climate change through its offset projects.
Finally, the GS rules are enforceable. The GS Terms and Conditions (“GSTC”) provide that a breach of its rules may be “prosecuted as a violation of [GS’s] intellectual property rights.”85 In
addition, Section 10 of the GSTC addresses sanctions, including
fines and/or the freezing of a GS registry account, for a violation
of the GS’s rules.86

Private Party Dispute Resolution
Mechanisms in the Carbon Markets
There are several types of potential disputes that may arise
between a private party project proponent and a certification
standard.87 The first type involves the investment relationship.88
Project development requires large up-front capital expenditures
and, because certification is a time-consuming process, investors
may not see returns for a few years. Consequently, even a slight
delay may change the investment analysis. Second, disputes
can arise over registration, issuance, or revocation decisions.89
These disputes could involve a myriad of scenarios, such as
when a standard rejects a project, revokes credits based on
changes to the project, or where one project participant claims
that the certification standard issued credits to the wrong party.
Third, disagreements over bookkeeping could escalate into
a potential dispute over, for example, an allegedly erroneous
transfer.90 Fourth, a certification standard may invalidate credits
where it has reason to believe the project documentation was
fraudulent.91 Finally, disputes could arise in connection with the
validation or verification reports from the third-party auditor on
issues including, but not limited to, carbon quantification or the
correct application of a methodology. A dispute could also arise
when the certification standard accepts an allegedly defective
validation or verification report.
Litigation may be the obvious recourse in the event of a dispute between a private party project proponent and a certification standard. However, here, litigation may be an inadequate
mechanism for several reasons. A compliance market certification standard, such as the Clean Development Mechanism,
may be afforded sovereign immunity.92 In the case of a private
certification standard, domestic court systems may not have the
technical expertise to properly adjudicate registration, issuance,
revocation, or auditing decisions, and hiring the appropriate
expert witnesses can be expensive for both sides. Furthermore,
project proponents may not reside in the same country as the
private certification standard, and a foreign party may distrust
the ability of a foreign court to be impartial.93 Private arbitration may be a better forum for disputes with public or private
certification standards because it has the potential to be less time
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consuming and less expensive than litigation, parties can select
independent, technically qualified judges, and some arbitration
bodies provide standing to both public and private parties.94
More importantly, unlike potentially hostile foreign courts, a
project proponent will not question the allegiance of an arbitrator if it was involved in the selection process.95 On the other
hand, private arbitration may not be well suited to resolve disputes between project proponents and a certification standard
because of the lack of uniform decision-making and difficulty
for the prevailing party to enforce an award.96 Instead, an independent internal dispute mechanism, tailored to the standard’s
rules, could be the best forum for resolving such disputes.97

Dispute Resolution under the CDM
The significance of the CDM lies in the way it marries the
public and private sector. “The CDM is unique in regulating a
market dominated by private players that depend, in the creation
of the market’s underlying asset, on a United Nations committee, the CDM Executive Board that approves calculation methods and projects.”98 However, as the CDM grows—at the time
of this writing, over 2,000 projects have been registered and the
pipeline of undeveloped projects is equal or greater in size99—
questions about the CDM’s governance structure have arisen. In
particular, the EB functions as a regulatory agency issuing decisions and creating rules that have financial and legal implications for private parties.100 But, unlike many regulatory agencies
that operate in accordance with democratic notions of good governance, including “legality, certainty, formal equality, accountability, due process and access to justice,” the EB is not subject
to the same governance controls.101 Compounding the problem,
there is no independent tribunal for reviewing the EB’s decisions and, consequently, CDM project proponents have little, if
any, due process rights.102

Dispute Resolution in the Voluntary Carbon
Markets

The independent consultant will be selected by the VCS Secretariat and paid for by the project proponent demanding the
review.”107 Ultimately, though, the final decision rests with the
VCS Board.108

CAR
CAR offers a means of recourse for parties adversely
affected by its decisions that is tailored for the specifics of its
program.109 For example, CAR explains that disputes between
a verifier and project developer are to be handled by the verifier’s internal procedures, but nonetheless offers itself as an
informational resource to assist in the resolution process.110
However, if the parties cannot reach resolution through private
negotiation, then the parties can look to CAR to play the roles
of judge, jury, and prosecuting attorney.111 Once the verification
is complete, a committee of at least three CAR staff members
will review the submitted paperwork and interview the verifiers
and project developers involved before issuing a final, written
determination.112
Likewise, disagreements with regard to CAR’s decisions
affecting verifiers and project developers are also addressed
in CAR’s Verification Guidelines.113 Upon written request for
appeal, CAR will assemble a Dispute Resolution Committee
containing “an odd number of individuals, including at least
one Reserve staff member not directly involved in the case, one
Reserve Board member, [and] a representative from an appropriate oversight agency—potentially . . . [a] regulatory or government agency—that is knowledgeable of Reserve policies and
procedures.”114 The Dispute Resolution Committee will review
all relevant paperwork and is authorized to consult outside
experts.115 A decision is reached by majority vote and is considered final and not appealable.116

ACR

VCS, CAR, ACR, and GS have all developed their own
frameworks for appeals. Likewise, the CDM is following suit
in developing an appeals process and can look to the voluntary
market for guidance.103 Understanding how the different certification standards address due process rights may provide insight
into how the CDM should evolve.

ACR, unlike its aforementioned counterparts, does not
detail any appeal process in its Program Guidelines and although
the framework for the program provides project developers
opportunities to resolve issues discovered in the verification
process, there is no express recourse in the event of a material
disagreement or breakdown of communication.117 Instead, as
discussed above, ACR relies primarily on domestic courts for
dispute resolution.

VCS

GS

The VCS Program Guidelines acknowledge the possibility
of disagreements between project proponents and the validators and verifiers empowered to certify their project under the
VCS Standard.104 Contractual disputes under the VCS program
involving verifiers, validators, and project participants are generally governed by English law and will be heard exclusively in
English courts.105 The VCS Guidelines do provide “an appeal
process for cases where project proponents feel that the validator or verifier [has] misinterpreted the VCS Program and all
avenues of discussion with the validator or verifier have been
exhausted.”106 In those instances, “[t]he VCS Association will
commission an independent consultant to perform this review.

GS also provides an appeals process that protects constituents’ due process rights in a manner akin to traditional governmental regulatory bodies. In July 2010, GS released a proposal
for an appeals procedure to provide project developers with
recourse against adverse decisions by GS regarding registration,
issuance, or labeling.118 The purpose of the appeals procedure is
to “fill the gap in remedies between the decisions from the certification standard and the consequences for project developers.”119
It is the first of its kind in the voluntary carbon markets.120
Although the GS appeals process is in its pilot phase, it is
currently the most developed dispute resolution mechanism in
the voluntary carbon markets. If successful, it can serve as an
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example for other certification standards—both in the compliance and voluntary markets—that do not currently afford their
project proponents the same level of independent review.
The GS Rules for Appeals on Registration, Issuance and
Labeling (“Arbitration Rules”), which are based on the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s (“PCA”)
“Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to the Environment and/or Natural Resources,” (“Environmental Rules”),
will govern the arbitration procedure.121 Created in 2001, the
Environmental Rules fill a gap in international environmental
dispute resolution by providing a forum in which governments,
NGOs, private entities, and individuals can seek redress.122 Certain changes have been made to the Environmental Rules to
account for the particular characteristics of GS projects and the
GS project cycle.123
Initially, the scope of the proposed appellate procedure would
be limited to project proponents, project applicants, and project
owners.124 These parties would be required to submit their disagreement with a GS decision to mediation within six weeks.125
If the mediation proves unsuccessful, the parties would have the
option to appeal the dispute to the PCA at the Peace Palace in
The Hague, who will serve as the registrar of proceedings and will
channel communications between or among the parties.126
In accordance with the GS Arbitration Rules, the parties will
have the option to choose one arbitrator or a tribunal of three
arbitrators, with opportunities to challenge the appointment

of an arbitrator on various grounds.127 The arbitrators will be
appointed from a list of specialized arbitrators to be created and
maintained by a neutral appointing committee.128 Hearings may
be held in person, or via telecommunication and parties may call
experts to provide evidence during the hearings.129
With regard to the award, the purpose of the arbitration procedure is not to award damages or pecuniary compensation.130
Rather, the award will determine whether the adverse decision
was well-founded and in accordance with the relevant version
of the GSRs.131 If it is determined that the adverse decision was
not well-founded or it violated the relevant GSRs, the arbitration tribunal may issue an alternative decision or provide for an
alternative action.132

Conclusion
The right to due process is fundamental to democratic ideals and governance systems. As the compliance markets and, in
particular, the CDM, evolve, they will likely seek to incorporate mechanisms to protect individual procedural rights. Those
best positioned to play the part of role model are CAR, ACR,
VCS, and GS, having all achieved a level of market credibility
measured by the NSMD framework. However, the appeals procedures provided for by these four standards vary widely. The
voluntary carbon markets, and the offset certification standards
that operate within them, are gaining credibility and can set the
tone for the compliance markets.
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Carbon Reduction Projects and the Concept
of Additionality
by Brian Joseph McFarland*

C

Introduction

arbon reduction projects follow a cycle that includes
conceptualization, due diligence, implementation,
documentation, audit or validation, and finally certification, with the eventual issuance of verified, serialized carbon reduction credits, also known as carbon offsets. To fulfill
this process, there are several technical elements that must be
addressed: monitoring or measurement, reporting, and verification (“MRV”), permanence (i.e. ensuring the project’s duration),
leakage (i.e. addressing negative and identifying positive offsite
impacts), and additionality.
Additionality is a test that a carbon reduction project must
meet to ensure the project would not have been implemented
without the revenue of the carbon markets.1 This test of additionality must be satisfied if the project is being submitted to the
voluntary carbon markets—for which, voluntary buyers want to
be ensured their donations actually matter for a project—or to
the compliance markets since buyers need to be confident that
regulators will accept their carbon reduction purchase.
It is important to further note that all of the most prominent
carbon reduction certification standards—again, whether a compliance market under the Kyoto Protocol or an internationally
recognized voluntary standard—require some type of additionality test. This includes, but is not limited to, the following certification standards: the American Carbon Registry (“ACR”),2
Center for Resource Solutions (“CRS”),3 Green-e Climate
Protocol for Renewable Energy,4 Chicago Climate Exchange
(“CCX”),5 Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”),6 Climate
Action Reserve (“CAR”),7 Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standard (“CCBS”),8 Gold Standard,9 Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative (“RGGI”),10 and the Verified Carbon Standard
(“VCS”).11
Additionality is an important requirement because if nonadditional (i.e. “business-as-usual”) projects are eligible for carbon finance, then the net amount of greenhouse gas emissions
will continue to increase and the environmental integrity of carbon reduction projects will be called into question. For example,
if a project was already far exceeding its industry average return
on investment and was implemented over fifty years ago when
no carbon markets existed, why should this particular project
also be eligible for additional revenue from the carbon markets?
Similarly, if an activity was legally required, then why should
this activity of a regulated entity also be eligible for additional
revenue from the carbon markets? The challenge with additionality, however, is that one must prove a counterfactual argument
(i.e. what would have otherwise happened in the absence of a
15

project) to ensure the project provides carbon reductions that
would not have otherwise occurred. This article explores the different concepts of additionality, while acknowledging its controversial elements and proposing inclusion of some important
considerations to ensure net emissions reductions.

Legal or Regulatory Additionality
Legal additionality, or what is sometimes referred to as
regulatory additionality or surplus, is perhaps the most objective type of additionality. If a law exists and a given activity
is regulated, then the project is most likely not eligible for carbon finance. Therefore, for a project to meet the legal additionality standard, it must provide carbon reductions beyond those
required by law.12
To put this in context, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) regulates large municipal solid waste (“MSW”)
landfills, and according to the Climate Action Reserve’s Landfill
Project Protocol Version 3.0, “[t]here are several EPA regulations for MSW landfills that have a bearing on the eligibility of
methane collection and destruction projects as voluntary GHG
reduction projects.”13
Two challenges with legal additionality are that on one
hand, the concept might create perverse incentives, and on
the other hand, sometimes following the law is not common
practice. With the first idea in mind, the Montreal Protocol is
an international treaty designed to phase out the production of
ozone depleting substances (“ODS”).14 While the United States,
Canada, and European nations have phased out the production
of hydrofluorocarbons (“HFC”), which are ODSs and greenhouse gases, the largest contributor of certified emission reductions (“CER”) under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development
Mechanism are from HFC projects in China and India.15 Since
legal additionality would rule out the eligibility of HFC projects hosted in China and India if these countries were to pass
* Brian McFarland, who recently finished a dual graduate degree in Business
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domestic laws eliminating the production of HFCs, they have
little incentive to begin regulating HFCs. If they did pass regulations, China and India would experience a reduction of foreign investment towards the purchase of these carbon reduction
credits and would need to use their own public funds to phase
out HFCs. Due to the perception that manufacturers are actually
producing excess HFCs, the European Union Emission Trading Scheme will no longer accept these HFC reduction credits
beginning in 2013.16 Another example of this legal additionality challenge is the tough predicament a government might face
when contemplating the passage of a strict feed-in tariff or an
aggressive renewable portfolio standard. Such a passage would
effectively legally require an increase in renewable energy production, however, there would be fewer carbon reduction credits
from these renewable energy sources eligible for purchase from
international buyers.
On the second challenge of additionality, there are legal
reserve requirements on private property in Brazil. Depending
on the region (e.g. Amazon Region versus Cerrado Region), a
landowner is restricted from using twenty to eighty percent of
his or her land.17 However, it is a somewhat common practice—
particularly in the remote Amazon—to illegally clear forests
from the legal reserve.18 Now, if such practices are deemed to be
common, should legal additionality still apply and thus prevent
the reforestation of this fallow land using carbon finance?
Corruption also presents challenges for ensuring the legal
additionality of a project. There are currently carbon reduction projects either certified or under development in Ethiopia,
Nicaragua, the Philippines, Kenya, and Venezuela.19 Yet, Transparency International’s Global Corruption Report 2009 rates
Ethiopia as the 126th most corrupt country out of 180 countries,
Nicaragua as the 134th, the Philippines as the 141st, Kenya as
the 147th, and Venezuela as the 158th.20 Where projects provide
much needed financing in developing countries with already
corrupt infrastructures, there may be a disincentive to upgrade
or improve legal frameworks that could reduce the number of
carbon reduction projects.
The evolving regional compliance carbon markets of the
U.S.—which are the Western Climate Initiative (“WCI”), the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”), and the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (“Accord”)—have
Canadian Provinces and Mexican States as either participants
or observers.21 As these regional programs transform, it will be
interesting to see how state or national laws, and thus legal additionality, will be applied.

Common Practice or Technological
Additionality
Common practice additionality, which could incorporate
either the technological or market penetration of a given project
type based on its geography, is another objective additionality
test. The aspect of geography is important because what is prevalent in one location—for example, wind turbines in Texas or
solar photovoltaic systems in California—might not be so prevalent in other locations (i.e. such as New Hampshire or Alaska).
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According to the American Carbon Registry’s standard, common practice is determined by whether there is “widespread
deployment of the project . . . within the relevant geographic
area.”22 Similarly, the Verified Carbon Standard defines it as one
which is “not common practice in the sector/region, compared
with projects that have received no carbon finance.” 23
Yet, how does one define common practice and what specifically would be the particular geographic focus (i.e. a country, state, local electric grid)? Perhaps one of most controversial
examples surrounding common practice was the Chicago Climate Exchange’s acceptance of soil conservation carbon reduction projects (i.e. also known as no-till), which were previously
enrolled in the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Conservation
Reserve Program.24 Under this program, farmers were rewarded
by the purchase of their carbon reduction credits for activities
that they were already undertaking without revenue from the
carbon markets.25 If a regulated industry is allowed to emit
greenhouse gas emissions because they are supporting non-additional carbon offset projects, then the environmental integrity of
the system should be called into question because the net greenhouse gas emissions will continue to increase. Climate Action
Reserve (“Reserve”) aptly points out that there are many difficulties in actually defining the common practice of a region. 26
According to Derek Six, the Portfolio Manager for Environmental Credit Corporation, the best assessment of additionality
would be the use of a market penetration approach.27 Such an
approach, which is similar to common practice, would incorporate knowledge and technology barriers to implementation,
along with financial aspects of additionality.28 For example,
agricultural methane destruction or agricultural methane gas-toenergy projects are only installed on about 0.5% of U.S. farms.29
Thus under a market penetration approach, all agricultural methane destruction and agricultural methane gas-to-energy projects would be eligible for carbon finance whether or not there
were projects clustered in a specific region (e.g. California) or
whether a particular project had a slightly higher financial return
(i.e. financial additionality).

Financial Additionality
Many carbon market participants are averse to the concept
of financial additionality, which is much more subjective than
legal additionality or common practice. Likewise, financial
additionality is difficult to determine due to matters of confidentiality, proprietary internal business decisions, and the potential
use of arbitrary metrics. The Clean Development Mechanism,
which refers to financial additionality as the investment analysis, considers whether the project would have been financially
attractive without the revenue from carbon reduction credits.30
The Verified Carbon Standard considers financial additionality, which it defines as an investment barrier and a subset of
implementation barriers.31 The American Carbon Registry also
considers financial additionality a subset of implementation barriers and asks whether funding from carbon reduction credits
will incentivize the project’s implementation.32
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Confidential and proprietary internal business matters that
make financial additionality a subjective and difficult assessment include, but are not limited to:
• Capital budgeting decisions (i.e. which projects will get
funded and why?)
• Financing sources (e.g. banks, internal funds, venture
capitalists)
• Portfolio of available projects (i.e. what alternative investments/projects are possible?)
• Required internal rate of return (“IRR”), return on assets
(“ROA”), return on equity (“ROE”), and/or payback
period (i.e. which metric does a firm use and what is the
requirement?)
While the Clean Development Mechanism has an extensive
discussion on appropriate metrics for financial additionality
(i.e. discount rates and benchmarks), arbitrary metrics such as
the following could be used as justification for allowing or not
allowing a project to count as eligible for carbon finance:
• Companies of the same size (e.g. in terms of money and/or
employees)
• Geographical location (e.g. country, sub-national, local
electric grid)
• Length of time company is in business
• Public vs. private ownership
This said, how do you compare a small, specialized renewable
energy company to a large, diversified provider? Similarly, do
start-ups differ from “well-established” companies enough
to present a challenge when comparing financial additionality
thresholds? Also, how does the ownership structure (i.e. nonprofit, limited liability corporation, type C corporation, publicowned entity, joint-ownership) impact financial decisions and
thus, financial additionality?
Applying financial additionality across a broad spectrum
of project types is another significant challenge, posing many
serious questions. Likewise, why should carbon markets reward
projects that demonstrate the poorest financials? If two different
projects existed and with one thousand dollars, one could reduce
one thousand metric tons of carbon dioxide and the other could
reduce one hundred metric tons, why should the one hundred
metric tons project be considered more financially additional?
On the other hand, why reward projects that already have “superior” returns and that existed before the formation of carbon
markets (i.e. a question which relates to voluntary buyers wanting their donations to matter)?
Financial additionality should be phased out of future certification standards and new revisions of current certification standards, a position supported by Green-e Climate.33

Project-By-Project Additionality
Under the project-by-project test for additionality, each project individually undergoes a series of additionality tests according to the given standard. Two main standards, which apply a
project-by-project additionality test, are the Clean Development Mechanism and the Verified Carbon Standard. The Clean
Development Mechanism is the carbon reduction standard for
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Certified Emission Reductions (“CER”) for the Kyoto Protocol’s international compliance market.34 In contrast, the Verified
Carbon Standard is the leading voluntary carbon markets standard, in terms of market share, and has adopted methodologies
from the CDM.35
Essentially, project proponents—whether referring to investors, project developers, landowners or buyers—need to assess
whether each and every individual project meets the additionality tests. Such a process can be expensive, time-consuming (i.e.
reduces scalability and time-to-market), and difficult for both the
general public and local communities to grasp. Furthermore, it is
difficult for auditors to determine an individual project’s subjective assertions, especially with regard to financial additionality.

Performance or Sectoral Additionality
Many current and evolving certification standards—including the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the Western Climate Initiative, and the Climate Action Reserve—are adopting
performance or sectoral approaches to additionality. Essentially,
such performance or sectoral approaches use a uniform additionality test or benchmark, which could be based on an industry or
geographic region. It is important to note, the same additionality
criteria—such as legal, common practice/technology, and financial—can be applied to a performance or sectoral approach, the
main difference is that such criteria are not uniquely applied to
each single project. Under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) offset projects may not be government ordered
projects, may not receive incentives from RGGI auction proceeds, and must meet certain requirements to qualify.36
Recent discussions of the WCI indicate that it will attempt
to set a standardized baseline for offset protocols that reflect
the strictest regulatory and legal requirements.37 The Climate
Action Reserve uses standardized performance based tests for
additionality because they are administratively easier to implement and less subjective.38
For the level of scalability required to address global climate change, there needs to be a near-full transition to sectoral
or performance benchmarks for additionality. To this end, one
of the decisions made at the sixteenth session of the Conference
of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change in Cancun, Mexico, was for the Clean Development Mechanism to work towards standardized baselines and
additionality tests.39 Similarly, the Verified Carbon Standard
has convened a steering committee, which is developing “VCS
requirements and guidance on performance benchmark and
technology test approaches to baselines/additionality.”40

Conclusion
Carbon reduction credits, also known as carbon offsets, are
an effective cost-containment mechanism and have the potential
to produce greenhouse gas reductions alongside a host of cobenefits (e.g. local jobs, technology transfer, reforesting critical
wildlife habitat). However, the general public, regulators, and
environmentalists do not want to hear, “well we were already
doing the project and we are doing nothing different, but now
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we are getting revenue from the carbon markets.” To ensure
overall reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, additionality is
a useful technical tool to ensure the integrity of carbon reduction

projects, but certification standards should be less concerned
about financial additionality and more focused on transitioning
to sectoral or performance approaches.
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Climate Change:
Government, Private Property, and Individual Action*
by Paul Babie**

C

Introduction

limate change is a private property problem. Some
may react strongly to such a bold claim—after all,
private property is seen as a solution to the crisis, as
illustrated by the current fascination with the “commodification”1 and “propertization”2 of carbon through “cap-and-trade”3
schemes.4 Notwithstanding the current fashionability of legislative responses to climate change, in the last year governments
seem to be backing away from taking bold action.
In late 2009, the United Nations climate talks in Copenhagen failed to produce a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol5—participants opted instead for a weak political agreement.6
Throughout 2010, this compounded the inability of national governments, especially those of the major developed nations such
as the United States7 and Australia,8 to mitigate greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emissions through “cap-and-trade” legislation aimed
at permitting the purchase and sale of rights to emit GHG.9 Governments let their initiatives lapse.10 Some more cynical might
say the failure of Copenhagen galvanized the resolve of such
governments to oppose mitigating legislation of any kind. 11
Finally, at the end of 2010, the Cancún UN climate talks, rather
than focusing on mitigation through binding political agreement,
issued a set of agreements, a major portion of which aims at
adaptation to the changes wrought by the un-mitigated emission
of GHG.12
As matters currently stand, as of January 1, 2013, the day
Kyoto expires, the world will have no binding limits on GHG.13
For many,14 this fact causes real alarm. And it ought to, for this
governmental failure stands as a depressing indictment of the
effects on people of anthropogenic climate change. Bjørn Lomborg, the self-proclaimed “skeptical environmentalist,”15 puts it
this way:
The risks of unchecked global warming are now widely
acknowledged: a rise in sea levels threatening the existence of some low-lying coastal communities; pressure on freshwater resources, making food production
more difficult in some countries and possibly becoming a source of societal conflict; changing weather patterns providing favorable conditions for the spread of
malaria. To make matters worse, the effects will be felt
most in those parts of the world which are home to the
poorest people who are least able to protect themselves
and who bear the least responsibility for the build-up
of greenhouse gases . . . . Concern has been great, but
humanity has so far done very little that will actually
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prevent these outcomes. Carbon emissions have kept
increasing, despite repeated promises of cuts.16
Another way of looking at humanity’s inaction may simply
be the recognition, by governments if not yet by humanity as
a whole, that what is necessary is nothing short of wholesale
change to the dominant concept of private property. This brief
essay aims to explain why private property, touted as recently as
last year as the saviour to the challenge posed by climate change,
may in fact be the source of the problem and why we need to
take individual, personal action rather than wait for governments
to act for us.

What Private Property Is
We begin with liberal theory, from which the dominant
contemporary concept of private property emerges.17 Liberalism concerns itself with the establishment and maintenance of
a political and legal order which, among other things, secures
individual freedom in choosing a “life project”—the values and
ends of a preferred way of life.18 In order for life to have meaning, some control over the use of goods and resources is necessary; private property is liberalism’s means of ensuring that
individuals enjoy choice over goods and resources so as to allow
them to fulfill their life project.19
In simple terms, the liberal conception of private property is
a “bundle” of legal relations (or rights) created, conferred, and
enforced by the state (through law) between people in relation
to the control of goods and resources.20 At a minimum, these
rights typically include use, exclusivity, and disposition.21 One
can use one’s car (or, with few exceptions, any other tangible or
intangible good, resource, or item of social wealth), for example, to the exclusion of all others, and may dispose of it. The
holder may exercise these rights in any way to satisfy personal
preferences and desires.22 Alternatively, crafting this in a way
that comports with the language of liberal theory—rights are the
shorthand way of saying that individuals enjoy choice about the
control and use of goods and resources in accordance with and
to give meaning to a chosen life project.

* This is a revised version of Paul Babie, Private Property: the Solution or the
Source of the Problem?, 2 Amsterdam L. F., no. 2, 2010 at 17, http://ojs.ubvu.
vu.nl/alf/article/view/124/231.
** University of Adelaide Law School, Australia. Thanks to Joseph William
Singer and Peter Burdon for reading and providing invaluable comments on
earlier versions of this project. Any remaining errors are, of course, entirely my
own responsibility.
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Notice, though, that in this definition, such rights exist only
as a product of relationship between individuals. This is significant, for it focuses our attention on the fact that where there is a
right (choice) to do something, there is a corresponding duty (a
lack of choice) to refrain from interfering with the interest protected by the right.23 Rights would clearly be meaningless if this
were not so. As concerns a particular good or resource, then, the
liberal individual holds choice, while all others (the community,
society) are burdened with a lack of it. C. Edwin Baker summarizes the idea of rights and relationship this way: “[private]
property [i]s a claim that other people ought to accede to the
will of the owner, which can be a person, a group, or some other
entity. A specific property right amounts to the decisionmaking
authority of the holder of that right.”24
Private property, then, is not merely about the control and
use of goods and resources, but also significantly about controlling the lives of others.25 Using evocative and graphic language,
Roberto Mangabeira Unger puts it this way:
[t]he right [choice] is a loaded gun that the rightholder
[the holder of choice] may shoot at will in his corner
of town. Outside that corner the other licensed gunmen
may shoot him down. But the give-and-take of communal life and its characteristic concern for the actual
effect of any decision upon the other person are incompatible with this view of right . . . .26
Identifying the importance of relationship reveals the fact
that private property and non-property rights overlap; choices
made by those with the former have the potential to create negative outcomes—consequences, or what economists call “externalities”—for those with the latter.27 At the highest level of
generality, Unger’s “gunman” is vested with absolute discretion
to “an absolute claim to a divisible portion of social capital[]”
and that “[i]n this zone the rightholder [can] avoid any tangle
of claims to mutual responsibility.”28 The individual revels in
“a zone of unchecked discretionary action that others, whether
private citizens or governmental officials, may not invade.”29
Every legal system acknowledges this problem and, in doing
so, seems to accept that with rights come obligations towards
others.30 The state, through law, creates private property, just
as through that same law (what is more commonly known as
regulation), it is said to mediate the socially contingent boundary between private property and non-property holders. This is,
in fact, the essence of private property—state conferral of selfserving rights that come with obligations towards others.31
Yet there is something much more disturbing lurking just
below the surface of what appears to be state control aimed
at preventing harmful outcomes like those of climate change.
What is really being conferred by private property is what Duncan Kennedy calls the legal ground rules giving “permissions to
injure” others, to cause legalised injury.32 This is insidious, for
“we don’t think of [them] as ground rules at all, by contrast with
ground rules of prohibition. This is Wesley Hohfeld’s insight:
the legal order permits as well as prohibits, in the simple-minded
sense that it could prohibit, but judges and legislators reject
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demands from those injured that the injurers be restrained.”33
And they are invisible, in the sense, that
when lawmakers do nothing, they appear to have nothing to do with the outcome. But when one thinks that
many other forms of injury are prohibited, it becomes
clear that inaction is a policy, and that law is responsible for the outcome, at least in the abstract sense that
the law could have made it otherwise . . . . It is clear
that lawmakers could require almost anything. When
they require nothing, it looks as though the law is uninvolved in the situation, though the legal decision not to
impose a duty is in another sense the cause of the outcome when one person is allowed to ignore another’s
plight.34
This brings us full circle to the broader liberal theory with
which we began, for the importance of relationship in understanding private property reveals an important, yet paradoxical,
dimension of choice. It is simply this: the freedom that liberalism secures to the individual to choose a life project means that
in the course of doing that, the individual also chooses the laws,
relationships, communities, and so forth that constitute the political and legal order. In other words, in the province of politics
people choose their contexts (through electing representatives,
who enact laws and appoint judges who interpret those laws),
which in turn defines the scope of one’s rights—choice, decisionmaking authority—and the institutions that confer, protect
and enforce it (bearing in mind the ground rules of permission
as well as the ground rules of prohibition). Individuals as much
choose the regulation of property as they do the control and use
of goods and resources.35

How Private Property Facilitates the
Externalities of Climate Change
When we focus on relationship as central to private property and the political-regulatory contexts we choose, we begin to
see something else that was always there, although it was hidden
from our view. The externalities of private property create many
other types of relationship in which the lives of many are controlled by the choices of a few.36 Anthropogenic climate change
is a stark example.
While the science is complex, it is clear enough that humans,
through their choices, produce the GHG that enhance the natural greenhouse effect, which heats the earth’s surface.37 Among
other effects, anthropogenic climate change results in drought
and desertification, increased extreme weather events, and the
melting of polar ice (especially in the north) and so rising seas
levels.38 We might call this the “climate change relationship.”
Private property, as a concept, facilitates choice (both human
and corporate) about the use of goods and resources in such a
way that emits greenhouse gases.39
Our choices about goods and resources cover the gamut of
our chosen life projects: where we live, what we do there, how
we travel from place to place and so forth. Corporate choices are
equally important, for they structure the range of choice available to individuals in setting their own agendas, thus giving
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corporations the power to broaden or restrict the meaning of private property in the hands of individuals.40 Green energy (solar
or wind power), for instance, remains unavailable to the individual consumer if no corporate energy provider is willing to
produce it.41
Externalities do not end at the borders, physical or legal,
of a good or resource; choices occur within a web of relationships, not only legal and social, but also physical and spatial.
Who is affected? Everyone, the world over, is affected, with the
poor and disadvantaged of the developing world disproportionately bearing the brunt of the human consequences of climate
change42—decreasing security, shortages of food, increased
health problems, and greater stress on available water supplies.
Indeed, as Jedediah Purdy argues,
[c]limate change threatens to become, fairly literally,
the externality that ate the world. The last two hundred
years of economic growth have been not just a preference-satisfaction machine but an externality machine,
churning out greenhouse gases that cost polluters nothing and disperse through the atmosphere to affect the
whole globe.43
Consider human security. It will decrease both within countries affected directly by climate change, and in those countries
indirectly affected through the movement of large numbers of
people displaced by the direct effects of climate change in their
own countries.44 In the case of rising sea levels, for instance,
sixty percent of the human population lives within one hundred kilometers of the ocean, with the majority in small- and
medium-sized settlements on land no more than five meters
above sea level.45 Even the modest sea level rises predicted for
these places will result in a massive displacement of “climate”

or “environmental refugees.”46 Private property, by securing choice about the use of goods and resources to those in the
developed world, makes all of this possible.

Conclusion: Is it the Solution?
Nonetheless, private property and the commodification
upon which it depends seem to be in vogue at the moment as a
solution to anthropogenic climate change. Creating a proprietary
interest in carbon that can be bought and sold is the answer—is
the political choice, it is claimed and we believe—to the climate
crisis. Is it really? We could just as easily say that the concept
of private property is the primary culprit. Is it wise to entrust
the solution to the concept that put us here? Or might it be more
appropriate, as Mike Hulme suggests, to “see how we can use
the idea of climate change—the matrix of ecological functions,
power relationships, cultural discourses and material flows
that climate change reveals—to rethink how we take forward
our political, social, economic, and personal projects over the
decades to come.”47
Before we pin our hopes on it as a cure-all, we might ask
first whether the liberal concept of private property is ripe for
just such a reappraisal. We can choose, but we must do so with
our eyes open to the reality: that private property and the contexts in which we live are in fact our choice, not that of governments. We can no longer wait for government to act, with
cap-and-trade schemes or any other form of regulation. At the
very least, it is not enough, and at worst, it will take too long.
Now is the time to act. And only we can take action. In exercising choice about our context and about goods and resources, we
must take responsibility for ourselves, rather than waiting for
our governments to act for us.48
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Options for Blue Carbon within the
International Climate Change Framework
by Gabriel Grimsditch*
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Introduction

he concept of “Blue Carbon,” or atmospheric carbon
captured by coastal ecosystems, has recently been the
focus of reports by the United Nations Environment
Programme (“UNEP”) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (“IUCN”).1 The international community is
increasingly interested in exploring the potential of conserving
coastal ecosystems for their role in climate change mitigation,
reflected in the Manado Oceans Declaration signed by countries
in 2009 which recognizes that “healthy and productive coastal
ecosystems, already increasingly stressed by land-based and
sea-based sources of pollution, coastal development, and habitat
destruction, have a growing role in mitigating the effects of climate change on coastal communities and economies in the near
term”2 and “invite[s] the scientific community/institutions to
continue developing reliable scientific information on the roles
of coastal wetlands, mangrove, algae, seagrass, and coral reef
ecosystems in reducing the effects of climate change.”3

Blue Carbon in the Climate Context
The 2009 UNEP “Blue Carbon” report noted that fifty-five
percent of atmospheric carbon captured by living organisms
is captured by marine organisms and between fifty to seventyone percent of that is captured by ocean vegetated habitats (e.g.
mangroves, salt marshes, seagrasses, seaweed), which account
for less than 0.5% of the seabed.4 The report states that coastal
vegetated habitats sequester between 114 and 328 teragrams
(“Tg”) of carbon per year, or 1.6 to 4.6% of total anthropogenic emissions (7,200 Tg per year).5 Furthermore, the report
found that between two and seven percent of these marine and
coastal ecosystems are lost annually6—one of the highest rates
of loss amongst all ecosystems.7 Because of their high carbon
sequestration potential, there is a growing interest in exploring
the potential of including Blue Carbon in existing and emerging climate change frameworks.8 However, considerable uncertainty surrounds these estimates and the level of understanding
of carbon storage in coastal ecosystems.
Several opportunities for Blue Carbon exist within the
United Nations Climate Change Framework (“UNFCCC”). The
UNFCCC is an international environmental treaty with a goal of
the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic9
interference with the climate system.”10 The UNFCCC includes
coastal and marine ecosystems in Article 4(d), which states that
all parties shall “promote sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the conservation and enhancement, as
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appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all GHG not controlled
by the Montreal Protocol, including . . . oceans as well as other
. . . coastal and marine ecosystems.”11 However, the current
UNFCCC processes does not include adequate measures for
protection and restoration of Blue Carbon ecosystems as a climate change mitigation strategy, and this represents a missed
opportunity in our global portfolio of options for combating climate change.
Countries that have signed the UNFCCC are obligated to
submit annual National Inventory Submissions (“NIS”); these
inventory submissions record the country’s greenhouse gas
emissions from anthropogenic activity, as well as sequestration
from land use and forestry, based on guidance from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”).12 Within
the NIS, there is a section on Land Use, Land-Use Change and
Forestry (“LULUCF”) that accounts for the carbon budget (i.e.
emissions and reductions) due to the management of terrestrial
ecosystems including forests, peatlands, grasslands, and agricultural wetlands.13 In this section, only the carbon sequestered or
emitted due to direct human management of ecosystems can be
included.14 However, unmanaged ecosystems are not accounted
for.15 Blue Carbon ecosystems—whether managed or not—
are not accounted for under LULUCF and thus, not included
in the UNFCCC.16 The IPCC should amend their guidance on
LULUCF in order to include Blue Carbon ecosystems under
LULUCF and UNFCCC processes. Moreover, management of
coastal and wetland ecosystems should be defined as an activity under LULUCF. The IPCC operates based on peer-reviewed
science and therefore, the current scientific gaps in knowledge
regarding carbon fluxes,17 need to first be addressed in the peerreviewed literature. In order for Blue Carbon ecosystems to be
included in the wider UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol processes,
an important step would be to have Blue Carbon ecosystems
fully embedded and accounted for in the LULUCF process.
* Gabriel Grimsditch is a program officer with the United Nations Environment
Programme (“UNEP”) Marine and Coastal Ecosystems Branch based in Nairobi,
Kenya and specializes in climate change and oceans. Before joining UNEP, Gabriel
worked for the International Union for Conservation of Nature (“IUCN”) Global
Marine Program where he was based in Mombasa, Kenya. He has published various peer-reviewed articles and institutional reports on marine and climate change
issues. Two of his latest publications, Blue Carbon and The Management Of Natural
Coastal Carbon Sinks have helped create international interest in the role coastal
and marine ecosystems play in the global carbon cycle. Gabriel obtained a BSc from
Manchester University and an MSc from University College London. He is a dual
citizen of the United Kingdom and Spain. The opinions expressed in this paper are
those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of UNEP. Address:
United Nations Environment Programme, PO Box 30552-00100, Nairobi, Kenya.
Email: gabriel.grimsditch@unep.org. Tel: +254 20 762 4124.
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Existing International Climate Change
Mitigation Frameworks
Although the UNFCCC is legally non-binding, the Kyoto
Protocol (“Protocol”) adopted in 1997 commits industrialized
countries to reduce emissions of the greenhouse gases, carbon
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and sulfur hexafluoride by at
least five percent from 1990 levels.18 The Protocol includes flexible mechanisms such as emissions trading and offsets for industrialized countries, known as the clean development mechanism
(“CDM”), which allows the nation to meet its emission reductions obligations by funding carbon capture in developing countries.19 Blue Carbon projects could potentially become an offset
category for CDM projects and—although presently standardized—UNFCCC-approved methodologies do not exist for establishing project baselines and monitoring results.20 UNFCCC
criteria would have to be amended to include Blue Carbon projects under the CDM in the form of protection or rehabilitation of
coastal ecosystems. However, as discussed above, appropriate
methodologies would have to be developed and approved.
In addition to the CDM, under the 2009 Copenhagen
Accord, developing countries agreed to report Nationally
Appropriate Mitigation Actions (“NAMAs”) to the UNFCCC
every two years; such mitigation actions are monitored domestically.21 NAMAs refer to a set of policies and actions countries
undertake as part of a commitment to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, recognizing that various countries may engage in
different actions based on equity, and in accordance with their
respective responsibilities and capabilities.22 Presently, NAMAs
include, for example, investments in alternative energy or in
reducing illegal logging, but not Blue Carbon projects.23 There
is potential to expand NAMAs to include protection and restoration of Blue Carbon ecosystems, but as discussed previously,
an international standard approved by the UNFCCC needs to be
developed and applied to Blue Carbon.
Furthermore, the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (“REDD”) program within the
UNFCCC presents another opportunity for Blue Carbon ecosystem protection. This program aims to create financial incentives to reduce forest destruction and degradation, thus reducing
emissions and maintaining sequestration.24 REDD+ is a program defined under the Cancun Agreement as including activities such as “(a) Reducing emissions from deforestation; (b)
Reducing emissions from forest degradation; (c) Conservation
of forest carbon stocks; (d) Sustainable management of forest[s];
[and] (e) Enhancement of forest carbon stocks.”25 REDD+ carbon credits would allow funding from industrialized countries to
reduce deforestation and rehabilitate degraded forests in developing countries.26 After the decision in Cancun at the Sixteenth
Session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, it is
clear that mangroves are eligible for REDD+27 funding,28 yet
their full potential has not yet been realized by countries. Again,
standardized protocols for measurement, reporting, and verification (“MRV”) and monitoring of carbon sequestration and carbon emissions due to habitat degradation need to be developed
and approved by appropriate international bodies, such as the
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Voluntary Carbon Standard (“VCS”).29 Pilot projects exploring
the feasibility of mangroves under REDD+, are currently being
developed by non-governmental organizations and national governments in REDD countries around the world.30

New Opportunities for Blue Carbon
in Climate Frameworks
While opportunities exist, for Blue Carbon to be included in
any of these UNFCCC frameworks certain preconditions need
to be met. First, the science has to be robust, and adequate peerreviewed evidence must exist to make a compelling case for the
IPCC or the UNFCCC to amend their guidelines. This includes
the development of standardized and internationally approved
methodologies for MRV of carbon sequestration and emissions
from habitat degradation. Additionally, an adequate level of
understanding of carbon fluxes and their response to management in and around Blue Carbon ecosystems is necessary for
the IPCC to include the coastal ecosystems in their Assessment
Reports. The evidence is mounting that Blue Carbon ecosystems
are an important part of the global carbon cycle, and that their
destruction releases dangerous amounts of greenhouse gases
into the atmosphere.31 Secondly, Blue Carbon projects need to
demonstrate “additionality” (the project must demonstrate that
the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions through the protection or rehabilitation of Blue Carbon ecosystems would not have
happened without the sale of Blue Carbon offsets),32 “minimal
leakage” (the decrease in greenhouse gas emissions by the Blue
Carbon project does not cause an equivalent increase in emissions by another entity),33 and “permanence” (minimizing the
risk that greenhouse gas emissions will occur after the Blue Carbon project has been sold as a carbon offset).34 Finally, the third
precondition for the success of Blue Carbon projects and acceptance under the UNFCCC and other international climate frameworks is a feasible economic model, which actually generates
revenue from the Blue Carbon project. The revenue generated
by carbon credits sold in the carbon markets must be higher than
the cost of protecting or restoring the Blue Carbon ecosystems.
Economic feasibility studies need to be undertaken which examine the total revenue from carbon sequestered (including carbon
fluxes), the total value of ecosystem services associated with
Blue Carbon ecosystems, the total direct costs of protection or
rehabilitation of Blue Carbon ecosystems, and the total opportunity costs associated with the project (e.g. loss of revenue from
lost coastal development opportunities).

Conclusion
The fact that Blue Carbon ecosystems such as mangroves,
sea grass, salt marsh, and seaweed are currently largely overlooked by the UNFCCC, CDM, and other international climate
frameworks represents a missed opportunity in our global portfolio for mitigating climate change through ecosystem management. The UNFCCC does provide appropriate frameworks
and opportunities to include Blue Carbon in the global climate
change debate, and a growing community of UN agencies, nongovernmental organizations, research institutions, civil society
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groups, and national governments are forwarding the agenda
for this change to occur. Crucial steps include the development and standardization of MRV protocols in order to monitor
the success of pilot Blue Carbon projects, as well as the continued amassing of evidence and understanding of the role of
Blue Carbon ecosystems in the global carbon cycle, including
the effects of anthropogenic management on their greenhouse

gas sequestration or emissions. This peer-reviewed evidence
should be presented to the IPCC and be used to drive changes
in guidelines so that Blue Carbon ecosystems are included in the
NIS and LULUCF processes and thus, into the wider UNFCCC
framework. The potential of Blue Carbon is clear; it is now a
matter of expediting this process in international frameworks
before we lose even more of these precious ecosystems.
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Is REDD Accounting Myopic?:
Why Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
Programs Should Recognize and Include Other Ecosystems and Services
Beyond CO2 Sequestration
by Paulo A. Lopes*

“W

Introduction

hat is a cynic? A man who knows the price
of everything and the value of nothing.” 1
Although uttered in Oscar Wilde’s 1892 comedy, Lady Windermere’s Fan, its reference could not have been
more foreboding.2 Wilde’s comedy foreshadowed what was to
come as the classical economics of the 18th and 19th century3
evolved into neoclassical economics in the 20th century,4 and
finally into mainstream economics5 built on the theory, and now
the practice, of free market economies.6
Unfortunately, over the years, free market economies have
long since forgotten Wilde’s definition of a “cynic” even though
remembrance of it today is paramount for environmentalists
as they try to mitigate climate change. Today, humans have
embarked on what may be the last frontier of mainstream economics, the monetization of what was once thought incalculable,
Earth’s ecosystems,7 some of which remain largely unscathed
by mainstream economies.
Payment for ecosystem services (“PES”)8 is a type of
mainstream economic recognition of benefits provided by land.
However, this rebirth of economic land recognition is not a reincarnation of Adam Smith’s economics that consisted of labor,
land, and capital.9 Instead, PES programs, such as reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (“REDD”),10 try
to monetize aspects of nature, including carbon dioxide (“CO2”)
sequestration with REDD projects.11
The lack of recognition of the total value of land by mainstream economics is in large part because of the continued classification of land as a subcategory of capital, which results in
undervaluation of the land.12 This undervaluation of land is an
externality of mainstream economics that discounts the ecosystem services provided by the natural environment.13 Mitigation of
these externalities can occur when there is actual recognition of
the ecosystem services.14 Although mainstream economies advocate that REDD programs will help “save” the planet from climate
change,15 current REDD programs fail to internalize many of the
ecosystem services provided by forests, thus perpetuating the
undervaluation of land recognition in mainstream economics.16
This article argues that the current design of REDD is a
myopic Partial PES at best.17 Forest ecosystems provide numerous services beyond the sequestration of CO2, such as protecting upstream watersheds,18 conserving biodiversity19 and
gene pools,20 soil formation,21 nutrient recycling,22 and plant
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pollination.23 Thus REDD programs should recognize and
include these and other ecosystem services.24 After reviewing
REDD in the international context and the accounting scheme,
recommendations and concerns are provided for why the expansion of REDD to include other ecosystems and services would
result in not only a greater CO2 reduction, but also other important environmental benefits.25 The article concludes by recognizing that REDD’s accounting loopholes, by focusing solely on
CO2 reduction without recognition of the ensuing impact from
that reduction, will impose negative externalities on other ecosystem services, and that REDD needs to transition to a program
that internalizes these externalities.26

Paying for Ecosystem Services
Payment for Ecosystem Services Generally
The Earth’s ecosystem provides benefits, sometimes
referred to as “services,” for all organisms on the planet.27 These
ecosystem services may or may not be directly recognized by
mainstream economics.28 PES is a financial valuation of Earth’s
ecosystem services.29 The primary purpose of a PES program
is to maintain a specific ecosystem “service,” such as clean
water,30 carbon sequestration,31 or biodiversity habitat,32 for
some type of economic value.33 However, the transfer of money
to maintain the ecosystem service is not the defining factor of a
PES program.34 Rather, it is the fact that the “payment causes
the benefit to occur where it would not have otherwise.”35 By
having the service be “additional,” a value for the service can be
determined, thus creating a PES program.36

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation is an Example of a Payment for
Ecosystem Services Program
As mentioned above, carbon sequestration is one of the ecosystem services provided by forests. The net forest loss between
1990 and 2000 was 13.1 million hectares (“ha”) per year and
12.9 million ha between 2000 and 2005,37 the equivalent of the
land area of Greece38 or New York39 every year, and according
to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”),
emissions from deforestation during the 1990s were estimated
at 5.8 gigatonnes (“Gt”) of CO2 per year.40 With emissions
* Paulo A. Lopes is a J.D./M.P.P. Candidate, 2011, at American University,
Washington College of Law and School of Public Affairs.
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from deforestation and forest degradation accounting for nearly
twenty percent of total greenhouse gas emissions,41 there is a
need to reduce emissions from forests.
Over the years, varying countries have undertaken numerous schemes, and institutions have proposed ways to reduce
emissions from deforestation.42 Some programs, listed in order
from narrowest to broadest include: reducing emissions from
deforestation (“RED”); reducing emissions from deforestation
and degradation (“REDD”); and reducing emissions from deforestation, degradation, and the enhancement of carbon stocks (the
“+” in “REDD+”) by means of carbon sequestration.43 These
schemes—coupled with needed financing—should result in
reducing emissions from deforestation.44

REDD Within the International Climate Context
In 1997, the third Conference of the Parties (“COP-3”) of
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC” or “Convention”) adopted the Kyoto Protocol.45
Article 3(3) of the Kyoto Protocol limited Land-Use Change and
Forestry (“LUCF”) activities to afforestation, reforestation, and
deforestation,46 while Article 3(4) provided flexibility with the
inclusion of other activities as determined by the first session of
the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.47
Noting the conclusions found by the Subsidiary Body for
Scientific and Technological Advice (“SBSTA”) at its eighth
session and the decision by the IPCC to prepare a report on
Land-Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (“LULUCF”), the
fourth Conference of the Parties (“COP-4”) of the UNFCCC,
began to lay the legal groundwork for the recognition and inclusion of LULUCF.48 This establishment of more specific legal
provisions for LULUCF continued with the sixth Conference of
the Parties (“COP-6”) in 2000, with the IPCC scientific report49
and the Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”) definition
for “forests.”50 At the 2001 seventh Conference of the Parties
(“COP-7”), the Parties agreed upon the inclusion of additional
activities, such as revegetation, forest management, cropland
management, and grazing land management, which were prohibited from jointly implemented activities but included in
domestically conducted activities.51
In 2007 in Bali, Indonesia, the thirteenth Conference of the
Parties (“COP-13”) recognized “the urgent need to take further
meaningful action to reduce emissions from deforestation and
forest degradation in developing countries.”52 The Bali Action
Plan established a goal to complete the policy approaches and
incentives to reduce emissions from deforestation by 2009.53
While the fifteenth Conference of the Parties (“COP-15”), in
2009, concluded with the nonbinding54 Copenhagen Accord,
which “recogniz[ed] the crucial role of reducing emission[s]
from deforestation and forest degradation,”55 the goal set by the
Bali Action Plan was not met.56
At the sixteenth Conference of the Parties (“COP-16”), in
2010 in Cancun, Mexico, the COP concluded by adopting numerous decisions, including one that recognized the need to reduce
emissions from forests.57 The outcome of the thirteenth session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative
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Action (“AWG-LCA-13”) under the Convention resulted in
agreement by Parties for “policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to [REDD] in developing countries; and
the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and
enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries.”58
It encouraged each country, as appropriate, to undertake the following actions: “(a) Reduc[e] emissions from deforestation; (b)
Reduc[e] emissions from forest degradation; (c) Conservation of
forest carbon stocks; (d) Sustainable management of forest; [and]
(e) Enhancement of forest carbon stocks.”59 Countries agreed to
develop a national strategy or action plan60 and a “robust and
transparent national forest monitoring system for the monitoring and reporting of the activities” listed above.61 During the
development and implementation of their national strategies or
action plans, developing countries are asked, “to address, inter
alia, drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, land tenure
issues, forest governance issues, gender considerations and . . .
[to] ensure the full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, inter alia, indigenous peoples and local communities.”62
This agreement of the AWG-LCA-13 text at COP-16 in Cancun,
Mexico is a step forward for the recognition and implementation
of REDD at the international level.63

CO2 Emissions Accounting
It is important to recognize that forestry accounting of CO2
emissions, although maturing, is in its infancy and thus still
imprecise.64 Accurate accounting allows for the determination
of whether the REDD program will have added benefit,65 which
requires that the benefit be accurately quantified and documented.66 For a carbon offset to actually result from a REDD
program, one must review the additionality, definition of a forest, leakage, measurement, verification, and permanence of the
offset.67 If a REDD program fails to meet any or all of these
requirements, then the offset is not actually realized since forestry CO2 emissions were not reduced.68 Recognition of this
failed emission reduction offset would allow countries to emit
more, since emissions were not offset by the REDD program
even though they were recognized as having occurred.69

Additionality
Additionality refers to the quantity of emission reductions
that result from the implementation of the REDD program
when compared to business as usual.70 The difference between
the reference level and the emission reductions achieved is the
“additionality.”71 Although in theory this sounds possible, if not
straightforward, experts still differ on approaches for determining the additionality amount since “there is no correct technique
for determining additionality because it requires comparison of
expected reductions against a projected business-as-usual emissions baseline . . . [, which] is inherently uncertain because, it
may not be possible to know what would have happened in the
future had the projects not been undertaken.”72 Fundamentally,
the test to determine additionality will always vary depending
on the balance between reduction of administrative costs versus
program rigor and environmental certainty.73
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Definitions of Forests
Article 3(3) of the Kyoto Protocol lists LULUCF activities
as afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation74 but does not
provide definitions for these activities.75 In 2000, the IPCC, in
a special report on LULUCF, recognized the importance of providing clear definitions of these activities to facilitate accounting for different land-use activities.76 The report also notes that
“[f]orest definitions based on legal, administrative, or cultural
considerations” may not be appropriate for carbon accounting
since these definitions do not always correlate to the quantity of
carbon stored on the site as illustrated by the following forest
definitions.77 The ninth session of the Conference of the Parties
(“COP-9”), in 2003 in Milan, Italy, provided the Parties with
flexibility on a forest definition with “(a) A single minimum tree
crown cover between 10 and 30 per cent; (b) A single minimum
land area value between 0.05 and 1 hectare; and (c) A single
minimum tree height value between 2 and 5 meters.”78 The
Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”), in a 2006 working paper, also noted the issue of selecting a forest definition for
accounting in Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) projects.79 Unlike COP-9’s three criterions, the FAO working paper
put forward a ten-step process to aid countries in selecting the
optimal parameters for a forest definition.80 As evident by these
different approaches, providing flexibility in defining forests is
necessary since ecosystems around the world vary greatly. This
variation prohibits creation of a uniform international definition
applicable to all countries, because it would result in winners
and losers amongst countries.81

Leakage
While the emphasis and requirements under the Kyoto Protocol that CDM projects be additional82 is important, the risk
of leakage must also be recognized.83 Leakage “occurs when
economic activity is shifted as a result of the emission control
regulation and, as a result, emission abatement achieved in one
location that is subject to emission control regulation . . . is offset
by increased emissions in unregulated locations.”84 For example,
in the context of a REDD program, leakage occurs when site A’s
forest emissions, which are under a REDD program, are reduced
by two tonnes of CO2, yet CO2 emissions from site B, which is
not under a REDD program, increases CO2 emissions by two
tonnes.85 The achieved emission reductions of site A is negated
by the increased emissions from site B, resulting in a zero-sum
game of emission reductions.86 COP-9 recognized leakage if the
increase in emissions occurs outside of the project and is measurable and attributable to the reduced emissions undertaken by
the project.87

Measurement and Verification
Measurement and verification of deforestation is essential
to any REDD project with a goal of issuing emission reduction
credits.88 However, measurement and verification of carbon
sequestration is difficult since “rates vary by tree species, soil
type, regional climate, topography and management practice.”89
In the United States, carbon sequestration rates for tree species
are better understood than soil carbon sequestration rates, which
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vary by cropping practice and soil type.90 Over time, the rate of
carbon sequestration absorption decreases in trees and stops as
it nears the saturation point, when no additional sequestration of
carbon is possible.91

Permanence
Permanence is one of the major concerns with biological
carbon sequestration projects such as REDD,92 because it is key
when trying to achieve overall emission reductions.93 With biological sequestration programs—unlike emission reductions that
achieve results by reducing the release of carbon—if the sequestered carbon is released sometime in the future, the sequestration program is a failure.94 This concern over a potential release
also applies to avoided deforestation, since avoided deforestation today may turn into future deforestation.95 The release
of sequestered carbon may result from human causes, such as
changes in land use and management, or from natural causes,
such as a fire.96

Policy Recommendations and Concerns:
Expanding Beyond the Myopic Confines of
REDD to Recognize and Include Other
Ecosystems and Services Will Result in Not
Only a Greater CO2 Reduction but Other
Important Environmental Benefits.
Other Ecosystems: Expanding REDD to Mitigate
REDD’s Accounting Loopholes
The negotiations concerning biological carbon sequestration evolved over the years from COP-3 with the Kyoto Protocol’s recognition of LULUCF,97 to the COP-6 debate,98 and final
recognition by COP-7 of a more expansive program recognizing
additional activities.99 In 2007, the Bali Action Plan of COP-13
acknowledged the need to establish incentives to reduce emissions from deforestation,100 which was reiterated in the Copenhagen Accord of COP-15.101 At COP-16, additional progress
occurred with the decision to adopt the AWG-LCA-13 policy
approaches and positive incentives on REDD.102 Although the
progression of the need to reduce emissions from biological
sources is evident, the unifying theme over the COPs has come
to focus on forests, as a result of the recognition of the need to
reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation.103
The progression is also apparent with the IPCC accounting of emissions recognized by the UNFCCC.104 The IPCC
has released numerous reports over the years on forestry and
carbon capture: in 1996, on Land-Use Change and Forestry
(“LUCF”), which identified major emissions from large probable land use sources;105 LULUCF in 2003, which expanded
LUCF to include all carbon pools;106 and in 2006, a report that
transformed LULUCF into Agriculture, Forestry, and Other
Land Use (“AFOLU”), which integrated both the agriculture
and LULUCF sectors.107
While the IPCC accounting has evolved over the years to
include all carbon pools from all sectors, the UNFCCC’s decisions and resolutions on RED, REDD, and REDD+ all focus on
forestry.108 Although emissions from forests are substantial and
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the need to reduce forest emissions is necessary,109 the UNFCCC
should evolve negotiations on REDD+ to include all of the land
use sectors recognized under AFOLU.

Is There a Better Scheme than RED, REDD, or REDD+?
A scheme that would go beyond the confines of RED,
REDD, and REDD+ is Reducing Emission from All Land
Uses (“REALU”).110 By applying AFOLU accounting, some
of the emissions recognized by REALU would include forestland, grassland, cropland, settlements, wetlands, and other
lands; meanwhile this would also account for agriculture and
other land use emissions resulting from liming, urea, manure,
enteric fermentation, nitrous oxide, and others.111 REALU with
AFOLU accounting would “include all land use proportionate
to actual emissions and emission potential.”112 REALU, like
other proposals,113 is supported by many organizations and is
still evolving.114
One of the lingering issues pertaining to REDD is the definition of what is a forest115—or rather when does a tree become
classified as a forest? The Kyoto Protocol and COP-9 provided
a flexible definition based on tree crown cover, minimum land
area per hectare, and minimum tree height,116 a 2006 working paper by the FAO provided a ten-step process for selecting
the optimal parameters for a forest definition,117 and the IPCC
special report on LULUCF noted the importance of clarity.118
However, none of these definitions account for trees outside the
forest or wetlands, which also sequester large quantities of carbon.119 REALU with AFOLU accounting, since it covers all sectors, would recognize the tree that is not yet considered a forest
under these other definitions, along with the vast expanses of
wetlands.120
The definition of forests in the Kyoto Protocol also allows
for “areas normally forming part of the forest area which are
temporarily unstocked as a result of human intervention such
as harvesting or natural causes but which are expected to revert
to forest” to maintain their forest classification.121 The Kyoto
Protocol establishes no duration for “temporarily unstocked”
forest,122 yet still regards these areas as forested.123 Thus, the
Kyoto Protocol does not recognize the release of emissions from
clearcutting as long as there is an intention to replant the forest
since it is only a “temporary” release.124 Furthermore, the Kyoto
Protocol forest definition does not account for the emissions
from clearcutting of trees not classified as forest, regardless of
whether there was an intention to replant the trees.125 The Kyoto
Protocol forest definition creates this “in or out” distinction for a
tree,126 which would not be a concern under the more expansive
REALU with AFOLU accounting.127
Another issue created by distinguishing among trees is that
of leakage.128 To avoid leakage, forest B’s emissions should not
increase as a result of a REDD program decreasing forest A’s
emissions.129 However, by only counting forests, a REDD program that decreases forest A’s emissions may result in an emissions increase from the non-forest area C of woody vegetation
or wetlands.130 Technically, there is leakage, since the increase
in emissions from area C negated the decrease in emissions
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from forest A.131 Yet under REDD, which only pertains to
forests, there is no leakage.132 REALU, by applying a more
expansive landscape accounting, AFOLU, would recognize
the leakage coming from area C, since AFOLU encompasses
sequestered carbon areas above and below ground, forested and
non-forested.133
Reduction of forest emissions is necessary, as emissions
from deforestation and forest degradation account for nearly
twenty percent of total greenhouse gas emissions.134 But it is
also evident that the current attempts with RED, REDD, and
REDD+ still falter in many areas because of the forest definition.135 Emissions and leakages pertaining to wetlands, agriculture, and other land uses are not accounted for in forestry
schemes.136 Thus, the deficiency that stems from the definition
of forests impacts the other accounting elements of REDD, additionality and leakage, which subsequently impacts measurement
and verification.137
REALU with AFOLU captures all of the sectors, which is
more effective and efficient138 while also being more equitable
since AFOLU accounting standards would apply to all countries.
REALU and AFOLU sectors include high forest cover and low
rates of deforestation (“HFLD”)139 and low forest cover and low
rates of deforestation (“LFLD”).140 A phased implementation
of biological sequestration starting with REDD that recognizes
indigenous peoples’ rights, as established in COP-16,141 and that
transitions to REALU with AFOLU accounting, would prevent
a delay in emission mitigation from the forestry sector while also
allowing the necessary time for the development and refinement
of REALU with AFOLU.142 A REALU scheme with AFOLU
may not address all of the biological sequestration issues, but it
would alleviate many of the problems with the current efforts to
mitigate forestry emissions under REDD.143

Wetlands: An Example of Biological Carbon
Sequestration Within REALU but Excluded by REDD
Type Schemes
Wetlands include freshwater mineral-soil wetlands, peatlands, and estuarine wetlands (i.e. salt marshes) and in North
America, they are the second largest natural carbon sink.144
Worldwide wetlands store about 223 billion tons of carbon.145
Although wetlands absorb about one-tenth of the amount of carbon as forests, wetlands absorb three times more than agricultural soils.146
While one-tenth might appear to be a small amount, wetlands currently only comprise 5.5% of the U.S. landmass
because land use changes, such as agriculture, have led to the
destruction of over fifty percent of wetlands.147 In the United
States, wetlands sequester thirty-five percent of the nation’s total
terrestrial carbon and further loss of the wetlands would result in
the release of sequestered carbon, increasing the carbon concentration in the atmosphere.148 The North American149 estuarine
wetland carbon sequestration is currently estimated at over ten
million tons per year.150 Collectively, North American wetlands
have the ability to sequester forty-nine million tons of carbon
per year.151 It is important to recognize that although wetlands
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only comprise 5.5% of the total landmass,152 the total sequestered carbon stored in wetlands is sixty-four billion tons, only
slightly less than forests, which store sixty-seven billion tons153
in twenty-five percent more land.154
Wetlands are a much more effective natural carbon sink
than forests. As peatlands are drained and converted from wetlands to other land uses, the carbon oxidizes, which reduces the
carbon captured in wetlands by about fifteen million tons per
year in North America.155 The recognition of wetlands by the
UNFCCC and payment for the service of carbon sequestration
would help mitigate the destruction of wetlands through land use
changes.156

Other Services: Expanding the Carbon Centric
“Partial” Payment for Ecosystem Services to
Recognize Co-Benefits
In addition to storing carbon, forests provide multiple ecosystem services such as soil formation,157 water cycle storage
and release,158 biodiversity conservation,159 and nutrient recycling.160 However, forests under a REDD scheme are only recognized for one ecosystem service, carbon sequestration.161
Although carbon sequestration is an important and necessary ecosystem service provided by forests, the current REDD
scheme can and already has led to the deterioration of other forest ecosystem services.162
The other ecosystem services that are not internalized by
REDD are not only valuable but also necessary for native forests
to survive.163 Although REDD is a PES, in its current insular
form REDD should be viewed as a Partial PES.164 In contrast,
the recognition of and payment for CO2 sequestration, soil formation, water cycle storage and release, biodiversity conservation, and nutrient recycling could be considered a Full PES.165
By recognizing these other economic benefits, mitigation of the
perverse incentives induced by REDD would be mitigated.166
The numerous ailments of the Partial PES REDD are reviewed
below and illustrate the need for the transition to a Full PES,
such as REALU with AFOLU accounting, to protect the forests
and other ecosystems.167

Soil Erosion: What Role Does Flora Coverage Play?
The first ecosystem service that REDD does not recognize
is that provided by soil in reducing or preventing erosion. Erosion occurs when the energy from water or wind is transmitted
to the soil, and it increases after a forest is deforested or temporarily unstocked.168 When raindrops hit exposed soil, such as a
deforested area, the particles of soil and water are launched into
the air.169 When the land is covered by biomass, such as a forest, it protects the land area by dissipating the wind and water
energy, which results in reduced soil erosion.170
After erosion occurs, the quantity of water runoff on the
area of land increases, which reduces the availability of water
for plant vegetation to grow.171 The rate of erosion is often high
on lands with higher gradients, with sometimes half of the soil
within the splash eroding.172 Deforestation on higher gradient
land is regularly used to replace spent agricultural land damaged
by erosion.173
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The eroded soil can end up in ecosystems such as streams
and lakes.174 The shape of the Araguaia River in Brazil has
changed, as sedimentation increased by twenty-eight percent,
and the river became straighter and deeper.175 According to the
U.S. Department of Agriculture, the final destination for sixty
percent of soil erosion is streams.176 The Huang He River in
China, often referred to as the Yellow River because of the color
of the silt, transports and deposits two billion tons of soil per
year into the Gulf of Bohai.177
For a forested area to prevent soil erosion, the forest must
cover a minimum of sixty percent of the land.178 Without the
flora that reduces the rain and wind energy,179 soil erosion results
in a decrease in plant nutrients, such as nitrogen, phosphorus,
potassium, and calcium.180 Without these vital nutrients, yields
in plant growth decrease.181 The eroded soil can contain as much
as three times the nutrient content as the soil that remains.182
Fertilizers and pesticides, derived from hydrocarbons, along
with irrigation, are often used to temporarily mitigate the natural
nutrient depletion from erosion on cropland.183 Once the application of hydrocarbon-based fertilizers and pesticides become
futile against the barren soil, the cropland is abandoned.184 To
replace this wasted land, additional forests are cleared for agricultural use and the cycle repeats.185
While at first glance it may appear that a REDD scheme
would mitigate many of the above soil erosion issues, since
people would be paid to reduce deforestation and forest degradation, if the scheme uses the term “temporarily unstocked” in the
definition of forests as the Kyoto Protocol does, it actually facilitates soil erosion.186 Since the Kyoto Protocol establishes no
duration for a “temporarily unstocked” forest, but still classifies
it as a forest, with enough time, the extent of soil erosion may
have degraded the soil to the point of not allowing the land to be
“restocked” with the forest that once existed.187 Since erosion
increases water runoff, the soil in the “temporarily unstocked”
region will have less moisture because less water has infiltrated
the land, resulting in a decrease in water-storage capacity of
the soil.188 Additionally, the erosion of the soil reduces organic
nutrients and soil depth, which are necessary to restock the forest.189 Restoration of the eroded soil is a slow process that can
take between “200 and 1,000 years to form 2.5 cm (1 inch) of
topsoil under cropland conditions, and even longer under pasture and forest conditions.”190

Water Cycle: Does Variation in Root Depth Matter?
The second ecosystem service not recognized by REDD is
the water cycle storage and release provided by the deep roots of
forests. After a forest is removed as a result of deforestation, the
flora that replaces the forest typically has shallower root structures and fewer leaves, which results in the new flora requiring less water than the forest.191 The evaporation from the new
flora is less than that from a forest because the new flora has
shallower roots.192 This decrease in evaporation reduces the
quantity of water vapor returned to the atmosphere, resulting in
more water runoff from the land and increasing stream flow.193
Thus the shallower roots result in less water availability and
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evapotranspiration during the dry season along with less precipitation during the wet season, all of which negatively impact the
water cycle.194
The degree of impact on the water cycle depends on not
only how the forested land is utilized after deforestation but
also how much of the forest remains.195 Deforestation of twenty
percent or less will have little effect on the water cycle while
deforestation of fifty to one hundred percent, which typically
results from modern agricultural and heavy equipment use, can
result in a large change in the quantity of water runoff.196 In Brazil, the deforestation of about fifty percent of the Tocantins and
Araguaia watersheds over the past fifty years has resulted in a
twenty-five percent annual increase in river discharge.197
The decrease in evapotranspiration, because of the decrease
in root depth,198 impacts the heat flux, resulting in a decrease
in the cooling of the surface soil, equating to higher surface
temperatures, especially during the dry seasons.199 The dry season is vital for reforestation efforts, but because of the impacts
from deforestation, such as a decrease in evapotranspiration
and an increase in surface temperature, there may be a water
shortage.200 This decrease in evapotranspiration can result in
extended drought periods, thus slowing the uptake of the reforestation efforts and possibly making the habitat more hospitable
for drought-resistant species.201
However, there is cause for concern if the project uses a
definition for forests that permits them to be “temporarily
unstocked.”202 Although the removal of the forest is not classified as deforestation, because there is an intention to restock the
forest, the deep roots from the forest are “temporarily” killed.203
Without deep roots, the evapotranspiration will decrease and
the water runoff will increase.204 This in turn makes reforestation efforts more difficult because the quantity of water stored
in the soil has decreased205 and the surface temperature has
increased.206 If schemes allow for forests to be temporarily
unstocked they assume the replanting of the forest and that the
restocking of the forest will negate the initial carbon release.207
Nevertheless, this reasoning is myopic since successful restocking is dependent on the root growth, and reestablishment of deep
roots will likely be more difficult because of longer dry periods
that are “warmer, drier and more intense.”208

Biodiversity: Does REDD’s Focus on Carbon
Concentration Create Perverse Incentives for Other
Ecosystems?
The third ecosystem service that REDD does not internalize is biodiversity of fauna and flora that have a symbiotic relationship with the forest. Forests cover roughly seven percent
of the Earth’s dry land, yet they may contain half of the species on Earth.209 Some species are so particular to their forest
microhabitats that they live nowhere else, which increases the
chances of their extinction.210 After deforestation and loss of
these specialized species, the surrounding fauna and flora may
also face extinction as the biodiversity in the forest decreases
and the habitat becomes fragmented.211 In Riau, Indonesia, the
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tiger population actually declined at a quicker rate than the rate
of deforestation because of habitat fragmentation.212
The fauna and flora also impact the soil composition.213
Before deforestation, the forest soil is teeming with organic matter, possibly supporting up to one thousand species of fauna per
square meter.214 The bacteria and fungi in the soil can add an
additional four to five thousand diverse species.215 However,
the lack of forest cover exposes the soil to erosion, washing the
nutrients from the deforested land and further diminishing biodiversity, and potentially causes the surrounding ecosystem to
collapse.216
Although initially it would appear as though REDD would
complement efforts to protect biodiversity, low-biomass and
high-diversity ecosystems, such as grasslands, savannas, woodlands, and transition forests, may be at a disadvantage for
protection when compared to high-biomass forests, such as
plantations.217 This is because REDD focuses on the quantity of
biological carbon sequestered and thus biomass that sequesters
more carbon, i.e. high-biomass ecosystems, are more advantageous for REDD projects than ecosystems that store less carbon,
i.e. low-biomass ecosystems.218 This focus on carbon concentration in biomass results in a preference for high-biomass
ecosystems even if the low-biomass ecosystem has a higher
conservation value pertaining to biodiversity, soil, and water,
since the focus of REDD is on biomass concentration and not
biodiversity.219 Thus, REDD programs will be more apt to protect high-biomass ecosystems because of the higher return on
investment, which is based on carbon concentration, than that
of a low-biomass high-diversity ecosystem, with the latter likely
being more prone to conversion for agricultural use.220
Forests with high-diversity native ecosystems must also
counter the introduction of alien species that grow quickly, such
as monocrop eucalyptus plantations.221 With REDD’s focus on
high-biomass because of carbon credits, trees that grow quickly,
such as eucalyptus trees, are already encouraging some REDD
projects to introduce these alien monocrop species.222 In Brazil,
in an effort to earn carbon credits, eucalyptus plantations, which
are native to Australia, are replacing savannas and high-diversity
cerrado woodland ecosystems.223 However, these eucalyptus
plantations, since they are non-native, often require fertilizers
and pesticides, which increases the risk of chemical contamination and soil degradation.224 Additionally, the definition of
forests under the Kyoto Protocol makes no requirement that a
temporarily unstocked forest be restocked with species native to
that ecosystem.225
Furthermore, genetically modifying the non-native species
to increase the chance of survival in the foreign habitat is another
risk since species with increased resilience may overtake the
native species.226 These practices currently occur under REDD
projects and is one of the perverse incentives induced by REDD
since the accounting does not recognize a distinction between
carbon stored in genetically modified species versus native species.227 This deficiency in REDD is one of the reasons that organizations are proposing REALU with AFOLU accounting since
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it does recognize the carbon sequestered in native species of the
savannas and woodlands.228
The exclusion of ecosystems from the Kyoto Protocol
separated biodiversity and ecosystems from carbon and climate
change, and has resulted in the UNFCCC ignoring these synergies and placing biodiversity at risk.229 This is unfortunate
and inward-looking by the international community because
only five years prior to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol,
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, more commonly known as the Earth Summit, in Rio
de Janeiro in 1992230 resulted in numerous important achievements, two of which were the Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”)231 and the Framework Convention on Climate
Change (“UNFCCC”),232 the latter of which lead to the Kyoto
Protocol.233
Some might view the link between these two documents as
only being intrinsic, but in 2001, the CBD’s Subsidiary Body
on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice took “note
of the discussion of the interlinkages between biological diversity and climate change.”234 Two years later, the Secretariat of
the CBD released a formal report235 and in 2008, COP-9 of the
CBD recognized the possible use of REDD pertaining to climate
change236 but also the need to monitor “the threats and likely
. . . impacts of climate change mitigation and adaptation activities on biodiversity.”237 In 2009, the Secretariat of the CBD
released a second formal report and a year later at COP-10, the
CBD recognized the need to “enhance the benefits for, and avoid
negative impacts on, biodiversity from [REDD].”238 Moreover
the CBD stressed the need to consider “converting only land of
low biodiversity value or ecosystems largely composed of nonnative species, and preferably degraded ones” while also “avoiding [the use of] invasive alien species.”239
Although the CBD has been proactive in recognizing the
interlinkages between biological diversity and climate change,
the UNFCCC is focused almost exclusively on the objective
outlined in 1992—the adverse affect of anthropogenic climate
change on natural ecosystems and humankind.240 At COP-16, the
AWG-LCA under the Convention indicated that actions should be
“consistent with the conservation of natural forests and biological
diversity” and that they should not be “used for the conversion

of natural forests, but are instead used to incentivize the protection and conservation of natural forests and their ecosystem services, and to enhance other social and environmental benefits.”241
While the AWG-LCA document does mention biodiversity, the
UNFCCC continues to be myopic in regards to biodiversity and
makes no reference or granular distinction like the CBD’s document between low- and high-biodiversity ecosystems or the risk
of introducing alien species, such as eucalyptus trees.242

Conclusion
The accounting of REDD, which focuses on additionality, definitions of forests, leakage, measurement, verification,
and permanence, while all important facets, is not actually the
difficult part of implementing a successful REDD program. 243
These “difficult” facets are merely illusions that hide the true
difficulties of REDD, the loopholes that REDD accounting are
plagued with.244 The lack of protection of other ecosystems and
services beyond CO2 sequestration, which REDD accounting
externalizes instead of internalizes, facilitates the market’s ability to exploit these loopholes, without regard to the externalities
imposed on others.245
REDD accounting currently gives no regard and thus no
value to soil formation, water cycle storage and release, or biodiversity conservation and nutrient recycling.246 REDD simply
facilitates the market determination of the price of carbon stored
at the expense of these other ecosystems and services provided
by nature.247 Adam Smith’s recognition of labor, land, and capital resulted in a more accurate valuation and pricing of these
other ecosystems and services.248 However, REDD in its current
form classifies land as a subcategory of capital by disregarding
these other ecosystem services.249 Although a transition from
REDD to REALU with AFOLU accounting may not mitigate
all of REDD’s externalities, it would help to elevate and start
to recognize land as an equal with labor and capital.250 Therefore, since REDD merely determines the price of carbon without
valuing the other ecosystem services provided by forests, environmentalists, when sequestering and monetizing carbon, must
not forget Oscar Wilde’s definition of a cynic: “[a] man who
knows the price of everything and the value of nothing.”251
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The Tortuous Road to Liability:
A Critical Survey on Climate Change Litigation in Europe and
North America
by Luciano Butti*
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Introduction

limate change is increasingly coming to the fore of public debate. Since the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol on
December 10, 19971 and its entry into force on February 16, 2005,2 the international community has drawn increasing attention to the topic of carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emissions.
The most recent international meetings and political trends, such
as the Copenhagen Climate Conference of 20093 and the latest
steps taken by the U.S. administration4 have resulted in perplexity and criticism from many international commentators.5 Critics
have argued that “the Copenhagen Accord left most substantive
disagreements unresolved.”6 However, these recent developments have paved the way for a more informed debate on global
warming and environmental issues in general.7
The development of high-profile domestic and global discussion has also impacted the legal realm.8 In recent years, particularly since 2006,9 climate change lawsuits have increased in
quantity and in sophistication, presenting one of the newest challenges within the public law arena. The increased sophistication
of climate change lawsuits is a result of individuals who recognize that climate regulation is an issue for both governments and
citizens to pursue. This mounting public awareness is evident in
U.S. climate change lawsuits. The vast majority of U.S. climate
change-related claims are based on individual or communal
actions meant to influence industrial and environmental policies
by promoting regulation and impact assessment. The U.S. focus
on “regulatory claims,” rather than on tort law claims, is mainly
due to the difficulties individual applicants face in showing locus
standi, in demonstrating direct liability of the entity sued, and in
finding a feasible pathway for redressability. On the other hand,
European climate change litigation has blossomed out of private
and governmental market-induced interests, as they have been
brought primarily with respect to “carbon market” issues. Such
a tendency has clearly been highlighted by European Union
Courts’ case law concerning the European Union Emissions
Trading System (“EU ETS”) Directive.
An additional method of linking climate change to legal
claims is the presentation of individual actions for damages
directly associated with global warming-related human rights
violations. Although important, such an approach to climate
change litigation is still far from being widely accepted by
courts. The decisions of the European Court of Human Rights
(“ECtHR”) and the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (“IACHR”) are not encouraging for the prospects of the
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viability of human rights claims within the climate change context. Therefore, it may be a long time before climate change litigation becomes commonplace among individual rights claims.
This article provides an overview of the evolution of climate
change related litigation, highlighting the differences and similarities between the U.S. and the European context. Additionally, the article analyzes the future perspective of such claims
and concludes with a discussion concerning the possibility of
linking climate change to human rights.

Climate Change Litigation:
The United States Scenario
Recent U.S. case law involving climate change demonstrates
that most successful claims concern existing regulations. This is
due to the specific aims that applicants pursue, using “existing
law—primarily environmental law—to force or block regulatory behavior” in response to policy failures.10 Thus what climate
change litigation has so far achieved is to effectively function as a
“gap-filling role” as defined by Professor Hari Osofsky.11
The results of a recent study relating to climate change cases
filed through the end of 2009 highlights that the courts play a
pivotal role in governance, especially with respect to partially
unregulated areas such as those of environmental law, regulation, and responsibility.12 The same survey depicts a situation
where almost 40.5% of legal actions related to climate change
are brought to achieve “substantive mitigation regulation.” 13
Therefore, most controversies are based on the willingness of
public bodies, states, companies, or non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) to urge for public intervention, focusing on
the necessity of the limitations of the promulgation of statutes
and policies establishing more stringent limits on emissions.
The 2006 U.S. Supreme Court case of Massachusetts v. EPA14
is probably the most distinguished example of a regulatory claim
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in the context of climate change.15 Twelve states, three cities, a
U.S. territory, and several NGOs claimed that the Environmental
Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) denial of a petition to address CO2
emissions was an arbitrary exercise of the EPA’s mandatory
function.16 Many petitions of the same nature17 have been filed
by public and private actors18 in state and federal U.S. courts
to promote enhanced regulation of carbon dioxide emissions
and to force public authorities to take positive action in limiting
CO2 pollution. Such pressures by both public and private actors
ultimately resulted in urging public authorities to reform the
existing regulatory framework, which happened mainly through
the modification of existing laws. Examples of these modifications may be found in some of the major environmental related
acts such as the Clean Air Act of 2000 (“CAA”) or the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”).19 The aforementioned statistics uncontrovertibly demonstrate that in most circumstances “climate change litigation . . . represents an effort to
fill perceived regulatory gaps.”20
A second trend playing a dominant part in U.S. climate
change litigation is what Professors David Markell and J.B.
Ruhl have defined as “Procedural Monitoring, Impact Assessment, and Information Reporting.”21 Claims that fall within this
category are similar in scope to those of the “regulatory claims
model” outlined above, as they seek to impose on public or private entities new or more stringent obligations in monitoring,
assessing, or disclosing the environmental impact of activities
that such entities perform. An example of this type of claim is
the complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief that Greenpeace, Friends of Earth, and four U.S. cities filed against a private investment corporation and a bank for the failure to produce
an environmental impact assessment when developing heavily
polluting overseas projects.22 Some fifty-five petitions of this
kind have been filed in U.S. courts with the same monitoring
and assessment purpose,23 representing the majority of the U.S.
climate change related claims.
Thirdly, tort claims, mostly public nuisance and negligence,
have also been brought in U.S. litigation.24 However, case law
concerning the violation of individual rights and liabilities represents only a small minority of the legal arguments brought
before U.S. judges when compared to the amount of cases aimed
at pushing authorities toward a more efficient, large-scale regulation of CO2 emissions.25 Although tort law as a basis for climate change challenges has advanced from a situation in which
“such cases were . . . derided as frivolous long shots that would
be shot down quickly”26 to one in which more reliance is placed
in claims of individual harms from CO2 emitters, such claims
have yet to result in fully successful outcomes.
The difficulties complainants encounter are numerous when
seeking redress of environmental wrongs linked with carbon
emissions through tort actions.27 The primary hurdle for applicants is demonstrating substantial interest for standing.28 The
“classic” U.S. theory of environmental locus standi does not fit
the peculiar requirements of climate change.29 Climate change
usually does not entail the existence of a specific natural feature (e.g. a river or a forest) which human behavior is about to
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despoil or endanger. On the contrary, climate change stems from
a multiplicity of sources and affects different aspects of the environment including: arctic melting, rising sea-levels, and disappearing endangered species due to changed weather conditions;
these are merely examples of the numerous, yet unpredictable,
consequences of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere.30
Since it is difficult to identify the specific harms that may affect
the environment and the specific species that are at risk of being
endangered, it is that much more difficult for a judicial panel to
grant standing to the plaintiffs.31
The most difficult standing-related hardship that applicants
must face when filing emissions-related court claims is proving
an emitter’s direct responsibility. It is often argued that there
are not a definitive number of entities liable for climate change,
or that, on the contrary, this number is too great. Scholars have
tried to overcome such hurdles by applying innovative theories
on climate change liability,32 some of which aim to establish a
link between local causation and local consequences.33 These
doctrines may prove successful in those cases where the damages at stake are clearly identifiable (and, therefore, the obstacle
of locus standi has already been surmounted) and where such
damages occur in areas where major emitters directly operate.
Also, the application of the environmentally based precautionary principle to tort litigation may provide a clearer basis for
allocating liability, thereby providing a reverse burden of proof
under which “economic actors are liable unless they can prove
that their activities are environmentally harmless.”34 Such a
principle though, despite having been frequently recognized
as a “general principle of international law,”35 has not yet been
accepted by U.S. courts, so that future applications within the
United States still appear highly improbable.
However, even if these doctrines may sometimes prove successful, applicants may not always find the road to redress clear
of impediments since “there is at present no international liability framework directly applicable to climate change-related damage.”36 This is demonstrated, for instance, by the unfortunate
outcome of Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company,37
in which plaintiffs unsuccessfully alleged infringement by six U.S.
power companies (alleged to be major polluters with respect to carbon dioxide emissions) of federal and state public nuisance law.38
Although the decision was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit,39 the District Court decision represents a
valuable example of an approach that is still frequently adopted by
U.S. courts. Even if it were proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
climate change-related damages had actually occurred, it would
nonetheless be difficult to identify the entity liable for damages.40
Finally, there is one other barrier to justiciability which
may be the most difficult to overcome. The “political question
doctrine” permits judges to defer climate change questions for
political consideration reason.41 The doctrine highlights the fact
that climate change concerns are more appropriate for the legislative branch of the government than for the judiciary.42 The
original District Court’s decision in Connecticut v. American
Electric Power Co. aligned with this doctrine,43 which is now at
the center of the American debate.44
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Nevertheless, tort claims have attracted a lot of attention
from the public. Many “liability” actions result in widespread
discussion. Some of the most renowned examples include the
Inuit Circumpolar Conference Petition, which will be further
examined below,45 or the Hurricane Katrina case,46 in which
victims of the Katrina hurricane sought compensation from CO2
emitters for loss of private property and use of public property.47
In light of the above, it can be concluded that the U.S.
approach to climate change litigation has been primarily based
on regulatory claims. Although it is debatable whether the CAA
is the most suitable instrument for addressing such problems,48
it is nonetheless clear that judicial rulings cannot substitute for
robust and stringent policies on global warming and carbon
emissions, and that the “abdication of congressional responsibility” feared by some commentators should be avoided.49 Despite
the fact that many, even within Congress, applauded the initiatives undertaken by the Supreme Court, viewing them as ways
to enact CO2 controls without directly taking responsibility for
them, it has been noted that such ceding of legislative power to
non elected litigators and judges may ultimately endanger the
principle of representative democracy.50

Climate Change Litigation:
The European Scenario
European climate change litigation has differed from that
of the U.S. mainly because of the diverse and less homogeneous
framework that characterizes Europe. Each European state tends to
tackle domestic issues, including those related to the environment,
with a unique and cultural-specific approach, not only from a legal
perspective, but also from political and cultural points of view.
To identify a common European trend, it is necessary to
reference the supranational political framework provided by the
European Union (“EU”) institutions, which have been far-sighted
in enacting a thorough regulation of greenhouse gas emissions.
When analyzing EU climate change policies, recall that the EU,
which was born out of the ashes of a purely economic entity,51
is facing a difficult process of integrating political, military,
financial, and cultural aspects.52 This process is ongoing, with
many purported goals still unachieved, and the road to further
unification seems at present tortuous and uncertain.53 Although
important steps have been taken to allow individuals to use the
European Union Foundation Treaties, which include the defense
of individual subjective rights,54 when European Union litigation
is involved (the Luxembourg-based Court of First Instance and
European Court of Justice) the concerns of applicants and defendants are arguably of a purely economic nature.55
Directive 2003/87/EC established a greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system within the Community56 commonly known as the Emissions Trading Scheme (“ETS”),57
which fixes a number of allowances for the quantity of CO2 that
can be emitted by a single Member state over a particular period;
the level of emissions in such period shall then “be equal to the
established cap.”58 Under the ETS, Member states may buy and
sell allowances, thereby creating a supply and demand model
that forms a basis for the European carbon market.
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As a result, carbon market litigation has ensued, resulting in
a considerable number of proceedings before the Luxembourg
Courts, which have been conceptually divided into the following three categories:59 challenges to the validity of the Directive,60 infringement proceedings,61 and challenges to decisions
of the European Commission on the National Allocation Plans62
designed by Member states for re-allocating the allowances
to national installations.63 The case of Abraham and Others64
slightly detaches itself from this categorization since the applicants asked the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) to interpret
the European Environmental Impact Assessment Directive
(85/337/EEC) so that restructuring of the Liège-Bierset Airport
could be included within the definition of “project” set out in
the directive, and the environmental impact assessment could be
considered mandatory for the restructuring.65
Although many claims have been brought with respect to
carbon market issues, regulatory claims are similarly predominant in Europe. Even the abovementioned case of Abraham and
Others, although directly linked to the impact of potentially polluting works on the well being of a community, was aimed at
triggering inclusionary interpretation by the ECJ of a specific
regulation.66 Evidently, little room is left for individual applications aimed at recovering damages suffered as a result of global
warming and, therefore, linked to CO2 emissions. Currently
“EU ETS litigation is not concerned with the impacts of climate
change . . . but rather the finessing of a new market mechanism
from the perspective of key market actors within the established
confines of EU law.”67
The implications of this mainly regulatory approach to climate change litigation are even worse for Europe than they are
for the U.S. Although the U.S. carbon emissions framework is
in dire need of further regulation,68 and though litigation may
not be a completely adequate substitute for legislative control,
the benefits of litigation far outweigh the drawbacks of total
inaction. In Europe, where the ETS is the core of the carbon
emission regulatory framework, climate change related claims
are primarily concerned only with the applications of such a
scheme.69 The influence of the resulting jurisprudence thus ends
up being considerably more limited, and the possibilities of evolution more scant.
In addition, other criticisms may arise. Firstly, as has
already been mentioned, regulation is not considered by some
as an appropriate task for judges. Even though such an assertion
is debatable, it will always be difficult for counter-arguments to
prevail, even from a theoretical standpoint.70 It may be argued,
for instance, that the strict “separation of tasks” theory, which
some British judges are already accustomed to,71 is often supported by governments, entities, and courts for nothing but specious reasons.72 Such arguments, though, appear particularly
difficult to prove, and the “spatial separation of competence
theory” remains difficult to rebut.73
Secondly, once a regulatory mechanism has been successfully implemented, it may not suffice on its own to reduce the
effects that greenhouse gases have on the environment.74 As
Philippe Cullet argues, “[I]t cannot be expected that the Climate
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Change Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, or any other protocol .
. . would be sufficient to effectively mitigate global warming so
as to avert the need for adaptation . . . .”75 In other words, the
EU ETS Directive, as well as the other international instruments
mentioned by Cullet, should be supported by a more complete
framework of policies (for instance, liability schemes applicable
at the international level), in order to be more effective at preventing—or at least in limiting—climate change.
Thirdly, a lack of political willingness to attain a stricter liability regime for ecological damages exists. The European Environmental Liability Directive, which entered into force in 200976
with the purpose of harmonizing the concept of pollution and the
reinstatement of regimes throughout the region, has been until
now heavily criticized for not having provided Europe with the
expected uniformity with regard to liability for ecological damages.77 Similarly, the 1993 Lugano Convention on Civil Liability
for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment,78 which established tougher rules for liability for environmental damages,79 has not yet been ratified or entered into force.80
The above analysis clearly does not favor a bright future for a
comprehensive civil liability regime for damages stemming from
carbon dioxide emissions.81 The outcomes of the efforts made
by applicants in the human rights law arena are not any more
encouraging.

Linking Climate Change to Human Rights
Recent attempts to link climate change claims to human
rights principles have not achieved any revolutionary outcomes.
While several human rights-based petitions alleging climate
change damages have been filed in international or regional tribunals, none of them has yet come to a completely favorable
conclusion for the applicants.
The Inuit petition filed at the IACHR,82 by far the most
famous case in which a human rights-focused body addressed
climate change, featured applicants seeking “relief from human
rights violations resulting from the impacts of global warming
and climate change caused by acts and omissions of the United
States.”83 The action was brought against the U.S. for being the
largest emitter of greenhouse gases and because, according to
the applicants, it continually refused to undertake serious efforts
to reduce emissions.84 The IACHR rejected the petition, holding
that the information provided by the claimants did not enable the
Commission to determine whether the alleged facts entailed a
violation of the rights protected by the American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man.85 Even though a subsequent hearing could be held by the IACHR focusing on “the right to use
and enjoy property; the right of peoples to enjoy the benefits of
culture; and the rights to life, physical integrity, and security,”86
no further action has been taken.87
The Inuit petition outcome may sound surprising, especially
in light of the fact that the IACHR had previously upheld indigenous people’s claims related to violations of rights analogous
to those mentioned in the petition.88 However, the Inuit petition distinguishes itself from other indigenous communities’
legal actions because of its peculiar liability-related aspects. It is
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difficult to establish direct links of causation between emitters,
no matter how big they are, and damages when climate change
is involved. In addition, it can be argued that a decision holding
the United States responsible for arctic melting and other damages related to CO2 emissions would have ended up being too
big of a step, providing legal basis for claimants all around the
world to sue Western industrialized countries for sea-level rise,
hurricanes, flooding, and other effects of climate change. It is
undisputable that politically revolutionary decisions have to be
balanced with political counter-interests that cannot be set aside:
therefore, justices and commissioners tend to be cautious before
allowing potentially destabilizing claims to succeed.
In Europe, claimants have not been any more successful. The
ECtHR, based in Strasbourg and acting within the framework of
the 1951 European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”),89
is renowned for being the most important tribunal for assessing
human rights claims in Europe and one of the most efficient civil
rights monitoring bodies in the world.90 However, the area pertaining to environmental damages is a partially neglected area in
the ECtHR’s case law: successful claims in connection with the
environment have so far been grounded mostly on Article 8 of
the ECHR on protection of private and family life, broadly interpreted so as to include interferences with individuals’ well-being
caused by public nuisance and environmental damage.91 In the
context of violation of property rights,92 the Court has also recognized that “the environment is a value in itself in which both
society and the public authorities take keen interest.”93 Although
the ECtHR has recently begun to consider the precautionary
principle, while assessing claims on unlawful interference on the
applicant’s right to a healthy life,94 there are several obstacles
that impede climate change-related claims from being justiciable
within the ECHR framework.
First, for a claim to succeed, applicants must demonstrate
a concrete interference of their rights beyond all doubt.95 Given
that the Convention does not provide for an express right to a
safe and healthy environment, whether the latter is included
within the scope of Article 8 (the right to private and family life)
or Article 1, Protocol 1 (the right to peaceful enjoyment of possession) of the ECHR, is a matter of interpretation. In light of
the abovementioned case law, this hurdle may not seem insurmountable. However, climate change claims are different from
the classic “environmental claims” brought before the ECtHR
because in the former no explicit link between emissions and
damages can be easily demonstrated.96
Second, in the unlikely case of an incontrovertible causal
relationship between greenhouse gases and local damages in
Europe, the “margin of appreciation” doctrine could serve as
a convenient tool for the ECtHR judges to defer the matter to
the national regulatory level.97 In short, once a private or public entity has satisfactorily demonstrated that domestic law on
greenhouse gas emissions has not been infringed upon, the
Court could decide to leave this sensitive area of judgment to the
discretion of national Member states’ authorities (legislators and
judges), thereby abiding by the Court’s subsidiary role.98

Sustainable Development Law & Policy

It has been recently argued that the ECtHR should address
climate change within the scope of the right to property, namely
that of protecting private low-carbon investors against risks of
excessive state interference through regulatory changes and the
imposition of heavy financial burdens.99 This innovative and practical approach is proof that there are strong countervailing interests (namely, those of investors and corporations) that should be
balanced with the perceived need of establishing the civil liability
of corporations and emitters. These countervailing interests are
worth considering if their aim is “stimulat[ing] the flow of private
capital in the implementation of low-carbon investments.”100
In other fora, more attention has been drawn to the human
rights implications of climate change. For example, in Gbemre
v. Shell101 the Federal High Court of Nigeria held that gas flaring, an unconstitutional practice in breach of the fundamental
human right to health, also contributes to adverse climate change
as it emits carbon dioxide.102 The case is particularly important
because it is “one of the first where a national court held that
climate change, like other environmental issues, may implicate
human rights.”103 However, the Nigerian judges’ conclusions on
climate change are not final and do not address global warming
directly since gas flaring was the real underlying issue in the case.
In light of the above, it is clear that counter-interests
have thus far prevailed over the commitment of states to take
a strong standpoint against violations of fundamental human
rights caused by human-induced global warming. Arguments
against linkages between climate change and human rights law
have been brought on several grounds, including the idea that
international human rights actors and tribunals should prioritize
other emergencies (which are also depicted as easier to cope
with in legal terms) and concerns relating to the current trend
of excessive anthropocentricity under which climate change is
currently being approached.104 The most convincing explanation of the scant success obtained by climate change petitions
in human rights fora seems to be, however, the one which links
together hypothetical favorable judgments and their potential
consequences, and which takes into account the countervailing economic interests of major public and private emitters.105
The unwillingness of domestic tribunals throughout the world
to acknowledge the existence of “environmental refugees” (who
often flee from their countries because of the consequences of
climate change) and to grant to such migrants the state-onerous
refugee status is clearly another side of the same story.106 In this
sense, the obstacles that prevent human rights tribunals from
intervening directly in the climate change issue are similar to
those that actors seeking redress in domestic tort actions have
found.

Conclusion: Bleak Prospects for Civil Liability?
Notwithstanding the recent developments of the environmental liability doctrine, which seems to be undergoing a process of strong “internationalization,”107 it can be concluded
that the road to clear and convincing guidelines for establishing liability in cases of climate change-originated damages still
appears to be long and tortuous. Even those authors who have
tried to provide climate change litigation advocates with a “more
realistic understanding of the scientific reality of causation” that
“will suitably address climate change”108 have had to deal with
the fact that the proposed solution of making recourse to “probabilistic causation” still leaves several problems unsolved.109
Moreover, all the proposed “technical” solutions for establishing airtight causational links tend to overlook the political and
institutional problems underlying the task that courts should perform in relation to climate change. As it has been argued in this
article, there is a lack of commitment by governments, judges, and
other public and private multinational actors to allow the courts
to take over the role, which many see as best left to domestic
and international regulators. Should a court provide leeway for
claimants to obtain redress for damages not strictly linked to local
infringements, more petitions would proliferate and the consequences on the international equilibrium would be immense.
The scenarios discussed may be satisfying to those who are
“skeptical that tort litigation will be an effective way to combat climate change.”110 However, from a different standpoint,
this “skeptical” approach appears to be misplaced as it tends to
confuse the regulatory function with that of assessing damages.
While on the one hand it is difficult to rebut the critiques that
regulation should be left to the government, on the other hand
one could object that the “skeptical” approach would sound
more reasonable if applied to regulatory claims, which have
proved to be the most successful up to now. On the contrary,
establishing standing, liability, and redressability is an appropriate task for the judiciary to carry out.111
Civil liability is still far from taking root in the climate change
litigation context for different reasons. They are grounded on
the far-sightedness that judicial panels have so far demonstrated
in dealing with this area of litigation. Judges are often conscious
of the vast, wide-ranging consequences (involving, inter alia,
economic, energetic, developmental, and migratory issues) that
holding an American or European actor responsible for damages
occurring thousands of miles away would entail in legal terms.
Consequently, before innovative liability principles are established, decision-makers, such as national legislators, must ask if
the climate change litigation floodgates are ready to be opened.
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Hazy Skies in America’s Future?:
The Battle Between “Free Industry” And Clean Air
by Oded Cedar*

A

series of Republican-supported bills in the 112th Congress are aimed at preventing the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) from regulating the heaviest
polluting industries in America.1 At the forefront is H.R. 97—
short-titled the Free Industry Act—a bill introduced by Rep.
Marsha Blackburn (R-TN) and sponsored by 120 other representatives.2 H.R. 97 would amend the Clean Air Act (“CAA”)
to exclude a series of greenhouse gases (“GHG”) from the list
of pollutants that the EPA can regulate.3 Media sources have
already pointed out that H.R. 97 will likely die in the Senate or
by Presidential veto.4 Regardless, H.R. 97 indicates an agenda to
impede EPA regulatory authority that could rise to the forefront
should Republicans take control of Congress.5 The philosophy
that undergirds H.R. 97 represents a paralytic force to U.S. climate change policy, and policymakers should begin drafting
solutions now before H.R. 97 and similar bills become a reality.
The CAA is a cornerstone of U.S. climate change policy,
and the EPA is the primary vehicle through which the federal
government enforces the provisions of the CAA.6 Congress
successively increased the EPA’s authority to regulate harmful pollutants under the CAA with amendments in 19777 and
1990.8 GHG emissions entered the dialogue in 2007 when the
Supreme Court decided Massachusetts v. EPA, mandating that
the EPA had the authority to regulate GHG emissions pursuant to the CAA.9 In 2009, the EPA issued an Endangerment
Finding, stating that GHG emissions posed a serious health risk
for the population and environment.10 With the support of the
Obama Administration, the EPA declared that it would pursue
new regulations for mobile and stationary sources.11 It is against
this backdrop that Republicans in the 112th Congress levy their
attacks against the EPA.
Supporters of H.R. 97 (“97’ers”) wish to strip the EPA of
its regulatory authority because they claim that stricter GHG
standards will “kill” American industrial jobs.12 The 97’ers first
argue that the detrimental effects of GHG emissions are uncertain and require more research before the EPA can move to
regulate those emissions.13 The argument continues that stricter
regulations will force companies to expend money installing
new equipment and put American jobs at risk.14 There is evidence that lends credence to the 97’ers’ economic argument, but
most of it comes from industry-led reports.15
The two largest stationary sources of GHG emissions
are the electric power industry (oil, natural gas, and coal) and
manufacturing, producing an estimated 51.3% of U.S. GHG
emissions in 2007.16 The oil and natural gas industries directly
employ roughly two million people,17 coal employs about ninety
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thousand,18 and manufacturing employs around twelve million
people.19 With more than fourteen million people employed by
these industries (not including “supporting” industries),20 it is
reasonable to assume that new regulations could cause potential job losses. However, the 97’ers’ argument fails to consider
the potential for job creation resulting from new technology and
programs required to comply with these regulations.21 Instead,
H.R. 97 proposes an extreme political maneuver that threatens to
dismantle the core of U.S. climate change policy.
By eliminating EPA’s authority to regulate GHG, H.R.
97 unleashes a host of consequences. Without the EPA as the
regulatory authority, state governments will have the choice, or
obligation, to regulate GHG emissions. This means a patchwork
of regulations from state to state instead of one uniform federal
standard.22 Companies who wish to escape GHG regulations
may decide to move to states without emissions standards.23
Also, without GHG regulations, it is unlikely that industrial
companies will invest in “clean tech,” only further delaying U.S.
entrance into a growing global marketplace with $7.8 billion in
investment in 2010.24 Finally, there is no way to measure how
much credibility the U.S. will lose in the international climate
change dialogue without an effective policy in place.25
H.R. 97 is part of a broader Republican plan to dismantle the
EPA.26 The bills presented in the 112th Congress bear an eerie
resemblance to bills presented by Republicans during the 111th
legislative session.27 To assume that Republicans will not present
these bills in the 113th Congress would be foolish. Policymakers
who favor a strong climate change policy must take affirmative
steps to entrench the EPA’s authority to regulate GHG emissions.
Amending the CAA or passing an authorization bill would be two
ways of accomplishing this goal.28 Although the political distribution of the 112th Congress is unlikely to allow the entrenchment
efforts to succeed, it could provide a rally-point for all those in the
public who stand against H.R. 97.
Endnotes: Hazy Skies in America's Future?
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Africa and the Climate Change Agenda:
Hurdles and Prospects in Sustaining the Outcomes of the Seventh
African Development Forum
by James Forole Jarso (HSC)*
Climate change has become one of the biggest developmental challenges facing the planet. The challenges are even more
pronounced and significant for the African continent, because
of its levels of poverty and low capacity to adapt. . . . Time has
now come that we collectively as nations [and] individually in
our right have to do something to avert consequences of climate
change in order to avoid a future catastrophe. We need to act
now, because if we do not, the development gains that we have
attained in our countries will be lost, thereby leaving more people in poverty. – Dr. Bingu wa Mutharika1

O

Introduction

ver the past decade or so, climate change has been regularly cited as one of the biggest impediments to Africa’s
realization of sustainable growth and development.2 In
particular, African leaders have been warned that, in light of the
immense challenges posed by the phenomenon, the continent
stands a very marginal chance of making meaningful progress
towards achievement of the Millennium Development Goals
(“MDGs”) by 2015.3 It cannot be gainsaid that these warnings
are not without basis. Climate change commands significant
influence on Africa’s performance; it portends innumerable
socio-economic and political challenges for the continent, which
has perennially garnered “breaking news” coverage largely for
the appalling humanitarian catastrophes on its soil.
Though it contributes only about 3.8% of the total greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions,4 the continent constantly experiences the adverse impacts of climate change, as a result of its
high poverty levels and low capacity to adapt.5 For example,
the continent’s food security situation has continually worsened
as the productivity of rain-fed agriculture, the main source of
livelihood for most Africans, frequently slumps due to erratic
rainfall patterns;6 massive livestock losses have been caused by
successive prolonged droughts in virtually every corner of the
continent;7 sea level rise (leading to coastal erosion) and flooding (even in areas that never before experienced floods) have
become a common sight;8 persistent and new health problems
are increasingly reported in virtually every corner of the vast
continent;9 and violent conflicts have become the order of the
day as environmental migrants and local communities clash over
control of, or access to, resources.10 Worryingly, the effects of
climate change have proved to be akin to Russian roulette, with
every pull of the trigger posing risks for all, and the poor bearing
the heaviest brunt because of their dependence on the surrounding environment for their survival.11
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Today, issues relating to climate change are addressed in a
plethora of treaties adopted within the United Nations (“UN”)
framework. These international instruments include the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”),12
which was adopted at the landmark UN Conference on Environment and Development (“Earth Summit”) in 1992 as part of
the package to save the planet along with the UN Convention
to Combat Desertification (“Desertification Convention”),13
and the Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”), which
seeks to ensure conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity,
as well as fair and equitable sharing of the benefits of genetic
resources.14 Other instruments related to climate change which
were subsequently created include the Kyoto Protocol to the
UNFCCC (“Kyoto Protocol”),15 which establishes legally binding obligations for the developed countries to reduce their GHG
emissions and, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (“Cartagena
Protocol”), which was adopted (as a supplement to the CBD)
to protect biodiversity from the potential risks posed by living
modified organisms (“LMOs”) resulting from modern biotechnology.16 In their formal acknowledgment of the importance of
climate change issues, African countries have overwhelmingly
subscribed to these instruments.17
Africa’s predicament has received formal acknowledgement in various circles. Within the inter-governmental African
Union (“AU”) framework, on several occasions climate change
has garnered the attention of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government (“the Assembly”). For instance, in January 2007,
the Assembly called upon the AU Member States to integrate
climate change into their respective national development programs.18 In February 2009, the Assembly emphasized the need
for international climate change negotiations to give Africa an
opportunity to demand compensation for damage caused by
global warming.19 More importantly, the Assembly approved
the Algiers Declaration on Climate Change (“Algiers Declaration”),20 thereby paving way for the building of a common
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African Position in preparation for the fifteenth Conference of
the Parties to the UNFCCC (“COP-15”).21
In July 2009, the Assembly, among other things: 1) established the Conference of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (“CAHOSCC”)22 to spearhead
leadership in the climate change negotiation process;23 2) urged
the CAHOSCC, all ambassadors, and negotiators to use the
approved African Common Position24 to achieve optimal results
for the continent;25 and 3) authorized the AU Commission to
facilitate the AU’s accession to the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the CBD.26 Then, in February 2010, the Assembly
requested the CAHOSCC to establish a streamlined single negotiating structure at both Ministerial and Expert levels.27
At the inter-ministerial level of the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (“AMCEN”), climate change issues
were addressed on a number of occasions. The agenda was officially floated at the Conference’s twelfth session in Johannesburg,
laying the groundwork for the preparation of a common continental position on climate change.28 Shortly thereafter the special
session on climate change, which also had the African Group of
Negotiators in attendance, adopted the Nairobi Declaration on the
African Process for Combating Climate Change,29 which, among
other things: 1) noted with concern the inadequacy, complexity,
and fragmentation of the existing climate financing mechanisms,
as well as the constraints faced by African countries in accessing these facilities;30 2) reaffirmed the adoption (by the Assembly)
of the Algiers Declaration, and “the need [for African countries]
to speak with one voice in the negotiations process for the new
legally binding global climate change regime;”31 3) stressed that
“Africa’s priorities are to implement climate change programmes
on adaptation . . . , in particular to alleviate poverty and attain
the Millennium Development Goals, with emphasis on the most
vulnerable groups, especially women and children;”32 and 4) recognized the need “to ensure coordination and coherence in the
implementation” of existing climate change adaptation and mitigation actions in Africa.33
Within the framework of the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (“NEPAD”),34 the Action Plan of the Environment Initiative affirms the continent’s concerns vis-à-vis the
challenges posed by climate change, and provides for climate
change as one of the core priority areas to be addressed by the
continent’s leadership.35 On the realization that climate change
poses a key challenge to environmental sustainability, biodiversity, and food security in Africa, through its Climate Change and
Natural Resource Management program, NEPAD provides a
platform on which the continent’s players share knowledge and
experiences in addressing the fast-creeping threat.36
Climate change issues have equally garnered the attention of various forums, in particular the African Development
Forum (“ADF”), a biennial multi-stakeholder gathering committed to building consensus and mobilizing partners for Africa’s
development. The 2010 Seventh African Development Forum
(“ADF VII”), whose theme was “Acting on Climate Change for
Sustainable Development in Africa,” was jointly organized by
the Addis Ababa-based UN Economic Commission for Africa
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(“UNECA”), the AU Commission, and the Tunis-based African
Development Bank (“AfDB”).37 The participants, drawn from
diverse stakeholders,38 deliberated on the challenges and opportunities presented by climate change in Africa, and, after the
five days of intensive panel discussions and parallel sessions,
adopted a common statement (“Consensus Statement”) with
some fifty-six points of agreement.39
This article aims to unearth the challenges and prospects
in sustaining the outcomes of these principled negotiations for
the African continent to make lasting progress in addressing the
effects and impacts of climate change and variability.

Understanding the Forum
On the Forum Generally
The African Development Forum (“ADF”) is a joint initiative of UNECA, the AU Commission, and the AfDB.40 It is
Africa’s pioneer multi-stakeholder platform established with a
view to establishing a consensual African-driven development
agenda, and mobilizing partners for Africa’s development.41
Every forum has a designated theme, on which deliberations
are based. Initially, it was intended that the Forum be convened
annually. However, after the second ADF, in 2000, the participants agreed that the Forum be convened biennially. Thus, the
third ADF was held in 2002, instead of 2001. The seventh ADF
VII was recently held in October 2010 and the eighth ADF VIII
is slated for 2012.

ADF VII: A Contextual Overview
Thematic Focus of the Forum
ADF VII was devoted to discussions on climate change and
participants were tasked to examine the challenges and opportunities presented by the phenomenon, with a view to, within the
global context, identifying long-term actions to ensure Africa’s
development process is climate resilient.42 The discussions were
carried out against the backdrop of the realization that climate
change is one of the biggest threats to sustainable growth and
development in Africa.

Objectives of the Forum
Generally, ADF VII was intended to provide a multistakeholder platform to discuss and build consensus on how to
mainstream climate change concerns into development policies,
strategies, programs and practices in Africa, and to strengthen
the African Common Position to ensure that it adequately
reflected the continent’s concerns and priorities in the on-going
international climate change negotiations.43
Specifically, the Forum was convened to accomplish several goals. First, it considered the evidence and impacts of climate change in Africa and the need for adequate information and
services to better inform decision-making and actions.44 Second, it deliberated on the challenges and opportunities climate
change poses in Africa and policy-making,45 while promoting
cooperation in sharing of best practices and lessons-learned.46
Finally, within the framework of the demonstrated evidence and
impacts of, as well as the challenges and opportunities presented
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by, climate change, the Forum defined priority actions and
measures, built new strategic alliances and partnerships, and
provided momentum for the African Common Position, in preparation for the sixteenth Conference of the Parties (“COP-16”)
in Cancún, Mexico.47

Adf Vii: Highlight of the Key Outcomes
On the premise of the evidence presented, which reflected
climate change as a serious, urgent, and compelling reality in
Africa,48 the participants concluded the Common Statement,
which embodies some fifty-six points of agreement. The key
ones are highlighted below.

Consensus on the African Common Position
With a view to enhancing the continent’s position in the
international climate change processes, ADF VII participants
agreed that African countries and their leadership should engage
all relevant stakeholders in the on-going climate change discussions, and in particular, build the continent’s capacity through a
coordinated, effective, and representative position to effectively
participate in the relevant international negotiations, in order to
ensure that the outcomes reflect the continent’s concerns and priorities.49 The agreement also pledged to support implementation
of decisions and resolutions of the AU Assembly, the AMCEN,
and other relevant continental bodies in regard to climate change
concerns for the continent.50

Leadership for Climate Change Response
On the understanding that African leaders and their development partners have critical roles to play in implementing
Africa’s climate change agenda, participants also agreed that
African leaders and their development partners should strongly
support the CAHOSCC to enable it to effectively mobilize political commitment and provide effective political leadership. Further, there were pledges to demonstrate additional leadership.51
These included commitments relating to: 1) taking bold decisions on the issue of innovative climate change financing mechanisms, including proper carbon pricing to complement funding
under the UNFCCC;52 2) educating the public to enhance understanding of climate change and variability; 3) garnering support
necessary to meet national commitments; and 4) addressing the
fallacy that developed countries only have a charitable obligation to finance climate change actions in developing countries.53

The Role of the Private Sector
On the understanding that the private sector54 has a vital role
to play in addressing climate change in Africa, the participants
agreed that African governments should “create an enabling
policy environment to encourage the private sector to harness
its expertise, resources and creativity.”55 Related to this pledge,
there was agreement to create and develop partnerships between
public, private, and civil society stakeholders.56
Further, the participants called on African governments
to “establish minimum standards for local and Foreign Direct
Investments” (“FDIs”) that were appropriate for both national
needs and the private sector.57 Finally, there was a pledge to
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“encourage research and development that will create Africaspecific technological solutions . . . taking into account [the continent’s] rich indigenous knowledge systems.”58

Key Outcomes on Food Security and Economic
Development59
In the Consensus Agreement, ADF VII participants pledged
a number of sector-specific actions, including in agriculture,
food security, and infrastructure. For instance, in order to
improve the continent’s approach in addressing agriculture and
food security challenges, the Agreement called on African countries to take a “holistic approach;” seek a strong, fair, and comprehensive future agreement on payment systems for agriculture
sector emissions;60 improve and grow “index-based insurance
schemes and safety nets;” and accelerate initiatives aimed at
reducing dependence on rain-fed farming.61
In addition, to address the adverse impacts of climate
change on the continent’s infrastructure development efforts,
the agreement called on African governments to “climate-proof
their water infrastructure,” promote more sustainable demand,
increase efficiency, increase rain-water harvesting, and support more successful water management at all levels, including
for states sharing water resources, notably rivers.62 In addition,
the agreement pledged to adopt a “holistic approach” to promote low-carbon energy sources and technology, and “to support the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa
(“PIDA”)63 to ensure development of the continent’s priority
infrastructure projects.64

Outcomes on Human Development, Security, and
Ecosystem Sustainability
In their resolve to address the social and human development challenges posed by climate change,65 the participants
agreed to “employ . . . a human rights-based approach (HRBA)
in climate change mitigation and adaptation policies.”66 The
agreement pledges the governments to support an “equity-based
health care financing in climate change funding mechanisms
and internal resource mobilization.”67 There was also a pledge
to comprehensively incorporate gender perspectives in development, encourage eco-friendly development and awareness, and
promote “youth-led actions and processes.”68
Further, the participants agreed that, in order to address the
peace and security issues posed by climate change,69 African
countries should “engage in preventive diplomacy,” 70 in part
through the Climate for Development in Africa (“ClimDevAfrica”) Programme, to effectively address the interface
between climate change, peace and security issues, and disaster
response.71 The agreement also proposed amending the African
Union Protocol on peace and security,72 and tasked the AU Peace
and Security Council (“PSC”) to, in its work, take into account
climate-related peace and security issues, including migration.73
Finally, in their efforts to address the impacts of climate
change on ecosystem sustainability,74 African governments
agreed to promote effective and sustainable human-centered ecosystem management,75 encourage the use of Reducing Emissions
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation Plus (“REDD+”)
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initiatives to reduce poverty, and implement the UNFCCC, the
CBD, and the Desertification Convention “in a synergistic manner to promote coherent [environmental] management.”76

Outcomes on Harnessing Means of Response to
Climate Change: Financing, Risk Management,
Science & Technology, and Capacity Building
It was agreed that, in order to improve financing for climate
change actions in Africa,77 African governments and their development partners should promote financial reform to enhance
funding access for Africa, in particular by identifying and prioritizing efficient financial resource distribution, in part through
newly forged Public-Private Partnerships. The agreement also
“strongly supports” the establishment and setting up of the proposed African Green Fund (“AGF”),78 which is expected to
coordinate and manage climate financing on the continent.
In addition, the participants agreed that to improve the continent’s capacity to manage the risks of climate-related disasters,79 African governments should strengthen the national
institutions generating and handling climate-related data, and
promote the exchange of this information. The agreement also
calls for promotion of broad cooperation in sharing climaterelated knowledge (through early warning systems) and disaster
management, and strengthening of surveillance and monitoring
systems across all regional levels.80 It also calls for promotion of
index-based insurance in arid and semi-arid areas,81 as well as
promotion of integration of climate risk management (“CRM”)
in all levels of education and all levels of policy-making.82
Further, to improve the continent’s level of scientific and
technological innovativeness to respond to climate change,83
the participants agreed that African countries should “build
a regional climate change knowledge repository,”84 invest in
scientific research and development,85 and support and prioritize disaster risk-management and preventive capacity. On the
international level, the agreement seeks to promote the pursuit
of technology transfer and global partnerships to that end.86
Finally, the Agreement promotes the strengthening of African
universities and research and technology centers to “increas[e]
their competitiveness in the global market.”87 To improve
Africa’s capacity to respond to climate change,88 the agreement pledged that African countries, with the support of their
development partners, should strengthen CRM-related national
institutions, including educational institutions at all levels, and
improve the capacity of vulnerable groups;89 and foster SouthSouth cooperation.90

Sustaining The Outcomes: A Reality Check
Practical Challenges in Sustaining the Outcomes
Impotent Political Leadership
Africa lacks credible leadership to address climate change.
The political leaders are yet to effectively walk their unending
talks; save for the multitude of pious resolutions,91 there is no
concrete effort to deal with the fast-unfolding crisis. In fact,
the continent’s affairs have been reduced to endless spirals of
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meetings and deliberations, only to come up with more meetings. It is this circus that has, for instance, delayed the establishment of the AGF.92 In general, the continent’s leadership
lacks the requisite political will to steer the continent to the path
of sustainable growth and development, with mere rhetorical
promise to tackle the climate change-related challenges engulfing the continent.
Further, leadership has been lacking in preventing the
destruction of the continent’s ecosystems, and in mitigating
poverty and hunger, two of the biggest drivers of environmental
destruction on the continent. For instance, in the fast-evolving
“global land rush,” millions of African farmers have lost their
arable lands to foreign investors.93 These deals, often shrouded
in veils of secrecy, have violated the resource rights of millions
of poor Africans, fuelling poverty and food insecurity,94 two of
the biggest drivers of environmental destruction on the African
continent. Furthermore, as vast forestlands (and other ecosystems that act as carbon sinks) are opened up to large-scale farming, the continent continues to be exposed to further threats of
climate change. Sadly, attempts by environmental activists to
resist the deals are often forcibly countered by the concerned
governments.95
Against this backdrop and in the absence of committed and
visionary leadership, it cannot be denied that at both regional and
national levels it would be an exercise in futility to attempt sustaining the outcomes of ADF VII. Sadly, if African leaders continue to act in the way they are currently, the Consensus Statement
may as well land in the heap of unimplemented texts on climate
change, only to gather dust and be forgotten altogether.

Corruption and Economic Mismanagement
Corruption may be the most talked about problem in most
African countries, many of which have been poorly managed for
the better part of their post-independence histories. As we begin
the twenty-first century, unfortunately, not much has changed;
most of the leaders still use their official positions for selfaggrandizement, as opposed to public service.96 In fact, over
the years, many African countries have perpetually ranked very
poorly on Transparency International’s corruption scorecard.97
In both the public and private spheres, the vice has greatly
undermined the continent’s growth and development prospects,
while exacerbating the costs and effects of climate change.98
Undoubtedly, the resulting impoverishment, dilapidation of
basic infrastructure, and decay of the social justice system,
among many other associate evils, will adversely undermine
the affected population’s resilience to shocks related to climate
change. More importantly, corruption affects the flow of financing for addressing climate change.99 These are real challenges
that starkly stand in the path to effectuation of the outcomes of
ADF VII.

Continued Impoverishment and Worsening Food
Insecurity
For decades, Africa has unsuccessfully struggled to eradicate poverty.100 Closely intertwined with, and largely culminating from, poverty is chronic food insecurity, a situation that
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has seen millions of Africans deprived of food, the most basic
necessity in life. According to a recent estimate by the Food
and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”) of the UN, Africa hosts
approximately thirty percent of the world’s hungry population—about 276 million Africans face hunger.101 The causes are
many and complex, and include corruption, protracted armed
conflicts, economic and political marginalization, and continued
desertification.
Unfortunately, the millions condemned to perpetual poverty
and chronic food insecurity have often turned to various forms of
environmentally harmful means of survival, including charcoal
burning, fuel-wood vending, logging, and encroachment on forests and other sensitive ecological zones to open up more farmlands. These actions will undoubtedly exacerbate the impacts of
climate change in the affected areas, thereby portending a visible challenge to sustenance of the outcomes of ADF VII.

The Culture of Marginalization
Discussions on climate change issues in Africa are largely
dominated by the political elites and their ilk.102 Many have been
left out of the process. In particular, groups that have remained
vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change (like indigenous peoples, women, children, and the youth) have been
pushed to the peripheries of the discussion, and millions of Africans have had no effective voice in the process.103 This has further led to a number of individuals and communities expressing
skepticism of the nexus between the environment and climate
change, thereby dismissing claims that the current problems are
attributable to man’s activities.104
These challenges, which were expressly acknowledged at
ADF VII,105 cannot be wished away even in the post-Forum
periods, for they portend a serious challenge to effectuating the
outcomes of the Forum. Indeed, it need not be emphasized that
addressing these challenges will greatly contribute to sustenance
of the outcomes.

Global Inaction and Unreliable Pledges
Africa’s efforts to address climate change issues cannot succeed if treated in isolation of the global trends. Further, we must
not forget that, contributing only about 3.8% of the global GHG
emissions,106 Africa is suffering the wrongs of others, and even
if it were to fully tackle climate change in its domain, its efforts
would not be more than a drop in the ocean. In light of this, a
cursory view of the prevailing global practices reveals a mixed
track record, with non-commitment surfacing at various times.
For instance, the commitment of some developed countries to address climate change in developing countries has
been merely rhetorical; some of them have yet to honor their
pledges under the current global financing mechanism.107 This
has resulted in inadequate, unpredictable, and unreliable financing for climate change actions in Africa, as in other developing
countries.108 The World Bank too has not been straightforward
in its dealing with (and in) developing countries; through its subsidiaries, it continues to finance the “global land rush”109 and
other projects that would likely contribute to climate change.110
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Surely, if Africa is to meaningfully address climate change,
and if the outcomes of ADF VII are to be sustained, adequate,
predictable, and reliable, financing for climate change actions is
indispensable. Otherwise, in the absence of such external financing support and recognizing that most climate change actions
are largely capital-intensive, Africa may be able to only do very
little, if anything, to manage climate change on its own.

Prospects in Sustaining the Outcomes
Proliferation of Climate Funds
Over the last few years, we have witnessed proliferation of
climate funds, a handful of which have benefited (or are expected
to benefit) the African continent in its efforts to implement various climate change mitigation and adaptation actions. Such funding regimes include the Clean Technology Fund (“CTF”),111 the
Special Climate Fund (“SCF”),112 the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund,113 the Congo Basin Forest Fund (“CBFF”),114 the
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (“FCPF”),115 the Global
Environment Facility Trust Fund (“GEF Trust Fund”), 116 the
Global Climate Change Alliance (“GCCA”),117 the Least Developed Countries Fund (“LDCF”),118 and the Special Climate
Change Fund (“SCCF”).119 These funding efforts received a
major boost when the establishment of a “Green Climate” Fund
was proposed at the recently concluded COP-16.120
It cannot be denied that, the dissatisfactions notwithstanding,121 cumulatively, these initiatives can greatly contribute
to Africa’s cause to address the challenges posed by climate
change. If well harnessed, these funding mechanisms have the
potential to significantly contribute to the sustaining the outcomes of ADF VII.

Developments within the AU Framework
A number of recent developments within the AU framework hold some positive prospects in sustaining the ADF VII
Outcomes. For instance, on October 13, 2010, at a ceremony
on the sidelines of ADF VII, the AU Commission, the AfDB,
and UNECA launched the Climate for Development in Africa
(“ClimDev-Africa”) Programme,122 which aims at strengthening the climate-resilience of economic growth and the MDGs
through mainstreaming of CRM in sensitive sectors. Shortly
thereafter, in November 2010, under the auspices of the AU
Conference of Energy Ministers (“CEMA”), the AU Commission, the AfDB, and UNECA jointly hosted the First All-Africa
Energy Week 2010 (“AAEW”), a high-level stakeholder forum
for monitoring progress, taking stock, undertaking constructive
dialog, and sharing knowledge, with the aim of enhancing universal energy access.123
In addition, on November 4, 2010, the AfDB launched the
African Carbon Support Project (“ACSP”), which is designed
to assist project developers in the continent in accessing carbon
finance to ensure commercial viability of their projects.124 Most
recently, on December 6, 2010, the AfDB representatives joined
representatives from other Multilateral Development Banks in a
joint side event of the COP-16, whose theme was “Scaling-up
International Climate Finance.”125
42

By and large, their individual merits or otherwise notwithstanding, these initiatives hold immense potential to sustain the
outcomes of ADF VII, as well as other regional commitments
to address challenges related to climate change and variability.

The Cancún Gains
Though heavily criticized as having yielded too little,126
COP-16 heralded a number of gains with potential to contribute to sustenance of the Outcomes of ADF VII. For instance,
though not legally binding, the Cancún Agreement reflects some
level of changing relations between developing countries and
the developed countries; it embodies a “fairly modest” deal on
reduction of emissions, calling on developed countries to reduce
their GHG emissions (as pledged in the Copenhagen Accord).127
The Agreement also proposes the establishment of a “Green
Climate” Fund, which is intended to assist developing countries
finance emission reductions and adaptation actions.128

Contributions of the Civil Society and the Private
Sector
The African private sector and the civil society, though long
excluded from the mainstream discussions, currently play indispensable roles in addressing climate change issues on the continent. While the civil society has been particularly involved in
lobby and advocacy activities,129 the private sector has proved
critical in supplementing the existing global climate financing
initiatives.130 For instance, on June 5, 2008, the Rockefeller
Foundation and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation—through
their Nairobi-based Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
(“AGRA”)—established the Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund
(“AECF”) to leverage private sector and donor funding for successful eco-friendly projects and enterprises.131

Sustaining the Outcomes: The Way Forward
In order to sustain the various outcomes of ADF VII, African governments should, as a matter of priority, implement a
number of measures. Though not offered as an absolute panacea
for the climate change problem in Africa, these measures are
believed to wield immense potential to sustain the outcomes and
other related initiatives to address the challenges posed by climate change and variability on the continent.
First and foremost, they must back up their words with
action—moving from the unending official rhetoric to offering effective leadership in addressing issues related to climate
change. In particular, they have to link the continent’s Common
Position and the prevailing regional, sub-regional, and national
policies, strategies, practices, and programs. Second, they have
to fully commit themselves to the fight against corruption,
ensure proper targeting of funds received under the prevailing
climate funds regimes, and establish effective normative and
institutional frameworks. Third, they have to fully commit themselves to the fight against poverty, also through the establishment of appropriate normative and institutional approaches, and
with adequate budgetary focus.
Fourth, they must profile climate change as a human
rights issue and nurture a sustainable culture of human rights,
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in particular through mainstreaming of human rights concerns
into all regional, sub-regional, and national polices, strategies,
practices, and programs. Indeed, climate change issues have
to be effectively integrated in litigations on the environment,
with effective remedies for any resulting violations of environmental rights. Fifth, African governments need to effectively
leverage the window of opportunity availed by climate change
and variability, in particular the opportunity to establish green
economies.
Sixth, African governments have to consider inviting leaders from developed countries to their meetings, with a view to
enabling them to fully appreciate the African version of the climate change debates. Seventh, they need to effectively engage
the big GHG emitters, with a view to having them honor their
pledges to reduce their emissions and support climate change
adaptation and mitigation actions in Africa. Eighth, they need to
engage the international community to break the long-standing
lack of transparency at the Breton Woods institutions, in particular the World Bank.
Ninth, African governments have to invest in routine situational assessments in order to establish the progress, challenges
and prospects in addressing climate change. In addition, they
need to work towards breaking the reigning skepticism (through,
for instance, broad-based social mobilization and dissemination
on the interface between the environment and climate change.
Further, the governments have to establish and sustain credible
specialized institutions, preferably within the AU Commission
framework, to coherently address climate change issues on the
continent. In particular, they must prioritize the operationalization of the AGF, while engaging the continent’s international
development partners to sustainably support the initiative.
Last but not the least, African governments have to consider subscribing to the Nagoya Protocol to the Convention on
Biological Diversity.132 The Protocol, which opened for signature and ratification on February 2, 2011, has the potential to
promote more equitable distribution of genetic resources for the
continent.

Conclusion
This article highlighted key challenges and prospects in sustaining the outcomes of ADF VII. Although immense challenges
lie in the path to sustenance of the outcomes, there are equally
immense prospects, which, if properly harnessed, can ultimately
drive Africa towards effectively combating climate change. On
the basis of the balance sheet of challenges and prospects, the
article has offered measures that African governments must to
adopt. These measures, though not an absolute panacea for the
continent’s woes, have the potential to contribute to the cause of
fighting the challenges posed by climate change and variability
on the continent.
African leaders must improve the continent’s normative
and institutional capacities to deal with the challenges posed
by climate change. Undoubtedly, they cannot just sit and watch
calamities unfold in series; the time has come for them to
jointly and individually take action to avert the consequences
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of climate change, if they are at all committed to saving Africa
from fatal catastrophes. Otherwise, the continent’s hard-earned

development gains may quickly erode, thereby subjecting more
Africans to the curse of poverty for the foreseeable future.
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Implementing A Renewable Energy Feed-In
Tariff In South Africa:
The Beginning Of A New Dawn
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Introduction

he notion that nothing is possible belongs to those who
are reluctant or unwilling to take the first bold steps.
South Africa has taken a bold step in the right direction,
which may unlock various potential opportunities for renewable energy in South Africa. On March 31, 2009, the National
Energy Regulator of South Africa (“NERSA”)1 announced
the long-awaited Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff (“REFIT”)
Regulatory Guidelines. South Africa, in order to source and use
energy in a sustainable way, has focused on renewable energy
as opposed to energy from conventional sources.2 REFITs “are,
in essence, guaranteed prices for electricity supply rather than
conventional consumer tariffs.”3 The underlying basic economic
principle underpinning this system is the “establishment of a tariff (price) that covers the cost of generation plus a ‘reasonable
profit’ to induce developers to invest.”4
In October 2009, NERSA approved REFIT Phase 2 based
on the Levelized Cost of Electricity (“LCOE”).5 The newly
approved regulatory framework adds new technologies to the
existing REFIT guidelines, namely, biomass, biogas, concentrated solar without storage, photovoltaic (“PV”), concentrating photovoltaic, and concentrated solar power (central tower).6
Though the guidelines were generally welcomed by the role
players in the renewable industry, the overarching contention
was the omission of PV from the March 2009 RREFIT guidelines.7 Consequently, Phase 2 of the guidelines addressed this
concern and includes large-scale PV that is greater than 1 megawatt (“MW”)) due to economies of scale.8 It is expected that
during the annual REFIT review, small-scale PV technology
would be considered and added.9
The first and the second phases of the REFIT guidelines
are the culmination of a study initiated in 2007 by NERSA10
to facilitate the introduction of renewable energy generation
into the electricity network in order to meet the target of 10,000
gigawatt hours (“GWh”)11 from renewable energy sources, and
possibly surpass the target prior to the 2013 due date set by the
2003 Government White Paper on Renewable Energy.12 Articulating the cost benefit of REFIT to the investors, NERSA likens
it to the cost recovery used to regulate utilities, which is based
on the cost of capital.13 There have been aggressive moves and
attempts by the proponents of REFIT to rename the mechanism
“Renewable Energy Payments” in order to stop using the term
tariff. However, these efforts proved unsuccessful and the name
still remains.14
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REFITs are common in many countries and are aimed at
encouraging renewable energy generation by making renewable
energy generators financially viable.15 The REFIT approach
makes strategic sense in South Africa because it will serve as
a powerful tool to address rapid climate disruption.16 REFIT is
now promoting growth of renewable energy and private sector
and donor financing at the same time.17
Against this backdrop, South Africa has joined a number of
countries that have already introduced regulatory frameworks on
REFIT.18 With the proper political and administrative will, the
current steps taken towards aggressive implementation promise to be a success—particularly as the system was adopted by
South Africa from countries that have successfully introduced
and implemented REFIT.19 Germany, Spain, and Denmark are
among the countries that have successfully used legislation to
promote the least expensive and fastest growth of renewable
energy.20 As a result of substantial successes achieved through
renewable tariffs, massive increase in investments in renewable
electricity generation has occurred and these countries have
produced “more installed generating capacity and more robust
competition among manufacturers.”21 Moreover, the tariffs
have stimulated more renewable technology development, not
withstanding some problems encountered at the commencement
periods.22

Policy Framework Supports and
Benefits of REFIT
“Within a policy framework, the development of renewable energy in South Africa is supported by the White Paper on
Renewable Energy, which has set a target of 10,000 GWh [of]
renewable energy to [contribute to the final] energy consumption by 2013.”23 REFIT is anticipated to run over fifteen years
until 2022,24 beyond the 2013 target of 10,000 GWh set by the
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Department of Minerals and Energy (“DME”) in the 2003 White
Paper on Renewable Energy.25 The “DME’s macroeconomic
study of renewable energy, developed under the now completed
Capacity Building in Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy
(“CaBEERE”) project, has established that the achievement of
this target would provide a number of economic benefits, including increased government revenue amounting to R299 million,
increased GDP of up to 1 billion [rand] per year and the creation
of an estimated 20,500 new jobs.”26 “In addition, the development of renewable energy beyond the 10,000 GWh target holds
further employment benefits and would maximize the number of
jobs created” per terawatt hour (“TWh”).27
One of the activists for the promotion and deployment of
wind energy for electricity generation saluted the courage and
the bold step taken by South Africa and described the REFIT as
a laudable project.28 Stefan Gsänger, the Secretary General of
the World Wind Energy Association said in a release that “South
Africa is the first African country to introduce a feed-in tariff
for wind energy. Many small and big investors will now be able
to contribute to the take-off of the South African wind industry. Such decentralized investment will enable South Africa to
overcome its current energy crisis. It will also help many South
African communities to invest in wind farms and generate electricity, new jobs and new income.”29
Furthermore, REFIT has many advantages over other mechanisms in spite of the extra initial cost.30 In order to ensure stable
return on investment by the investors renewable power prices
should not be subjected to the forces of demand and supply in
the market place.31 Guaranteeing profits for project developers
will serve as an impetus for the investors to expand the business
by applying for credit/loan facility from banks and other financial institutions since repayments are guaranteed from the sale
of electricity.32

South Africa’s Renewable Energy Feed-in
Tariff: An Overview
Background to Initiatives Taken by Role-players
REFIT was introduced in South Africa to progressively
reduce carbon-based power generation by creating a move
towards sustainable energy sources, along with socio-economic
and environmentally sustainable growth.33 Endless debates in
Parliament about energy crises, global footprints, endangered
species, and new coal-fired power stations had done little to
solve South African problems. Stemming from this lack of
progress, efforts to decrease greenhouse gas emissions fostered
a movement known as e-Parliament Renewable Energy Activists (“eREACT”) by some parliamentarians with the objective
of shifting the government’s focus away from coal and nuclear
towards renewable energy.34 The introduction of REFIT was initially met with stiff opposition from those entities that believed
in business as usual.35 But, in 2008, South Africa endured a
serious energy crisis when the national energy supplier, Eskom,
failed to meet electricity demand.36 As a result, eREACT was
able to influence future decisions and present the financial viability of developing renewable energy in South Africa.37
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This initiative commenced the bold step towards the establishment of the current energy generation mix in South Africa.
South African Member of Parliament Dr. Ruth Rabinowitz,
explaining the stiff opposition encountered in the Parliament,
said that at the hearing of the private members’ legislative committee in the South African Parliament on the REFIT, “in spite
of overwhelming support from NGO’s, businesses, academics,
local governments and civil society, both the DME and Eskom
were opposed to the idea of separate REFIT legislation” claiming that the Guidelines had already been drafted and would be
introduced to the public in early 2009.38 “Their resistance to
Parliament’s involvement is hardly surprising since the Eskom
monopoly is unlikely to suddenly give way to diversity, flexibility and open competition.”39 The firm commitment and perseverance of parliamentarians who believed that South Africa
should jettison the notion of using cheap coal to generate electricity and shift to renewables eventually led to the promulgation
of the regulatory guidelines.40

The Guidelines in Context
The most potent legislative mechanism being used worldwide to introduce and implement the use of renewable energy to
generate energy is feed-in tariff. South Africa has just joined the
numbers of the countries that are using renewable energy to generate power. It is the responsibility of NERSA to ensure that the
energy utility, Eskom, purchases energy from the generators at a
fixed price, provided they conform with the standard prescribed
by NERSA.41 The guidelines contain twelve sections. Section 1
provides a general introduction, while sections 2 and 3 highlight
the purpose, scope, and objectives of the guidelines in detail.
Purchase obligations of all players and stakeholders are outlined
in section 4, while sections 5 and 6 deal extensively with the
qualification criteria and the application process respectively.
Section 7 enumerates tariffs applicable to different technologies. The rights and obligations of qualified renewable power
generators, regulator, and renewable energy purchasing agency
(“REPA”) are provided for in sections 8, 9, and 10 respectively.
While section 11 provides for the monitoring, reporting, and
review mechanisms, section 12 provides for appropriate applicable law to resolve dispute arising from the guidelines. Any
ensuing dispute must be resolved in accordance with section 5 of
the Electricity Regulation Act 2006 of South Africa (including
the Regulations).

Exposition, Analysis, and Critique of
the Guidelines
Introduction, Purpose, Scope, and Objective
Section 1 of the guidelines provides an overview of why
the government has opted for renewable energy provisions side
by side with the current conventional energy. One of the key
reasons is that renewable energy resources in South Africa are
enormous.42 In a move to enlarge the market implementation,
government has now, through NERSA, introduced REFIT.43
“This is quite similar to the concept of cost recovery used in
utility rate regulation based on the costs of capital”44 invested in
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each technology deployed.45 With regards to cost, using the technique of degression, both the grid interconnection and metering
are covered by REFIT.46 The overarching benefit of this is that
the costs are spread across electricity customers and the tariff is
reduced overtime.47 The essence of this technique is to mount
pressure on the generators to continue to lower the costs of generating electricity from REFIT so that it will be affordable.
The IPPs will be remunerated based on the renewable
energy power they feed into the national grid.48 The guidelines
allow IPPs operators to receive preferential rate in a pay-forenergy-delivered contract allowing them to earn payment over
and above conventional prices.49 It is hoped that REFIT system
will create and foster an enduring and economically sustainable
renewable energy industry in South Africa.50
The scope and objective of the guidelines are outlined in
section 3.51 Section 3.1 provides for the applicable rules and
requirements governing license applications and the issuing
of approved licenses to energy developers.52 Section 3.2 gives
NERSA the mandate to determine the prices and the conditions
under which generated electricity may be supplied.53 Sections
3.3 and 3.4 provide that all subsequent relevant Acts of Amendment would also be applicable in conjunction with relevant
license procedures.
The underlying economic basis of section 3.2 is that economic principles of supply and demand do not affect prices
because NERSA has the absolute authority to determine the
rates. The rationale for this is that these prices have been chosen
to promote and increase investment in renewable energy, allow
small enterprises to make substantive entry into the market, and
operate by generating electricity for sale. This model is suitable
to developing countries in view of the fact that energy markets
are small in number and dispersed.54
But these guidelines could be amended by subsequent Acts
under section 3.3,55 which raises some concerns. The section
sets no boundaries on what type of amendments are permitted.56 A preferred approach would be to exempt certain provisions from future amendment. One provision that, if amended,
would undermine the entire regulation is the guarantee of payments over a specified period of time. This is assuredly the only
way an investor can realize the projected return on investment.
Notwithstanding the fact that there is no explicit prohibition
on amending any section, the fears of the investors have been
allayed by virtue of section 3.5(ii), which states that one of the
key objectives and principles of REFIT is the establishment of
“a guaranteed price for electricity generated from renewables for
a fixed period of time that provides a stable income stream and
an adequate return on investment.”57

Obligation to Purchase
Section 3.5(iv) enables access to the grid and obligates
Eskom to purchase power generated by IPPs. Eskom is designated as the Single Buyer and appointed as the Renewable
Energy Purchasing Agency (“REPA”) under sections 4 and 4.3.
To be eligible the generator must follow the rules and procedures of the regulatory body duly licensed under section 5.4 and
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fulfill all the license conditions under Section 5.5. While Eskom
must purchase electricity from the IPPs at set rates, under section 4.4 the IPPs can also sell renewable energy to buyers outside of REFIT.58
If a particular generator receives a license and fails to produce electricity for any reason, NERSA faces no obligations to
the generator and Eskom cannot be compelled to act on its purchasing obligation.59 Consequently, the maxim nemo dat quad
non abet meaning you cannot give what you do not have applies
to the generator if it fails to produce electricity.

Financial Implications for Consumers
Section 3.5(v) mandates the establishment of an equal
playing field with conventional electricity, but this provision is
ambiguous in both context and content.60 The meaning of “an
equal level playing field” is not defined in the guidelines and
this may result to different interpretations. Section 3.6 allows
for future inclusion of more technologies, bands within technologies, and incentives for projects in different geographical
areas.61 Section 4.5 provides that the financial subsidy required
to offset the difference in the cost of energy purchased under
REFIT and the Avoided Cost will be borne by all Eskom electricity customers through existing “pass-through” arrangements for costs of independent power production.62 While this
provision makes good economic and financial sense, a cursory
look at the section shows that neither the poor nor the rich are
exempted from the “pass-through” arrangements.63 The implication of this is that various customers of Eskom, irrespective of
their resources, will bear the financial burden. In South Africa,
both advanced and developing economies operate alongside one
another. Those who live in perpetual abject poverty outnumbered the rich elites.64
The huge disparity of income in South Africa is reflected in
limited access to electricity, with the majority of the population
in rural areas living without modern electricity.65 Even where
there is access, electricity is not usually affordable and is considered a luxury by most residents. Even in those areas serviced by
a grid, there have been reports of persistent default or non-payment of electricity bills and in some instances, these people have
improvised and connected to the grid illegally.66 The drafters of
the guidelines should have excluded indigents and the poor from
the current additional burden of paying more for electricity.67
Governments in countries such as Denmark, Australia, and a
number of U.S. states are sensitive to the plight of indigent citizens who would not be able to afford electricity. Consequently,
various concessions in the form of subsidies and incentives such
as reduction in bills, special loans, extra rebates and so on, are
being offered to unemployed, elderly, disabled, and low-income
households.68 As noted earlier, section 3.3 authorizes amendments; the guidelines should be amended to offer a range of concessions to the poorest of the poor, as has occurred in the United
States, Australia, and Denmark.

Qualification Criteria for the Generator
Section 5 lists the qualification criteria for renewable
generators. Section 5.1 defines renewable energy, and section
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5.2—read together with the newly published phase 269—sets out
the specific types of renewable energy technologies that qualify for participation in the REFIT scheme. Section 5.3 requires
NERSA to consider adding additional technologies to the list of
qualifying generators.70
By virtue of section 5.5(i), renewable energy generators
may generate electricity from non-renewables. But the generators must report the quantities of electricity generated from
these two different sources.71 Section 5.5(ii) provides for monitoring and verification to ensure credible production of renewable energy.72 Failure on the part of any electricity generators to
comply or act in accordance with sections 5.5(i) or 5.5(ii) leads
to the imposition of sanctions under section 5.5(iii), including
termination of the REFIT license.73
Importantly, under section 5.7, REFIT does not include any
electricity generated off-grid.74 Rather, “REFIT only includes
power generation from generators connected to the Transmission System and Distribution System and excludes off-grid
power generation.”75 Although this is the current scheme, in the
near future advancement in technology innovation and diffusion
might allow for the consideration of off-grid.76

Application Process
Sections 6.1 to 6.4 require the renewable electricity generator to state the specific REFIT technology and tariff category
for electricity produced in accordance to section 6.2. This will
enable regulatory authority to “specify the technology, the tariff
approved, duration of the REFIT, and other specific licensing
conditions” in compliance with section 6.4.77 The purpose of
this section is to ensure that applicants state the type of technology used, due to different prices for electricity produced from
each technology.78 It is expected that the majority of the applicants will use technologies that are economically beneficial in
terms of cost and maintenance, and at the same time reap the
so-called “reasonable profit” because this will continue to guarantee return on investment and the continuity of the venture.

Tariffs
Section 7.3 protects the licensees against inflation in each
year of operation and allows for an adjustment to the tariffs once
per annum using the consumer price index (“CPI”) or another
suitable inflation index.79 Section 7.4 requires monitoring of the
performance and the impacts of each technology, as well as analysis of reports from the monitoring to ascertain whether there is
any need for review.80 Irrespective of whether or not inflation
occurs, a full tariff review will take place every year for the first
five-year period of implementation and every three years thereafter.81 Section 7.5 stipulates that the resulting tariffs will only
be applicable to new projects.82 Section 7.6 provides for future
pricing of electricity produced by the generators. Consequently,
at the end of the contracted REFIT tariff, the generator will be
required to negotiate tariffs under current market conditions.83
The implication is that the economic principles of demand and
supply will dictate prices to be charged by the regulator. While
this is beneficial to the regulator, it does not foreclose the appropriate intervention by the regulator at any point in time—this
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is achievable in view of the fact that the generators still have
to negotiate tariffs under market conditions. The significance
of these tariffs is that they will stimulate the inflow of investment into the renewable sector and increase the pool of capital
in the sector, which may be used to promote the innovation and
advancement in renewable technology.84

Rights and Obligations of Generators, Regulators,
and REPA
Sections 8, 9, and 10 of the guidelines explicitly provide
for the rights and obligations of all parties.85 Any meaningful
discussion on rights and obligations must necessarily be founded
on conceptualization of both terms. The description of rights as
enshrined in the guidelines recognizes the legal rights of the generators to be entitled to an amount that will ensure their investments are properly protected, connected to the grid, and able
to provide a reasonable return on investment. In the same vein,
regulators are expected to act responsibly by virtue of section
8.5, which mandates that all the parties be on an equal level.86
It must however be mentioned that failure to act as stipulated under section 8.5 of the guidelines imposes an obligation
on the regulator to apply the appropriate sanction that could lead
to termination of the erring generator’s license.87 This is the only
reason why the right of the generator could be restricted. Conclusive and well founded evidence that a generator has acted contrary to section 8.5, for instance by generating electricity from
non-renewable technology mentioned in the guidelines without
a full disclosure to the regulator, will automatically affect all the
inherent rights in the guidelines and allow for imposition of the
appropriate sanction.

Monitoring, Reporting, and Review.
In accordance with sections 11.1 to 11.10, the regulator
will closely monitor the overall activities of the players and
stake holders enshrined in the REFIT. Monitoring, collection,
and maintenance of data on energy purchased under REFIT are
outlined in section 11.2, and the publication of summary of the
progress report by June 1st of every year is required by section
11.4. Section 11.4(iii) mandates the regulator to disclose the
financial impacts of REFIT, which includes both the increase
in electricity prices and the additional overall cost to consumers.88 This proviso serves as a basis for determining whether the
poor and previously disadvantaged people are able or not able
to access electricity services due to the additional cost imposed
on them. If the majority of the poor are unable to access and use
electricity based on the increase in cost, one of the fundamentals
of poverty reduction and eradication, as enshrined in the principles set out in the Millennium Development Goals, will not be
achieved.89 One of the ways to assist the poor in realizing their
economic and social aspirations is to offer them concessions on
electricity. It is suggested that in the interim, costs should be
passed on to the affluent in the hybrid residential and industrial
areas of urban South Africa. Various electrical appliances and
industrial equipment that are not energy efficient are used in
these areas. Increasing the costs of electricity for the more affluent might encourage them to use energy efficient appliances. An
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additional benefit of this differential pricing would ultimately be
less pressure on the transmitters from reduced energy use.

Resolution of Disputes and Remedies
Section 12 provides that any disputes arising from the operation of REFIT would be resolved as laid down in sections 42 to
43 the Electricity Regulation Act 2006.90 Before the commencement of any dispute resolution, the Minister is compelled by virtue of section 42(3) to prescribe the procedure to be followed for
the mediation and the fees to be paid.91 However, mediation or
arbitration of disputes occurs only at the request of the parties to
the dispute by virtue of section 42(4).92 While section 42(1)(a)
compels the regulator to appoint a mediator in a dispute between
licensees if so requested by both parties to the dispute, sections
42(1)(b) and 42(2) give discretionary power to the regulator to
appoint a suitable person to mediate.93
However, if any party disagrees with the outcome of the
decisions regarding adjudication as provided in section 42, such
party, under section 43, can seek remedies pursuant to section 10
of the National Energy Regulation Act of 2004, and specifically
invoke sections 10(3)(4)(a)(b) which provide that:
Any person may institute proceedings in the High
Court for the judicial review of an administrative action
by the Energy Regulator in accordance with the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000 (Act No. 3 of
2000). Any person affected by a decision of the Energy
Regulator sitting as a tribunal may appeal to the High
Court against such decision. The procedure applicable
to an appeal from a decision of a magistrate’s court in

a civil matter applies, with the changes required by the
context, to an appeal contemplated in paragraph (a).94
Section 10(1)(a) of the Act recognizes the supremacy of the
Constitution of the Republic South Africa.95 Hence every decision of the regulator or of the mediator, arbitrator or any person
appointed by the regulator, must be consistent with the provisions of the Constitution and applicable laws. The legal implication is that any party who is not satisfied with the decisions
arising out of section 42 of the Electricity Regulator Act, can
appeal for review of the decision, and ultimately appeal constitutional rights up to the Constitutional court.

Conclusion
The establishment of REFIT in South Africa provides an
excellent opportunity for South Africa to increase the use of
renewable energy and enhance the growth of the sector both
nationally and internationally. Most of the renewable energy
considered for the initial implementation has been included as
a result of experiences and success stories in countries that have
introduced and implemented REFIT. However, there is need
for extensive and expansive improvements in areas such as,
namely, harmonization of various policies on renewable energy,
enhancement of the standard to achieve sustainability, dissemination of information on the benefits of renewable energy to
attract investors, making stakeholders be more proactive, and
creating enabling policy and law for concessions and incentives
that will continue to bring down the cost of investment and make
cost of electricity affordable.
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National Security in the 21st Century:
How the National Security Council Can Solve the President’s Climate
Change Problem
by Arija Flowers*

T

Introduction

o adequately protect the national security interests of the
United States, the President should immediately implement domestic policies and vigorously pursue agreement
on international standards that stabilize greenhouse gas concentration at 350 parts per million (“ppm”) as soon as possible, and
no later than 2050.1 The Obama Administration acknowledged
the real threat climate change poses to U.S. security in the 2009
National Intelligence Strategy (“NIS”) and 2010 National Security Strategy (“NSS”).2 However, in failing to use the authority
delegated to the Committee on Transnational Threats to implement climate change prevention policies, the Administration has
not met its obligation under the National Security Act of 1947 to
protect U.S. people, property, and interests.3
The most politically feasible and compelling argument for
addressing climate change promptly is that U.S. security depends
upon it. Threats to security emanating from climate change are
many and varied, internal and external, and are already beginning to occur.4 This article explains the science behind climate
change, then discusses the impacts that climate change will
have on people and communities, and the relationship of those
impacts to threats on U.S. security. In response to these impacts,
the article examines national security law and the Administration’s faulty understanding of its power under that law and suggests how the Administration can use the authority it already
possesses to implement the necessary policies to ensure a comprehensive national security program and actions to take to meet
the present and future threat posed by climate change.

Climate Science
There is no longer any scientifically sound question as to
whether anthropogenic climate change is occurring, and will
continue to occur in the future; only the ongoing debate of how
much change human activity will produce remains.5 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) report finds
definitive anthropogenic warming between 3.2°F and 9.2°F
over the twenty-first century.6 Based on the amount of carbon
already released into the atmosphere, the Earth is committed to
a temperature increase of at least 2°F.7 The best estimates of
the IPCC, which depend on future reductions in CO2 emissions,
predict global average temperature increases of 3.2°F to 7.2°F
during the twenty-first century.8
In order to understand climate science, it is important to
also understand the political environment surrounding climate
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change science and to consider what that means for determining
future policies in the United States. The IPCC is a joint project
of the United Nations and the World Meteorological Organization that has compiled extensive, highly scrutinized data9 to
become the source of internationally accepted science on climate change, relied on by governments around the world including the U.S. government.10
The problem with the scientific numbers presented by the
IPCC is that they are influenced by the politics of strong, fossilfuel-dependent nations like Saudi Arabia, the United States, and
China, whose economies run on the sale and use of fossil fuels.11
The desire to keep their economies humming without changing their habits is a strong incentive to downplay the impacts
of CO2.12 Middle Eastern member states, like Saudi Arabia,
work to ensure that the primary export upon which their entire
economy depends on is not rendered valueless by the findings.13
Thus, the highly certain findings of the IPCC report exist in spite
of the efforts of oil exporting countries to water-down the language until more evidence of anthropogenic change is found.14
The result is an IPCC report with watered-down, politically
motivated findings,15 being represented to the global community
as scientifically factual findings,16 and ultimately the international acceptance of compromised science as the basis for climate change policy.
Other scientists, unconstrained by the challenges within
the IPCC, believe more significant temperature—and climate—
change will occur.17 Scientists know from studying ice cores
that Earth’s surface temperature increased 9°F when CO2 levels in the atmosphere rose by 100 ppm at the end of the last
ice age.18 Thus, logic renders it unlikely that a doubling of CO2
over the level in 1800 (an increase of approximately 280 ppm,
or nearly three times larger than the prior increase) will result in
a temperature increase of just 5.4°F, as the IPCC seems to predict.19 Based on scientific data, leading experts believe that the
current global goal must be to reduce CO2 concentrations below
350 ppm in order to prevent and reverse destabilizing global
warming.20
Climate science is becoming increasingly more accurate
as scientists continue to refine computer simulation programs
called Global Circulation Models.21 With increasing frequency,
these computer programs are able to accurately model weather
* Arija Flowers is a J.D. candidate, May 2011, at American University Washington College of Law.
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and climate events based on inputted data, for events that already
happened in the past.22 Because the events already happened and
we know what the model should look like, the computer models’
accuracy can be readily tested and proven by its ability to correctly forecast those events.23
Comparing current predictions with known previous atmospheric changes illustrates the appropriateness of skepticism
regarding the more conservative scientific estimates, like those
of the IPCC. Further, the scientifically accepted 550 ppm CO2
“threshold,” which is the maximum allowable level to avoid
inducing dangerous climate change, is nearly twice as high as
pre-Industrial Revolution levels.24 Even the IPCC predicts an
increase in temperature varying from 3.2°F to 7.2°F,25 which
is clearly below the 9°F history has proven can occur.26 Given
these illogical ratios, it is reasonable to be skeptical of the conservative estimates of the impacts of climate change, rather than
skeptical that climate change is real.

Ways in Which Climate Change Impacts
Threaten U.S. Security
Congress and the White House understand that climate
change threatens U.S. national security, because it threatens
internal systems and contributes to the destabilization of governments and people abroad.27 The range of threats begin with
“natural” disasters, including increasingly severe hurricanes like
Katrina in 2005,28 and extend to heightened terrorism risks as
diminished resources threaten livelihoods and foreign populations slip further into extremism.29
Natural disaster impacts are easier to visualize because they
have a direct cause and effect. Sea level rise threatens to wipe
small island nations off the face of the Earth.30 Rapid rising sea
levels of this type directly threaten military infrastructure on
low-lying islands, and in all coastal regions worldwide.31 More
hurricanes of higher intensity means military equipment and
personnel must be moved out of harm’s way, adding expense
and wear and tear, reducing general readiness, and interrupting
training operations.32 Increasingly severe storms can devastate
infrastructure, as hurricane Andrew damaged Homestead Air
Force Base in Florida in 1992 and prevented the base from ever
reopening.33 More frequent and intense flooding has similar
impacts, requiring disaster response, while simultaneously damaging the economy, and wasting resources that could be utilized
elsewhere. The Navy has additional concerns about vessel safety
in a polar ice-free world, since mapping of shifting ice locations
will become more difficult.34
The United States has the most varied and severe weather
of any country on Earth.35 With vast, drought-prone, high, arid
plains, extensive coasts vulnerable to sea level rise, coasts that
have already been battered by record-intensity hurricanes, and
plains repeatedly flooded by rivers following massive rains and
snow-melt runoff, the United States has more to lose in terms of
climate change induced domestic threats than nearly any other
country, except perhaps those that will be lost to the oceans.36
The western states should prepare for decreased snowpack and
correspondingly reduced summer runoff37 and extended periods
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of drought.38 Without even addressing the military components
of homeland security, these direct impacts on the infrastructure,
economy, and livelihoods of citizens threaten the security of
most of the largest cities in the U.S., because they are located
on coasts, and much of the farmland located in flood plains.39 It
is clear, however, that changing precipitation patterns, increased
severe weather events, and rising sea levels are all expected in
the future, with negative direct implications for U.S. national
security interests.40
The more complex threats are the indirect effects, which
result not from the changed climate and associated weather
events, but from the human actions which follow. As resources
become scarcer and local living conditions harsher, populations
with weak governments that are unable to assist those people in
adapting to changes will likely resort to methods of self-preservation.41 U.S. military leaders expect the United States will
see increased conflict for resources, mass migrations to escape
the dearth of resources, and incidences of terrorism.42 Where the
most basic resource needs—food and water—go unmet, disputes
spiral into full-fledged conflict,43 as evidenced by the “at least
[eleven] violent conflicts since 1990 [which] have been fueled
in part by the degradation of renewable natural resources.”44 In
these situations, populations may turn to extremism and terrorism,45 similar to al-Qaida in Afghanistan where half the country’s gross domestic product comes from farming or ranching,
but drought and overuse of the land has left most of the country
at risk of desertification.46 Populations will also likely participate
in mass migrations as environmental refugees increase global
tensions and further strain resources in the new location.47 The
IPCC and others believe that average global warming exceeding
3.6°F may be dangerous,48 while others argue that 3.6°F “warming would be catastrophic for large segments of humanity.”49
This type of instability in the developing world is a “threat
multiplier”50 and U.S. military leaders believe that “climate
change will provide the conditions that will extend the war on
terror”51 because “droughts, violent weather, ruined agricultural
lands—those are the kinds of stresses we’ll see more of under climate change [which lead directly to] more poverty, more forced
migrations, higher unemployment” so that “climate change prolongs those conditions [that increase terrorism risks] . . . [and]
makes them worse.”52 Many nations that struggle to maintain
political stability currently, or are likely terrorist safe-havens, are
also highly vulnerable to destabilizing climate change impacts,
such as drought,53 flooding,54 and increased disease.55 When a
region is “traumatized by an event or a change in conditions triggered by climate change . . . [i]f the government there is not able
to cope with the effects . . . you can be faced with a collapsing
state . . . as breeding grounds for instability, for insurgencies, for
warlords.”56 Ultimately, these conditions enhance the threat of
terrorist networks and risks for U.S. security.57
Increased temperatures will have dire consequences for
fresh water access, flood mitigation, and human health.58 Access
to fresh water for drinking, farming, and hygiene is threatened
by changing precipitation patterns and especially by altered
mountain glacier runoff.59 Three billion people already live in
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

water-stressed developing nations. However, that number is
expected to increase to half of the global population by 2030 and
those people will be exposed to high water stress, beyond what
is currently experienced.60 In addition to the increased spread
of disease resulting from reduced water availability,61 human
exposure to malaria will double and dengue fever will increase
with only a 1°F to 2°F temperature rise as the geographical
range of mosquitoes expands to new regions.62 Drought—or
permanently drier climates—result in food and water shortages,
as seen in Darfur, Sudan, that pose serious threats to stability,63
and these conditions are expected to increase around the globe.64
What began in Darfur as a struggle between farmers and camel
herders for minimal water during time of “drought” became a
permanent end of precipitation in the region, leading to desperation, civil unrest, and mass migrations.65 Mass migrations out of
permanently “drought” afflicted areas into northern hemisphere
countries should be anticipated, along with strained resources
and tempers in all regions.66
Changes in sea level and acidity could also have a devastating impact on communities around the world.67 Approximately
two-thirds of the world population lives within fifty miles of
the coast, and in some places, including New Orleans and The
Netherlands, below sea-level.68 Many vulnerable populations
live within the expected zone of sea-level rise, including the
ten million inhabitants living within three feet of sea-level in
Bangladesh.69 In addition to the encroaching waters, many of
the vulnerable populations are also vulnerable to the increasing
acidity of the oceans, which is a primary source for protein for
more than one billion people.70 Ocean acidity is increasing at a
rate that will be evolutionarily difficult for fish to keep up with,
and diminished food supplies are expected to result in greater
unrest.71
Between increased crises within the United States, reduced
capacity to respond to those crises, and the possibility of
increased extremism abroad, climate change impacts directly
and indirectly threaten U.S. national security. If the President
truly believes that “[t]o advance our common security, we must
address the underlying political and economic deficits that foster
instability, enable radicalization and extremism, and ultimately
undermine the ability of governments to manage threats within
their borders,”72 then the United States must address climate
change as a leading future cause of those political and economic
de-stabilizers.

The Development and Role of
National Security Law
The Obama Administration fully acknowledges that prompt
and sweeping action is needed to bring greenhouse gases
(“GHG”) to a safe level, thereby reducing the effects and degree
of climate change.73 The 2010 NSS acknowledges that the “danger from climate change is real, urgent, and severe” and that
the effects of climate change “will lead to new conflicts over
refugees and resources” as well as “catastrophic natural disasters.”74 However, the Administration incorrectly believes that
comprehensive legislation from Congress is required before
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such climate protection actions can be taken.75 The Administration already has the authority to take decisive action under the
National Security Act.
The National Security Act of 1947 (“NSA”) established the
National Security Council (“NSC”) with the intention of ensuring an open and effective working “relationship between those
responsible for foreign policy and those responsible for military
policy”76 by creating a central advisory coordinating office for
all matters related to national security.77 Before World War II,
it had become increasingly clear that the United States needed
a more unified approach to deal with national security issues,
and that need became apparent to the public at large with the
attack on Pearl Harbor.78 The NSC may have originally been
conceived of as an advisory group, rather than a force for implementation, but the group’s function has varied to both ends of
that spectrum over the years.79
The sweeping language in the opening lines of the National
Security Act of 1947 expresses Congress’s acknowledgement
of the need for a large-scale program to address threats to U.S.
security.80 The Act opens with the declaration that, “[i]n enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States;
to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security.”81 The Act does not
define a threat to national security, instead leaving that undefined for future experts to determine in order to fulfill the stated
purpose of the Act.82
Congress also provided for a National Security Council
whose purpose was advising the President regarding “the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the
national security to enable the military services and the other
departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more
effectively in matters involving the national security,” 83 and
other duties in addition to functions directed by the President.84
Congress’s plain intention was government-wide policies promoting national security. Though some members of Congress
expressed concern that the NSA should not delegate unsupervised authority to the Executive,85 they were persuaded that
extensive delegation would not deprive Congress the authority of oversight or implementation of new laws,86 and gave the
Executive the power necessary to carry out the desired mission:
protecting national security.87 Additionally, at the time of enactment, like today, flexibility in national security was a serious
concern and other members of Congress believed too many
restrictions on military activity would undermine the purpose of
unifying defense intelligence and strategy under this new protocol.88 Ultimately, Congress was convinced of the necessity
of the NSC as an advisory council to the President and coordination center for all matters relating to national security.89 The
result of these competing Congressional concerns was a broadly
written statute creating the NSC, which has enabled Presidents
to determine the structure and workings of the Council, while
conforming to the purpose, functions, and duties established in
the original Act of 1947.90
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Given the flexibility of the NSA, Presidents have altered
the structure and use of the NSC from its beginnings to fit their
leadership styles and the changing nature of the challenges faced
by the nation at any particular time.91 Where President Truman
rejected the authority to promote “implementation,” President
Eisenhower specifically authorized the coordinated implementation of national security policies under the NCS, creating an
Operations Coordinating Board.92 While this “implementation” function was criticized by some, its legal validity was not
questioned,93 and President Kennedy went on to invoke similar
powers during the Cuban Missile Crisis, even after rejecting the
practice.94
The oscillating nature of the NSC95 peaked during President
Reagan’s tenure, in the form of the Iran-Contra Affair, but ultimately resulted in a strong and stable NSC to shape and monitor
the implementation of national security policy.96 Accordingly,
extensive reforms were made whereby the NSC became responsible for making policy recommendations and “reviewing, coordinating, and monitoring the implementation of national security
policy.”97 Upon assuming office, President George H. W. Bush
was able to use his experience as the lead intelligence officer to
the NSC as a prior Director of National Intelligence to establish working groups (Policy Coordinating Committees “PCCs”)
for the NSC that actually worked.98 This structure was also
adopted by Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush because of
its effectiveness.99
Congressional approval of increased authority to the Executive was evident following the attacks on September 11, 2001 in
the United States, in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security,100 and in President Bush’s creation of a Homeland
Security Council (“HSC”) with extensive powers.101 The President created the HSC to assist in developing and implementing
homeland security policy, and created the Policy Coordinating Committees—modeled after the NSCs PCCs that became
so effective under the first President Bush—to coordinate the
development and implementation of homeland security policies,
including working with local governments.102 Congress passed
legislation supporting this Executive-created expanded authority (the HSC’s creation), and authorized the Council to advise
the President and “perform such other functions as the President
may direct,”103 supporting a similar attitude towards the NSC,
which also contains language authorizing “other functions as
the President may direct.”104 Even before September 11, 2001,
Congressional appreciation for the need of unified, flexible, and
responsive national security systems, following increasing international terror attacks,105 was plainly expressed in the passage
of the Intelligence Renewal Act of 1996.106
Specifically, Congress added the Committee on Transnational Threats (“CTT”) to the NSC107 as part of a commitment to
reexamine and modernize intelligence and security programs108
following attacks on U.S. soil in the 1990s.109 The statute
defines a “transnational threat” as “any transnational activity
(including international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the delivery systems for such weapons, and organized crime) that threatens the
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national security of the United States”110 or “any individual or
group that engages in an activity referred to in [the prior definition].”111 The CTT is directed to “coordinate and direct the
activities of the United States government relating to combating transnational threats.”112 The Committee is required to identify these threats; develop strategies to respond to such threats;
“monitor implementation” of those strategies; make recommendations of appropriate responses to specific transnational threats;
develop policies and “procedures” to ensure effective information sharing about such threats between Federal departments and
agencies; and develop guidelines to enhance and improve the
coordination of activities regarding national security.113
The Committee membership includes the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, and any other members that the President chooses to
include.114 The NSC membership has fluctuated remarkably
since its inception,115 but Congress clearly granted the President
authority to include any one else he believes is properly included
for the purpose of protecting national security from transnational
threats.
Congress understood when passing the Intelligence Renewal
and Reform Act of 1996 that with the close of the Cold War,
non-traditional factors, from increasingly varied sources,116
influenced national security.117 Before passage of the law, floor
speeches from members of both houses of Congress advocated
for an adaptable118 and “dynamic” twenty-first century security force119 to counter the “rapidly changing threats.”120 This
included environmental research desired by the departments to
increase “understanding of global environmental challenges.”121
The language in the Conference Report indicates that Congress
supports CTT engagement in both developing and implementing coordinated policies across departments to protect the nation
from transnational threats, whatever they may be.122
Climate change is a transnational threat to U.S. national
security by the plain language of the law. First, it inherently
extends beyond the national borders of the United States
because it occurs across the planet through the atmosphere and
oceans.123 Second, the negative impacts of climate change, documented above, both from a purely domestic perspective and
from added tensions and risks at the global scale, establish the
consequences of climate change as national security threats.124
The original intention of Congress to create a unified security
force capable of adapting to the emerging and unknown threats
that left the United States vulnerable prior to World War II supports these broad and evolving views of national security.125
Even President George W. Bush’s policies support the inclusion of climate change by including “manmade disasters” in the
realm of national security.126 Thus climate change plainly falls
within the delegated responsibility of the NSA’s Committee on
Transnational Threats.
Congress has specifically recognized the importance of
climate change in the context of national defense127 and, since
2008, has required the Department of Defense to include the
armed forces capability to handle “the consequences of climate
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change” in its Quadrennial Defense Review.128 At the same
time, Congress required all future National Security Strategy129
and National Defense Strategy reports to provide military personnel guidance on how to “assess the risks of projected climate
change.”130
Excuses that responsibility for implementing policies to
protect against climate change are already within the authority
of other departments and agencies within the Executive, and thus
outside the President’s authority within the NSC, are unfounded.
This argument rests on CO2 regulation by the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”), which currently only has authority
to regulate GHG emissions131 to protect the public health or welfare.132 EPA does not have authority to implement GHG policies
to protect national security.133 The President and his NSC have
a mandate to do so,134 and climate change policy is not solely
about air quality standards, but also about protecting Americans
from increasing threats posed by catastrophic weather events,
destabilized global populations, and terrorism.
The variation in Presidential styles and uses of the NSC over
the years, recently expanded powers granted to the Presidency,
and creation of the CTT all demonstrate the President’s power to
use the NSC to establish policies and to oversee their implementation in the other departments. President Obama ought to use
his NSC to implement policies protecting the U.S. from modern
threats,135 since the purpose of the Act was to provide the United
States with a “comprehensive program . . . of integrated policies
and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of
the government relating to the national security.”136 Congress
has recognized climate change as a national security issue137 and
it is now the President’s responsibility to use the NSC and the
CTT to their fullest capacity, as Congress intended, to protect
U.S. security.

Recommendations
U.S. national security policies cannot be based on internationally accepted science, when that science is subject to
manipulation by segments of the U.S. public and private sectors, as well as some of the very nations whose activities may
threaten U.S. national security.138 To adequately address climate
change in the national security context, the United States ought
to abandon its reliance on the conservative IPCC estimates and
use the best available science to determine the actual risks, and
likelihood of those risks, to people, property, and interests of
the United States.139 Recent studies, including those by NASA
scientists, make clear that change must occur promptly to adequately reduce CO2 levels.140
The United States should also take on the challenge like a
new Cold War, fully deploying all resources necessary to defeat
the threat. President Obama already recognized this in his 2010
National Security Strategy stating,
[w]hen the world was confronted by fascism, America
prepared itself to win a war and to shape the peace
that followed. When the United States encountered an
ideological, economic, and military threat from communism, we shaped our practices and institutions at
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home—and policies abroad—to meet this challenge.
Now, we must once again position the United States
to champion mutual interests among nations and
peoples.141
Fully engaging to defeat the threats of climate change will
require more than just tax incentives—though these should be
utilized too—it will require significant financial investment in
overhauling U.S. infrastructure and international diplomatic
maneuvering to effect the necessary changes.142
First, the President should implement an aggressive green
Job Corps program, in the style of President Franklin Roosevelt’s Works Progress Administration, employing Americans
and building U.S. infrastructure for the new technological age,
harnessing the power of proven renewable energy resources.143
While such a program would cost significant sums of money, it
would also provide jobs to millions of Americans144 who currently receive ongoing unemployment benefits, without any benefit to U.S. infrastructure, as the job market refuses to improve
significantly.145 These jobs would vary in skill level from senior
planning positions to low-skill labor jobs building and installing
the new electrical generation and transmission systems. Additionally, proven economic advantages exist in moving to a lowcarbon economy.146 Similar to the construction of the National
System of Interstate and Defense Highways under President
Eisenhower, this new infrastructure system is necessary for
U.S. security in the future.147 Not only are U.S. civilians reliant on the current fossil-fuel-burning energy grid, exposing cities and entire regions to potential brown-outs,148 so too is the
U.S. military which relies almost entirely on the national power
grid at fixed installations and on petroleum in combat and operations.149 Thus, strategic security motivations exist for moving
to renewable energies that actually improve battlefield readiness.150 Dependence on fuel supply lines reduces operational
preparedness, and results in astronomical monetary costs associated with transporting large quantities of fuel in comparison
to the dependable renewable energy options, while jeopardizing
troops’ lives.151
Second, working with the Secretary of State, the President
must actively convince other nations, like China, to do the same,
to secure U.S. security into the future.152 This could be accomplished in a similar fashion to the “space race,”153 but intentionally created, since countries that implement the new technologies
first will be better prepared for the future.154 Unfortunately, the
2010 NSS claim that the United States is “promoting universal
values abroad by living them at home,”155 is simply not true.156
The 2010 NSS claims that the United States must be a global
leader and “reengage the world” to facilitate “global cooperation
on issues . . . [including] climate change . . . that challenge all
nations, but that no one nation alone can meet.”157 These statements, while true, effectively punt U.S. responsibility in dealing
with climate change by: emphasizing the global nature of the
problem and the need for individual nations to take responsibility; professing U.S. leadership on climate change solutions while
also asserting that the U.S. will meet climate goals; but hedging
the promise with the need for Congressional action.158 Now is
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not the time for the United States to shy away, but the time to
lead by example and convince others to join our efforts, through
diplomacy and fear of future ostracism in the global community
for failure to adopt clean renewable energy technology.

Conclusion
The impacts of climate change touch every aspect of U.S.
national security. They increase destabilization of governments
and demands on U.S. resources to aid or re-stabilize a region
after a crisis. They threaten U.S. land, people, and infrastructure
around the world, and are largely preventable. However, they
are only preventable if the Administration takes responsibility
for our future and utilizes the resources available to it, indeed

required of it, to protect the national security of the United
States. The President should seek Senate approval to appoint
the Secretaries of Interior, Agriculture, and Labor, as well as the
EPA Administrator, to the NSC.159 The President should rely
on the best science available, not the lowest common denominator, and should take responsibility on the international stage
for U.S. CO2 emissions by making the United States the leader
in climate change mitigation technology, enabling effective diplomatic and economic pressure in convincing other nations to
do the same. The President has the authority, and the responsibility, to establish these policies and procedures to protect U.S.
national security.
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Climate Change and Small Island States:
Adrift in a Raising Sea of Legal Uncertainty
by Jeremy Kelley*

I

n 1999, the rising sea level swallowed two islands of the
nation Kiribati.1 Rising sea level2 is one of the effects of
climate change to which small island nations are particularly susceptible.3 Considering that the average elevation of
this nation of ninety thousand people on thirty-three islands and
atolls4 is only about two meters above sea level,5 it is no surprise
that Kiribati’s President Anote Tong considers the rising sea a
threat to the very existence of his nation.6 Taking a cue from a
policy first announced by the Maldives, President Tong has suggested that the solution to his nation’s disappearance could be
purchasing land in another country to relocate the entire population of Kiribati.7 This unprecedented situation raises the question: what would be the legal status of an I-Kiribati or Maldives
population on the run from the rising waters?
Estimates vary, but it is undisputed that current and future
effects of climate change, including droughts, floods, desertification, and rising sea level, will displace millions each year.8 At least
some displacement will occur across borders, especially when
dealing with small islands nations. 9 In spite of this potential for
massive displacement, at present no international legal framework
exists which will recognize and protect those displaced by environmental factors, even though the concepts of “environmental”
and “climate” refugees have been contemplated since the 1980s.10
Two different approaches to the legal problems have been
proposed. On one hand there have been voices calling for an
expansion of the legal definition of “refugee” to incorporate
environmentally displaced persons,11 while others argue that a
new and separate legal framework be created.12 Island nations,
while supportive of finding an international legal solution, are
unwilling to wait for international consensus and are taking their
own measures to avoid catastrophe.13
“Refugee” is a legal term, narrowly-defined by the 1951 UN
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, protecting persons who fled their home country in fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, political opinion, or ethnicity.14 In 2006,
the Maldives proposed amending the Convention to include
“climate refugee.”15 Recently, the Bangladeshi Finance Minister called for “[t]he [C]onvention on refugees [to] be revised
to protect [those displaced by climate change.]”16 However, the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) is concerned
that the inclusion of environmental or climate refugee could
potentially undermine the clarity of current standards.17 Further,
UNHCR is already under pressure from host countries to reduce
the burden of refugees18 and it is also concerned that renegotiation of the Convention could result in the lowering of existing
protection standards.19
Winter 2011

For these reasons, some argue that dealing with climate
refugees calls for a new and independent legal framework.20
Any new framework would need to draw upon widely agreed
principles and connect the protection of those displaced with the
broader international legal framework on climate change.21 The
international instrument would also need to address the practicalities of enforcement and establishment of rights.22
One proposed convention from the University of Limoges23 recognizes different types of environmental displacement,
protecting generally against “natural and technological disasters.”24 It calls for the creation of a monitoring agency akin to
the UNHCR.25 The convention would recognize the duty of the
international community to assist a State that suffers from ecological disasters26 and the right to “conserve the nationality of
[the environmentally displaced person’s] state of origin . . . and
to acquire the nationality of the receiving state.”27 This last right
is especially important for a nation such as Kirbati, where complete loss of territory could result in the destruction of its legal
status as a nation.
Territory is one of the key elements of nationhood28 and
without physical territory under sovereign control, no nation can
exist.29 On the other hand, nationality is considered a fundamental right in international law.30 How can this right be squared
with permanent loss of sovereign territory and nationhood? It
is unlikely that another nation would accept a cash payment to
transfer the sovereignty of a part of its existing territory. Certainly, consideration would have to be made for those already
settled upon the land.31 Without an existing legal framework,
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perhaps Kiribati and the Maldives are doing the right thing to
proactively seek out alternatives.
Beyond purchasing land, one plan currently underway is
to secure “merit-based relocation.”32 Island nationals would be
trained in needed professions (e.g. nursing) in other countries,
with the ability to stay and seek citizenship there.33 In this way,
pockets of I-Kiribati community would be built up worldwide,
facilitating future resettlement.34 Furthermore, with removal of
much of the population, it would be possible to build up one
island and use it to “anchor” the sovereignty of the nation in
the event of drastic sea level rise.35 However, even if the state
continued to exist in legal terms36 it is unclear how it would
function.37

The best choice may be for an island nation to be absorbed into
another nation, using its own sovereignty to pay for relocation.38
For example, in exchange for control of Kiribati’s sovereign territory, India could accept Kiribati’s population and provide resettlement assistance such as language training, vocational training, and
financial aid.39 An end to nationhood, incorporation and relocation of an island nation in exchange for the sovereign control of its
resources and maritime zone would then benefit both parties.40
The world will see an increase in environmentally displaced
persons in the coming years. Room must be made for them with
the creation of a new and separate legal framework.41 However,
this will take time. In the meantime, small island nations are best
served to take matters into their own hands.
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Endnotes: Climate Change and Small Island States continued on page 94
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

Climate Change, Intellectual Property,
and the Scope of Human Rights Obligations
by Kavita Kapur*
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Introduction

unger,1 displacement,2 and loss of culture and traditional
ways of life3 are the likely consequences of continuing
on the world’s current trajectory of climate change.4
These phenomena and the images of suffering that they evoke
reflect situations rich with human rights concerns. Indeed, rights
activists demanding international action to halt global warming
invoke these themes of human vulnerability as a central part of
their protests.5 However, the extent to which the threatened effects
of climate change can be understood as imposing legal obligations
within the normative framework of international human rights
law, rather than simply as rhetorical ideas of moral rights, remains
unclear.6 In January 2009, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (“OHCHR”) published a report announcing that climate change had a range of effects on human rights.7
Although it may be unclear whether those effects constitute violations of human rights law, states still have obligations to protect
those affected by climate change.8 The OHCHR report provided
minimal guidance on what those human rights obligations consist
of, thus much remains uncertain about the scope of the obligations
imposed on states by climate change. As the international community continues to wrangle with the task of delineating a strategy
for climate stabilization,9 clarifying the human rights obligations
of states may help to inform both relevant national policies and
the emerging international framework.
The move towards climate stabilization, and consequently
an alleviation of pressures on human rights, will require all states
to transform the ways in which they produce energy, especially
developing countries with substantial green house gas emissions. This in turn demands adequate development, deployment,
and implementation of clean energy technologies, and diffusion
to those countries in need, including much of the developing
world.10 Because of the high-tech nature of clean energy solutions, the protection of intellectual property (“IP”) rights has an
important role to play in each stage of the process.11
States seeking climate change solutions will increasingly
deal with tensions caused when human rights and IP protection
obligations conflict. States must find a way to protect human
rights while addressing climate change.12 This article attempts
to anticipate some of these tensions and to propose potential
resolutions. The climate change crisis, the clean energy solutions that have emerged in response, and the role of intellectual
property protections in that process, provide a backdrop against
which the relationship between human rights and climate change
can be charted. This article begins by looking specifically at the
challenges that climate change poses to the traditional human
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rights framework, as well as the sources of human rights obligations in relation to climate change. The discussion then turns to
questions of access to clean energy technology, and contrasts the
issue to the debate over access to essential medicines. Next, the
article focuses on prospective tensions with IP protections in the
context of access to clean energy technology by applying various analytical frameworks grounded in human rights. The article
concludes by underscoring the importance of the human rights
analysis in mediating this tension and by cautioning against the
creation of fortified IP protections that do not prioritize human
rights considerations.

Climate Change, Clean Energy Solutions,
and Intellectual Property
The Climate Change Problem
The temperature of the global climate is rising.13 Once the
subject of considerable debate,14 the fact of global warming, both
natural and anthropogenic (human-induced), is now nearly universally accepted.15 Most states in the international community
are members of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), an international treaty aimed at
the reduction of global warming.16 Members of the UNFCCC are
thus aligned in their commitment to combat the “change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity
that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is
in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable
time periods.”17 Significant strides made in the direction of reaching international consensus on the problem of climate change are
due in part to the availability of reliable scientific information on
the causes and effects of global warming.18
In particular, the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (“IPCC”) contain assessments and projections
about climate change which are regarded as authoritative by the
international community.19 The IPCC is an intergovernmental
scientific organization established by the UN Environment Programme and the World Meteorological Organization, currently
with 194 members, that reviews and assesses available information on climate change in order to provide “rigorous and balanced scientific information to decision makers.”20
According to the IPCC’s most recent assessment, published
in 2007, there is sufficient scientific consensus to unequivocally
establish the fact of global warming.21 In making this conclusion,
the IPCC draws upon observations of increases in global average
* Kavita Kapur is a J.D. candidate, May 2011, at American University Washington College of Law.
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air and ocean temperatures, the widespread melting of snow and
ice, and the rising global average sea level.22 Additionally, the
same report asserts with more than ninety percent certainty that
most of the global warming experienced in the last fifty years is
due to anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases.23
Beyond establishing the reality of human-induced climate
change, the IPCC assessment also presents the current scientific consensus on the effects of climate change.24 These include
changes in weather patterns, which are ninety percent certain to
result in the shrinking of snow-covered areas and of sea ice, rising sea levels and water temperatures, increased frequency of heat
waves, and heavy precipitation events.25 These weather changes
will in turn have grave consequences for agriculture, forestry, ecosystems, water resources, human health, and society at large.26
The increased strength of consensus around the anthropogenic causes of climate change has inspired response efforts
aimed at reducing emissions levels. These strategies seek to mitigate the trend of global warming by sufficiently reducing green
house gas emissions to a level that would stabilize the rising
climate temperature.27 Although specific target emissions levels
were established in the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC,28 the
shift towards a stable climate will require additional strategies
and tools in order to reach any global target levels.

Clean Energy Technologies and Intellectual Property
Climate stabilization, or the emissions reductions that must
be reached globally in order to effectively combat global warming, requires a drastic overhaul of energy production systems.29
As such, there is a need for efficient clean energy technologies
that can be developed relatively quickly, deployed into action,
and diffused widely.30
Efforts to develop, deploy, and diffuse clean energy technologies have been underway for many years now, with significant
successes. There is great variation in the types of technologies available to facilitate the global shift to less carbon-reliant
energy production. Amongst the most prominent technologies
are photovoltaic (solar), biofuels, and wind technologies.31
As with any other technology industry, clean energy technologies are subject to a variety of IP protections. However, there
is considerable debate over the propriety and scope of such IP
protections since these technologies are integral to alleviating the
global stress of climate change.32 Those who generally favor IP
protections for clean energy technologies argue that incentives are
critical to drive innovation and diffusion of such technologies.33
Without IP protections, the theory goes, innovation would be
severely limited and new clean energy technologies would not be
developed.34 Opponents of IP protections for clean energy focus
on the problems of access caused by the exclusion rights afforded
to patent holders, which almost inevitably results in prohibitively
high costs.35 Thus, IP protections may render the technology unaffordable for those who most desperately need it, including, in this
case, those developing countries with high energy demands.
Basic renewable energy technologies, including wind,
biofuel, and photovoltaic, are not new and have been off patent protection for a number of years. 36 Instead, specific
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improvements and add-on features to these existing technologies are increasingly being patented.37 The emerging modification and adaptations are variously aimed at improving efficiency
by minimizing cost, maximizing energy production, or both.38
With solar energy, for example, new technologies attempt to
create a thin film of semiconductors that can be applied to existing surfaces, greatly reducing the costs of manufacturing solar
technology.39
While these complex technologies and processes are central to any effort to advance climate stabilization, the impacts of
climate change on humans should not be overlooked. Scientific,
environmental, and economic dimensions have long occupied
center stage in the discourse around climate change. However,
the grave threat that climate change poses to human lives and
human well-being should be the central consideration in crafting
solutions that are responsive to the lived realities of this crisis.

Human Rights and Climate Change
The symbolic force of framing climate change as an affront
to human rights may in itself have great utility. However, it
does not carry the same weight or consequences as violations
of states’ legal duties to guarantee the rights of individuals in
their territories. States will face little formal accountability for
breaching moral priorities that are simply phrased as a matter of
conceptual right.40 Violations of international human rights law,
on the other hand, may give rise to monitoring by an international treaty body, scrutiny by a special rapporteur, or litigation
of individual petitions before a regional human rights institution.41 Additionally, because the legal obligations of a state
under international human rights law include those standards to
which the state has explicitly consented to be bound, violations
of human rights law are a form of a breach. Such a breach threatens to call the credibility of a state into serious consideration.

Challenging the Framework
Conceptualizing the effects of climate change as human
rights violations poses a difficult conundrum for the international human rights law framework. At one level, there is no
explicit normative provision dealing with climate change that
would give rise to an international legal obligation.42 The universal treaties that create international human rights obligations
for states do not explicitly address the dangers posed by the climate change crisis.43 Even if we attempt to locate the human
impacts of climate change within the framework of environmental protection, the key human rights treaties—the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)44 and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (“ICESCR”)45—include no reference to a specific right
to a safe and healthy environment.46
The global nature of greenhouse gas emissions along with
the related transboundary impacts disrupts the traditional focus
of human rights on obligations that states have to individuals
in their territories.47 Although there are certain states who have
contributed more significantly to climate change, the effects
on their populations is often more attenuated. The most severe
impacts threaten to disrupt the lives of citizens in other parts
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of the world.48 Indeed, the states whose citizens would be most
dramatically affected by climate change, and thus who have the
greatest stake in efforts to combat global warming, are those
states who have least contributed to global greenhouse gas emissions.49 Holding these states responsible for human rights violations that they did not directly cause is untenable under the
existing framework. The traditionally territorial nature of human
rights obligations is thus inadequate to address the global climate change problem.

Human Rights Obligations Arising from Climate
Change
Pursuant to a resolution of the Human Rights Council, in
January 2009 the UN Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (“OHCHR”) released a detailed analytical report
of the relationship between climate change and human rights.50
The report analyzed the impacts of climate change on various
human rights protected within the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and
other international human rights treaties.51 Specifically, the
OHCHR report detailed the significant threats that climate
change poses to the rights to life, adequate food, water, health,
adequate housing, and self-determination, while also highlighting the particular impacts on highly vulnerable groups such as
women, children, and indigenous peoples.52 Additionally, the
report discussed the prospects for displacement, as well as for
conflict and related security risks, that are likely to occur as a
result of climate change along with the attendant human rights
implications for the individuals affected.53
The OHCHR report concluded that while it was unclear
whether the effects of climate change amounted to human rights
violations, states nonetheless had obligations to protect human
rights in the context of national-level measures undertaken to
address climate change.54 In addition, human rights law also
obliges states to engage in international cooperation to protect
and promote human rights. Specifically, the ICESCR carries
extraterritorial obligations that require states to
(1) refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of
human rights in other countries; (2) take measures to
prevent third parties over which they hold influence
from interfering with the enjoyment of human rights
in other countries; (3) take steps through international
assistance and cooperation, depending on the availability of resources, to facilitate the fulfillment of human
rights in other countries, including disaster relief, emergency assistance, and assistance to refugees and displaced persons; and (4) ensure that human rights are
given due attention in international agreements and that
such agreements do not adversely impact upon human
rights.55
Within the framework of the ICESCR, a state is obliged
to “take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in
the present Covenant by all appropriate means.”56 The duty to
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engage in international cooperative efforts aimed at the advancement of economic, social, and cultural rights is in direct contrast to the language in the ICCPR, which expressly describes
obligations of a state to “individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.”57 The broader scope of duties under the
ICESCR than in a traditional human rights model is supported
by the General Comments of the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”) which note, inter alia,
that under the ICESCR, it is “particularly incumbent on States
parties and other actors in a position to assist to provide ‘international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical’ which enable developing countries to fulfill their core and
other obligations.”58

Access to Clean Energy Technology
Overview of Technology and Access Issues
Most of the clean energy technology that has been developed in response to climate change has originated in developed
countries.59 This has created an imbalance in access between
developing and developed countries, with developing countries
asserting that intellectual property regimes prevent them from
gaining access to these critical technologies.60 Although there
have been numerous attempts to study the issue, there is no conclusive evidence that IP protections present or do not present a
barrier to the diffusion of clean energy technologies.61 However,
there are at least some indications that the process of negotiating for access when the base technology is subject to foreign
IP protection hinders developing country industries that want to
produce new technologies or develop an adaptation to an existing technology.62 Strong IP protection in developing countries
may promote diffusion by assuring patent holders that if they
license their technology to a firm in the target country, there will
be sufficient protection against unlawful copying.63
Regardless of the lack of conclusive data on whether intellectual property rights are a barrier to access to clean energy
technologies, it is irrefutable that they do influence access in a
variety of different ways.64 Despite the particular importance of
encouraging innovation in the clean energy technology industry in light of the great significance that slight modifications or
adaptations can have, technology transfer has rarely focused on
supporting the development stage of climate stabilization technology.65 Instead, funding and other forms of programmatic
support have been the primary strategies for spurring innovation
in developing countries.66
Most of the technology transfer that has taken place in the
context of climate change has been in the deployment stage.67
Transfer of technology for the purposes of deployment can take
various forms. First, products that incorporate the technology
can be transferred directly to the developing country for domestic use.68 A second form of transfer would be licensing production to a company in the target country.69 Third, transfer may
simply involve capacity building for research and production
facilities in the target country.70
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Contrasting Clean Energy and Essential Medicines
Despite the apparent parallels in the debates over access to
medicine and access to clean energy technology, there are some
acute differences between the two industries that limit the extent
to which arguments for access can be shared. One key difference
between pharmaceuticals and clean energy is the availability of
substitutes. A drug that is developed to cure or treat a particular
disease is likely to be one of the only medications that serve
that purpose; there are unlikely to be many, if any, substitutes.71
Technologies that produce clean energy, on the other hand,
range from wind and solar to hydro and nuclear.
The framework of normative instruments for facilitating access to essential medicines is much richer than that for
clean energy technologies. The Doha Declaration to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS”) formally recognized the flexibilities within the
TRIPS agreement that could be used as a basis for compulsory
licenses on essential medicines.72 The CESCR even issued a
General Comment asserting that the right to health includes an
obligation for states to promote medical research and to provide
access to affordable treatments, including essential drugs.73
The Doha Declaration does not significantly adopt a human
rights framework of analysis despite the human rights arguments
made by many within the access to medicines movement. 74
Instead, it carves out of the general rule of intellectual property
protection a limited range of exceptions to apply in narrow circumstances.75 Thus, the effect of the Doha Declaration is limited
to issues directly implicating public health rather than the full
range of human rights.76

Regime Shifting: Human Rights Analysis
As the forum for the coordination of the global climate stabilization framework, the UNFCCC has been the site of negotiations
over technology transfer, innovation, collaborations, and other
strategies aimed at facilitating the development, deployment, and
diffusion of clean energy technologies in the developing world.77
The various climate change conferences held under the UNFCCC
auspices have not recognized any progress towards articulating
an actionable global strategy to facilitate a developing world shift
to clean energy technologies.78 At the same time, activists, nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”), and international organizations have made repeated calls for the mainstreaming of human
rights concerns within the UNFCCC process.79 These demands
have similarly been met with little real action in the way of prioritizing human rights within the negotiating texts and processes.80
Accordingly, the UNFCCC regime has yet to connect human
rights to the debate over how to facilitate developing world adoption and adaptation of clean energy technologies.81 Therefore, a
discursive regime shift82 should be attempted from the politicized
negotiations of the UNFCCC process to a series of human rights
analyses that seek to link the human impacts of climate change
to the question of barriers to clean energy technology. While the
flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement that sufficed for guaranteeing access to medicines in the Doha Declaration may provide
a sufficient legal basis for the granting of compulsory licenses for
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clean energy technologies, the alternative frameworks presented
in this section aim to conduct the analysis starting from a position
of human rights protection.83 These frameworks are centered in
the protection of human rights and are utilized to find theories of
accommodating intellectual property protections.
The starting point of a human rights analysis is necessarily
international instruments and other sources of human rights obligations. This framework of analysis is in contrast to intellectual
property analyses, which take as the starting point instruments
relating to intellectual property rights.84

Human Rights Obligations
Intellectual Property Rights as Human Rights
The protection of intellectual property is not simply an economic
tool designed to encourage and award innovation. Instead, the protections afforded to a patent holder may also be an iteration of human
rights. As such, intellectual property systems may be frameworks for
states to fulfill their human rights obligations. The ICESCR delineates the right “authors” to “protection of moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary, or artistic production.”85

Rights Affected by Climate Change
In accordance with the guidance provided by the CESCR,
states are obliged to ensure the minimum essential level of each
right codified in the ICESCR.86 The duties of states derive from
the obligation to secure certain minimum standards of human
rights; thus, the duty is not fulfilled simply by adopting a particular policy or engaging in a particular transfer of technology
if that policy or transfer does not result in the realization of the
minimum value of the relevant human right.87 Rather, the duty
is satisfied when the minimum standards are guaranteed.88 This
substantive duty and its various constituent rights oblige states
to simultaneously advance development, deployment, and diffusion of clean energy technology.89 The human rights obligation
includes not only the importation of technology, but also support
for local capabilities to adopt, diffuse, adapt, and develop technologies that fit within the particular circumstances of the state.
This results in changing energy production systems in a manner
sufficient to meet the core minimum standards of human rights.90
The simple transfer of technology will not provide the requisite
knowledge about how or why the technology works without this
focus on local industry and infrastructure.91 Consequently, it will
be of little utility to advancing the realization of human rights.
The ICESCR obliges developed states and other actors to
engage in international cooperation in furtherance of the realization of human rights in developing countries. This does little to
ease the tension of how to balance the human rights of those most
directly affected by climate change with the rights to moral and
material interests of those innovators who are developing technological solutions to the energy crisis. While various human rights
are affected by climate change, the legal obligations of states to
cooperatively address climate change issues are not based on any
explicit norm. Nonetheless, various frameworks of analysis centered on human rights may prove useful in developing a sense for
how these obligations may play out vis-à-vis IP protections.
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Frameworks of Analysis
Strict Scrutiny
Borrowing the term from U.S. Constitutional law, Margaret Chon proposes a principle of substantive equality that would
require adjudicators and norm-generators to exercise a non-deferential standard of review when considering whether a grant
of an exclusive IP right or the denial of a limitation on the right
appears to conflict with a basic human need.92 Although motivated by a development rationale, Chon’s framework is useful for
thinking about clean energy technology as a “public good” that
advances an important human need (or a series of human rights).
The framework requires the potential IP barriers to access to clean
energy technologies to be balanced against the ways in which
those technologies would help to guarantee human rights by providing access to an important public good. As Chon notes, this
is not only important for the advancement of development and
human rights, but also for the fortification of IP systems in developing countries that “cannot ‘take root’ absent a basic national
capacity, which can only be developed with a population that has
its essential needs met.”93
The extent to which IP is a barrier to the spread of clean
energy technology through the developing world is admittedly
uncertain. Yet, its recurrent mention in policy documents and
commentary on the UNFCCC process imply that it is at least
perceived as an important issue by both the technology companies who hold the IP protections and developing countries who
encounter obstacles in accessing existing clean energy technologies.94 Applying Chon’s strict scrutiny to a theoretical category
of IP protections for such technologies prioritizes the experiences of the most marginalized within the process of norm setting. The implications on the rights of indigenous communities,
displaced persons, and other vulnerable groups who suffer as a
result of lack of access to clean energy technologies becomes
the starting point against which all IP protection regimes must
be measured. IP regimes that pose barriers to access to clean
energy technology would be deemed excessive where such lack
of access negatively impacts human rights.
The appeal of this framework is in its stark simplicity. It
brings forward the human rights impacts of climate change that
are all too often relegated to the background of international discussions or to exceptional circumstances in analyzing the TRIPS
flexibilities. Strict scrutiny allows for the human side of climate
change to be made the center point of the discussion. However,
the problem with applying this analysis to clean energy technologies is that it is difficult to imagine any IP protections without some negative impact on access and human rights. In other
words, all IP protections would seem to fail the strict scrutiny
test. As such, the utility of strict scrutiny is less as a framework
than as an important framing device that establishes the centrality of human rights concerns.

Human Rights Primacy
Another framework through which to understand the relationship between human rights and the protection of IP is that
of human rights primacy. Under this theory, “the protection of
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the non-human rights aspects of intellectual property protection
should be subordinated to human rights obligations.”95 Human
rights primacy as a tool to mediate tensions caused by IP protection involves striking a balance between the public and private
interests in innovation with the primary objective of promoting
and protecting human rights.96 Additionally, this tool of analysis
is premised on categorizing IP protections as qualitatively different from other human rights.97 Specifically, human rights primacy
understands IP protections as privileges assigned by the state
according to a pre-determined set of criteria.98 By contrast, human
rights are innate to an individual and are only recognized (rather
than granted) by the state.99 IP rights can be licensed or otherwise assigned, whereas human rights are universal and inalienable.100 Although similar to the strict scrutiny approach advanced
by Chon, human rights primacy carries a number of alternating
theories that can be used to delineate the scope of rights.
Core Minimum
One such framework is the core minimum approach advocated by both Laurence Helfer and Peter Yu in similar iterations.101 The ICESCR requires that states take sufficient steps,
as determined by the resources available to that state, to realize
the obligations to protect economic, social, and cultural rights
enshrined in the Convention.102 Regardless of available resources,
however, states are obliged to guarantee certain minimum levels of rights protection.103 The core minimum approach seeks to
reduce the competing categories of rights—those of the innovator
and those of the community that desire the technology—to the
“irreducible core.”104 For innovators, the core right under Article
15(1)(c) of the ICESCR is “a zone of personal autonomy in which
authors can achieve their creative potential, control their productive output, and lead independent intellectual lives.”105 Once this
irreducible core of rights has been protected, any additional protections afforded to innovators must be measured against other
human rights.106 The CESCR directs states to ensure that their IP
protection regimes “constitute no impediment to their ability to
comply with their core obligations in relation to the rights to food,
health and education, as well as to take part in cultural life and to
enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, or any
other right enshrined in the Covenant.”107 This approach takes as
a starting point that there are certain minimum human rights standards required of states, and locates intellectual property rights
as one of the tools to be utilized in advancing those standards.108
Thus, as Yu notes, under the core minimum approach
states will not violate the ICESCR if they modify or
roll back excess protection required under TRIPS, the
WIPO treaties, and other international, regional, and
bilateral treaties provided that such protection does not
have any human rights basis. They can also do so if the
protection already exceeds what is required under their
core minimum obligations and if they offer compelling
evidence of the competing demands with other human
rights obligations.109
Applying this to the situation of protections for clean energy
technologies, it appears that anything other than the protection
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of an innovator’s “zone of personal autonomy” would violate a
state’s other human rights obligations under the ICESCR. As discussed above, the realization of even minimum standards of the
various rights will allow a state to not only secure clean energy
technology, but also develop domestic capacities to adapt the
technology and develop locally relevant diffusion mechanisms.
Just Remuneration
Another framework for delineating human rights obligations
in relation to IP protections for clean energy technology is the just
remuneration approach.110 Similarly based off of the primacy of
human rights, the just remuneration approach seeks to delineate
the human rights dimensions of IP protections and assess adequate
compensation for use of the protected technology.111 The underlying theory is that IP protections have limitations in the form of
other human rights.112 Thus, if it is within an individual’s human
rights to utilize a particular creation in advancement of those
rights, some sort of compensation would be due for any limitations.113 This is different from a compulsory licensing framework,
although a national-level licensing policy could follow from this
theory.114 The just remuneration model requires that the innovator
be paid for his creation, either by the person or entity using it, or
by the state on behalf of the public (and in fulfillment of the state’s
obligations to advance human rights protections).115
Under this analysis, the IP protections extended to clean
energy technologies reflect a mix of human rights obligations and
non-human rights (economic) purposes. As with almost all IP, the
innovator of clean energy technologies possesses (human) rights
to the protection of moral or material interests in his intellectual
creations.116 However, if the utility of the technology would
serve to advance the human rights of others, then the interests of
the author are not limitless.117 In order to adequately protect the
innovator’s rights under Article 15 of the ICESCR, a state may
employ a just remuneration approach that provides appropriate
compensation in the context of a compulsory license to utilize
the technology for public welfare.118 This effectively changes the
protection from an IP form to a human rights form, by balancing
only the human rights interests of the innovator against the human
rights interests of the individual, industry, or state that is pursuing
access to the technology. Under this framework, “human rights
grant to the [entity seeking access to the technology] a compulsory license, as compared to a free license, and to the right holder
a right to remuneration, rather than exclusive control.”119 Thus,
those individuals or entities holding patents to important clean
energy technology could have their human rights guaranteed by
receiving adequate compensation for their technologies.

Conclusion
Although the existing flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement which, through the Doha Declaration, were asserted to
be sufficient for facilitating access to essential medicines may
similarly be sufficient for easing the IP protections on important
clean energy technologies, the fundamental differences between
the regimes of IP and human rights protections warrants this
human rights analysis. The TRIPS Agreement is focused on “the
promotion of innovation through the provision of commercial
incentives.”120 With its economic priorities at odds with those
of the human rights approach, which is centered on the protection and promotion of human rights, TRIPS is not an ideal or
sufficient basis upon which to build climate change solutions.
Instead, in order to keep the climate stabilization framework
grounded in the realities of the human suffering induced by
climate change, solutions to the technology access gap should
begin with a human rights analysis, even if they are eventually
realized through TRIPS flexibilities.
Beyond the mainstreaming of human rights in the climate stabilization context, the human rights analyses assist in identifying
a range of interests and obligations beyond the transfer of a clean
energy technology to a developing country. Funding and programmatic support for the development stage of clean energy technologies in developing states is a more sustainable fix for the climate
change problem. Local technology industries in developing countries would benefit more from direct access to technologies that they
could improve or adapt to their local contexts if they had increased
training in know-how and know-why. In many ways, this would
place developing countries on equal footing with developed countries and would enable the development of build-on technologies.
The human rights analysis also reflects an obligation of states
to cooperate internationally to lend their support to the realization of human rights for individuals outside of their territories. In
the context of the UNFCCC negotiations, the intergovernmental
bloc of developing countries within the UN, known as the G77,
has advocated for the creation of a multilateral fund to buy up the
various IP instruments protecting clean energy technologies.121
As at least one commentator has stated, “[a]n appropriate
and effective ‘social contract’ needs to be developed around low
carbon and climate resilient innovation to balance public and
private interests.”122 Rather than simply transferring technology or purchasing the IP protections to certain technologies, the
framework in which innovation can be incentivized and made
accessible needs to be revisited.

Endnotes: Climate Change, Intellectual Property, and the Scope of
Human Rights Obligations

1

See Press Release, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),
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for Agriculture” (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10565&LangID=E (last visited Jan. 28, 2011)
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Endnotes: Climate Change, Intellectual Property, and the Scope of
Human Rights Obligations continued on page 95
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Is Newer Technology Always Better?:
Why Indigenous Peoples’ Technology Should be Incorporated into
the International Fight Against Climate Change
by Ashley Gardana*

I

n 2010, with the aim of deviating from “business as usual,”1
the member states of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“Convention”) gathered in
Cancun, Mexico.2 The Convention currently consists of two
tracks, the Ad Hoc Working Group under the Kyoto Protocol
(“AWG-KP”)3 and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term
Cooperative Action (“AWG-LCA”).4 The latter track agreed
that developing countries would take on a greater responsibility
in climate change mitigation.5 Many of these countries already
play a key role in the mitigation effort by voluntarily participating in projects.6 Now they have agreed to further their role
under the AWG-LCA by implementing nationally appropriate
mitigation actions (“NAMAs”) for sustainable development7
and outlining a national strategy for reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation (“REDD”). 8 Developed
countries, under AWG-LCA, will continue to provide financial,
technological, and capacity-building support for both projects.9
However, many climate change programs involving outside
investment have resulted in violations to the rights of indigenous
peoples,10 such as forced relocation or loss of sacred land.11 In
an effort to prevent further violations, the developing countries
should consider investing foreign funds in indigenous technologies when implementing their NAMA and REDD Agreements.
Indigenous technology stems from traditional ecological knowledge.12 This specific knowledge is a collection of
“botanical, zoological, hydrological, cultural, and geographical
knowhow . . . that has developed over time, and that continues
to develop.”13 Implementing traditional ecological knowledge
has the potential to result in carbon sequestration, forest protection, renewable energy production, and land rehabilitation. 14
The technologies derived from this knowledge have proved
to be environmentally sustainable for eons.15 Moreover, the
indigenous technologies are evolving to combat climate change
impacts.16
Simona Gomez Lopez, a representative from a Mexican forest community explained how her village evolved their cooking
methods to mitigate climate change during the opening plenary
of the Sixteenth Conference of the Parties in Cancun, Mexico.17
The community recognized the forest warming, the rains starting earlier, and the rivers drying up.18 The village also noticed
that their traditional use of wood for cooking, which required
two to three truckloads of wood per family, was significantly
contributing to deforestation.19 To mitigate their contribution
to climate change, the community created an environmentally
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friendly kiln and now has eight for regular use.20 These kilns
require approximately eighty percent less wood. 21
Indigenous technology, which can help mitigate climate
change, is also a valuable tool for reforestation and biodiversity
conservation projects.22 For example, the indigenous peoples in
the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh devised new sustainable forest management practices, which expanded twenty acres
of forest to one hundred acres.23 Additionally, the Serangan
community of Bali rehabilitated their coral reefs and mangrove
forests, and managed to plant fifteen thousand pieces of coral in
various coastal regions of Indonesia.24 This collection of knowledge is a valuable resource that developing countries should
incorporate in the NAMA and REDD projects as appropriate.25
Incorporating indigenous technology into mitigation and
adaptation efforts will help alleviate the obstacles other climate
change programs face.26 Certain programs under the Kyoto
Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) caused
significant threats to indigenous peoples who refused to hand
over their territories for the purpose specified in the projects.27
The CDM is considered a success.28 However, because developed countries meet their emissions targets by designing projects that mitigate climate change in developing countries,29
they have such a strong incentive to maximize the emission
reductions yielded from these projects that the effects on local
populations are often ignored.30 For instance, one CDM project
included hydroelectric dams, which impacted river ecosystems
and required relocation of an entire indigenous community.31
Conversely, traditional ecological knowledge employed in the
Indian Himalayan region utilizes hydro-energy from the hill
streams and rivers through traditional watermills.32 Placing the
financial support of developed countries in technology derived
from traditional knowledge can help maintain indigenous communities’ continued existence with sustainable means.
Implementing the Cancun Agreements with traditional ecological knowledge also upholds the general principles developed
from the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (“Declaration”).33 While not a binding treaty, the standards of the Declaration are widely accepted and incorporated
into policies and programs.34 The preamble of the Declaration,
“[r]ecogniz[es] that respect for indigenous knowledge, cultures
and traditional practices contributes to sustainable and equitable
* Ashley Gardana is a J.D. candidate, May 2012, at American University Washington College of Law.
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development and proper management of the environment.” 35
Investing in available indigenous technologies while respecting
indigenous rights can help developing countries fulfill their obligations under the AWG-LCA.
The indigenous communities are the most vulnerable to
not only climate change impacts, but the mitigation measures
as well.36 Although the Convention has begun to recognize

indigenous peoples, “cooperative action” within the Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action requires
improvement.37 Incorporating proven and available indigenous
technologies can provide nationally appropriate mitigation
actions for sustainable development and reforestation projects
within developing countries while still respecting the rights of
indigenous peoples.
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The Singapore Workaround:
Providing a “Greenprint” for a UNFCCC Party Reclassification
by P. Cal Trepagnier*
Introduction
The international climate debate currently focuses on the
world’s two largest greenhouse gas emitters: China and the
United States.1 However, to successfully address the impasse in
climate change negotiations, the focus should actually be on one
of the smaller emitters, the Republic of Singapore (“Singapore”).
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”)2 classifies nations into two categories originally
based on 1990 economic levels: Annex I Parties (developed
countries) and Non-Annex I Parties (developing countries).3
Although there is no automatic graduation based on predefined
criteria, a process and a precedent exists for status graduation
that could provide a model for countries to shift from NonAnnex I to Annex I Parties. In 2009, Malta, originally a NonAnnex I country, successfully petitioned the UNFCCC after
joining the European Union (“EU”) to “put itself on the same
legal footing as the other Member States of the European Union
that are included in Annex I to the Convention.”4 Singapore’s
economy is also strong enough to shift it from a Non-Annex I
to an Annex I country and other countries can then follow suit,
providing a solution to the current impasse in negotiations.
This article offers a “Singapore workaround” as a way forward: diplomatic negotiations with Singapore aimed at changing
the classification of nations that have developed economically
since the formation of the UNFCCC. It has been argued by
“[p]roponents of reclassiﬁcation . . . that responsibility for mitigation and eligibility for support should reﬂect contemporary differences in levels of development among developing countries, rather
than those current[ly] built into the Convention.”5 The reclassification of Singapore from a Non-Annex I to an Annex I Party would
provide the ideal model for shifting parties’ obligations in the climate realm in the future. Singapore is a financial leader in both
globalization6 and the global recovery7 and is well positioned for
international and domestic “carbon finance.”8 The nation is economically poised to retool its energy sector,9 faces imminent and
significant risks from climate change impacts,10 and is also ready
to create and enforce modern climate laws.11 This article examines
climate law in Germany and Spain to show how Annex I classification benefited their economies over the past six years. Finally, it
discusses how establishing climate laws in Singapore could affect
emerging economies, namely Brazil, India, and China.

Opportunity for Breakthrough in
International Climate Law
Current international climate law is regulated primarily
by the UNFCCC, which was created in 1992 from the United
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Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil, also commonly known as the “Earth Summit.”12
Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 binds Annex I Parties to
reduce “their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 percent below 1990 levels in the commitment period between 2008
and 2012.”13 Under the Kyoto Protocol, however, the majority
of countries—Non-Annex I nations—do not have greenhouse
gas reduction targets.14 Moreover, there is no automatic system
that requires them to reduce emissions, regardless of the level
of gross domestic product (“GDP”) per capita.15 The lack of a
mechanism to graduate Non-Annex I Parties once they achieve a
certain level of economic development has emerged as perhaps
the greatest challenge of the UNFCCC.
The richer developing nations with high emissions that do not
take on Annex I rights and responsibilities have long caused frustration and concern for the United States,16 which refuses to ratify
the Kyoto Protocol and commit to emissions reductions.17 The
first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is on course to end
in 2012 and recent UNFCCC negotiations in Cancun, Mexico fell
short of creating a second commitment period.18 A lack of emissions reductions targets from emerging economies such as Brazil,
India, and China have caused stalemates in international negotiations.19 Despite Singapore’s small size and its relatively minor
greenhouse gas emissions, Singapore’s graduation to an Annex I
Party could have broader implications for emerging economies in
the international effort to curb global climate change.
A graduation mechanism in the UNFCCC would adjust
country mitigation obligations over time. A similar option was
successfully established by the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; that Protocol created a
panel that reviews country requests for exemptions from ozone
depleting substance commitments.20 Currently however, the
UNFCCC’s approach to evaluating country classification is
ambiguous.21 Singapore taking on the rights and responsibilities of an Annex I Party would help to kick-start the process
and encourage other rising nations to follow suit. Therefore, the
United Nations should facilitate talks with Singapore regarding
the transition of Singapore’s status from a Non-Annex I country
to an Annex I country.

* P. Cal Trepagnier is a master’s student at The Johns Hopkins University in the
energy policy and climate program. While pursuing an undergraduate degree in
environmental chemistry at the University of Virginia, he studied abroad at the
National University of Singapore.
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Economic Readiness
The International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) describes Singapore as a “newly industrialized Asian economy.”22 Singapore,
by land area, is a small, densely populated urban city-state that
has limited energy resources.23 In contrast to its Southeast Asian
neighbors, Singapore is not a major agricultural center and therefore much of its food is obtained through importation.24 The
IMF last reported on Singapore’s GDP in 2009 and, at recession levels, Singapore had a GDP of $182.2 billion U.S. dollars
or $37,200 U.S. dollars per capita.25 Singapore’s economy has
proven to be one of the most stable—not just in Asia, but also
globally.26
As a result of a strong economic outlook, Singapore can continue to retool its energy sector and meet the challenges of carbon
reduction.27 Singapore has already taken significant action toward
clean energy development. In 2001, for example, Singapore’s
National Environment Agency set up the Innovation for Environmental Sustainability Fund to provide grants for clean energy
investment.28 In 2007, the Economic Development Board created
the inter-agency Clean Energy Programme Office (“CEPO”).29
Additionally, the Ministry of National Development allocated
approximately thirty-nine million U.S. dollars over a five-year
period for a Research Fund for the Built Environment.30
Currently, Singapore also receives carbon finance through
the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”), under which
Annex I Parties sponsor projects in Singapore to offset the sponsoring country’s emissions.31 The Kyoto Protocol defines the
CDM as an instrument “to assist Parties not included in Annex
I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to
the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC, and to assist Parties
included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under
Article 3.”32 If Singapore were to accept Annex I responsibilities, it could no longer receive CDM financing and would
instead finance these projects in the developing world to help
offset its own emissions.33 With its regional placement and cultural expertise, Singapore would be well positioned to sponsor
the projects for other Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(“ASEAN”)—nine other developing countries that do not traditionally participate in climate finance projects.34 Furthermore,
Singapore’s stable and strong financial sector would bring additional liquidity to the global carbon market.

Singapore’s Climate Negotiating Position
The Singaporean government has taken a proactive stance
on mitigating global climate change and enforces its laws effectively. Singaporean climate negotiators made statements during the last two Conferences of Parties (“COP”) meetings that
indicate its willingness to address global climate change.35 On
January 28, 2010, Singaporean Ambassador-at-Large and Chief
Negotiator for Climate Change, Chew Tai Soo, wrote, “Singapore therefore wishes to associate with the [Copenhagen] Accord
as a good basis for advancing further international negotiations
towards reaching a legally binding global agreement on climate
change” in a letter to the Executive Secretary, Yvo de Boer, of
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the UNFCCC Secretariat.36 On December 9, 2010, Shunmugam
Jayakumar, Singapore’s Senior Minister and Chairman of the
Inter-Ministerial Committee on Climate Change addressed a
high level conference in Cancun, Mexico at the 16th COP meeting.37 He emphasized his commitment to a legal framework stating that
it is important that as we pursue a “Balanced Package”
in Cancun, we must have clarity that our end goal is to
reach a legally binding outcome. Whatever we achieve
in Cancun, and whatever be our next steps, it is imperative that these elements or decisions will eventually be
stitched together in a legally binding nature, without
which, there can be no guarantee of mitigation actions,
nor can there be guarantee of the support provided.38
Moreover, as a requirement for being a member of the
UNFCCC, Singapore submitted two “national communications
on climate change.”39 Each communication shows a willingness
to offer solutions to mitigate and adapt to climate change.40 In its
first national communication to the UNFCCC in August 2000,
the government of Singapore wrote, “[c]omprehensive preventive measures to safeguard the environment will not work unless
there is stringent enforcement to ensure that the laws and regulations are complied with.”41 In its second national communication from November 2010, the Singaporean government stated,
As a non-Annex I Party to the UNFCCC, we are not
subject to binding greenhouse gas emissions reduction
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. Our contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions is, and will
remain, small. Nonetheless, as a small-island state vulnerable to the impacts of global climate change, Singapore takes climate change seriously. We will therefore
continue to do our part in global efforts to address climate change.42
However, some opposition exists within the Singaporean
government. Its chief climate negotiator, Chew Tai Soo, made
a statement in February 2009 that Singapore should not become
an Annex I Party given its size and relatively small carbon
footprint: 0.3% of global emissions.43 Mr. Chew also made an
unofficial statement at a sustainability conference in Singapore
regarding his opinion on the UNFCCC country classifications:
“This approach is flawed as it does not take into account the
unique considerations and capabilities of different countries . . .
it penalizes small countries with small populations without taking into account their limitations.”44
These comments do not reflect Singapore’s overall commitment in addressing climate change and the important example
it would set for the global community by becoming an Annex I
party. For example, in 2009 a program called Sustainable Singapore Blueprint pledged that the nation would reduce greenhouse
gases by sixteen percent below 2020 business as usual levels
if a binding international agreement on climate change were
reached.45 With this program, Singapore is already implementing a voluntary mitigation plan, as a contingency should there be
a binding international climate agreement. The United Nations
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

should facilitate discussions to encourage Singapore to “graduate” and accept these responsibilities since Singapore is willing
and able to create and enforce laws necessary to achieve carbon
reductions.

Annex I Success and Implications
for Emerging economies
Singapore can benefit from looking to two Annex I Parties,
Germany and Spain, as models for maintaining economic growth
through Kyoto Protocol-based energy efficiency and renewable
energy projects. In 2005, both Germany and Spain entered into a
binding agreement to reduce carbon emissions under the Kyoto
Protocol.46 Since then, laws designed to reduce carbon and modernize electricity generation, distribution, and consumption have
steadily increased.47 Germany has a national commitment to
reduce its carbon footprint forty percent from its 1990 levels by
2020.48 Germany met its 2012 goal early, in 2007, by generating 12.5% of its electricity from renewables, and Germany will
likely exceed its twenty percent by 2020 goal as early as 2011.49
By 2020, conservative estimates show that Germany will source
forty-seven percent of its electricity from renewable energy.50
Thus, while honoring its Kyoto Protocol commitments, German
energy projects have in turn bolstered the fifth largest economy
in the world.51 Spain made a commitment to reduce its carbon
emissions by twenty percent from its 1990 levels by 2020, in line
with the EU target.52 Spain also committed to achieving twenty
percent of its own final consumption and ten percent of its transport energy needs from renewable energy by 2020.53 According
to its 2005-2010 Renewable Energy Plan, Spain plans to deploy
clean energy to meet 12.1% of its primary energy needs, 30.3%
of electricity needs, and 5.83% of transportation fuel.54 One of

Spain’s goals in its 2004-2012 Energy Efficiency Strategy is to
reduce domestic energy intensity by 7.2% by 2012.55
If Singapore adopts Annex I status and follows in Germany and Spain’s carbon reduction footsteps, it could advance
compliance in other developing countries such as Brazil, India,
and China. These countries will face greater and different challenges in greenhouse gas reduction from Singapore due to their
larger size and strong economies.56 However, Singapore could
establish the model and blueprint, which would help to change
the playing field for non-Annex I Parties and encourage greater
participation among those nations. Binding carbon emission
reductions and carbon finance are only possible if countries take
responsibility for their contributions to climate change, however
small they are.

Conclusion
In the UNFCCC, richer nations, mostly those in the EU,
have assumed the role of Annex I Parties.57 Singapore can and
should become an Annex I nation so that it can fulfill a broader
role on the global stage as a leader in greenhouse gas reduction.
Singapore is the ideal candidate for graduating from Non-Annex
I to Annex I. Its mature economy is ready to retool its electricity sector and to finance clean development mechanism projects.
Singapore has national interests in safeguarding its borders from
flooding and protecting the health of its citizens.58 It has a stable
government with a history of developing innovative laws and
enforcing them.59 As the international climate law community
awaits 17th COP in Durban, South Africa, it should consider
graduating a nation to Annex I status as a way to shift binding obligations from the Kyoto Protocol to a new international
agreement between nations.
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World News Update
UNFCCC Green Climate Fund Created
by Laura Drummond*

B

etween November 29, 2010 and December 10, 2010, the
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (“UNFCCC” or “Convention”) met
in Cancun, Mexico, for the sixteenth Conference of the Parties
(“COP”) and the sixth Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.1 One of the major decisions that emerged from this meeting
was to establish the Green Climate Fund.2 While the Fund has
the potential to be a huge step forward in creating long-term,
centralized climate change funding,3 its success will depend on
how subsequent decisions on management shape its efficacy.
The idea for a climate change fund originates from Article
11 of the UNFCCC, which calls on the Parties to create a mechanism that allows developed countries to financially support
developing countries in implementing the Convention.4 This
concept formally took shape as part of the Copenhagen Accord,
where Parties agreed to finance projects that address climate
change impacts in developing countries.5 The finalized Fund
includes provisions for technology development and transfer,
and capacity-building to help developing countries implement
effective mitigation and adaptation actions.6
In Cancun, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term
Cooperative Action, made up from representatives of all member countries, under the Convention put together the terms of
the Fund.7 The terms include the creation of a governing body,
who will contribute to it, and the trustees.8 The Fund has been
developed under the guidance of and will be held accountable to
the Conference of the Parties.9 The Parties established a Standing Committee, to manage the financial mechanism as well as
verify and report financial support that developed countries will
provide developing countries.10
The Green Climate Fund will be controlled by a governing board of twenty-four members, half each from developed
and developing country Parties.11 The Parties have designated
the World Bank as the interim trustee of the Fund, and its status
as trustee will be subject to review after three years of operating
the fund.12 The trustee will aid the governing board in managing the administrative portions of the Fund, such as the financial
records and statements.13 The trustee is required to act in a manner consistent with decisions made by the governing board14 and
is accountable to the board in performing its responsibilities.15
The Parties have also established the Transitional Committee to spearhead designing the operational components
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of the Fund.16 The Committee includes fifteen members from
developed countries and twenty-five members from developing countries.17 The Committee will design the legal and institutional arrangements for the Fund, including its governance
structure; methods on gathering financial, technological, and
capacity-building resources; and ways to ensure that the Fund’s
activities work well with other funding mechanisms that already
exist.18 The Transitional Committee is also responsible for creating mechanisms for independent review of the Fund, stakeholder input, environmental and social safeguards, and financial
accountability.19 The Transitional Committee is temporary and
will only exist long enough to establish these initial standards.20
The Green Climate Fund helps create new funding for projects that will allow developing countries to better mitigate and
adapt to global climate change. However, whether the Fund will
be a major improvement over the current financial regime21 will
largely depend on the effectiveness of the mechanisms that the
Transitional Committee establishes. One of the greatest opportunities for the Fund is the creation of environmental and social
safeguards, which currently do not exist with the other funds.22
Strong safeguards are essential in order to protect both the environment and human rights. The independent review mechanism
will review decisions made by the governing board and help
ensure that the Fund runs smoothly and effectively.23 While the
creation of the Fund can be hailed as a successful outcome of the
UNFCCC’s COP-16, its true measure will be determined down
the road.
Endnotes: World News Update
1

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action, Thirteenth Session, Cancun,
Mex., Nov. 29-Dec. 10, 2010, Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, UN Doc.
FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/L.7 (Dec. 10, 2010), [hereinafter LCA Report], http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/awglca13/eng/l07.pdf.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 11, May 9,
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
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27 See James Lovelock, Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth 10 (2000) (defining homeostasis (Gaia hypothesis) as, “a complex entity involving the Earth’s
biosphere, atmosphere, oceans, and soil; the totality constituting a feedback or
cybernetic system which seeks an optimal physical and chemical environment
for life on this planet”).
28 Market Failures and Externalities, supra note 13.
29 Environmental Pricing Reform, supra note 14. Sven Wunder, Principal Scientist, Forests and Livelihoods Program at the Center for International Forestry
Research (“CIFOR”), has put forward a widely accepted definition for PES.
See, e.g., Douglas Southgate & Sven Wunder, Paying for Watershed Services
in Latin America: A Review of Current Initiatives, 28 J. of Sustainable Forestry 497, 498 (2009) (describing PES in terms of five characteristics: “[1.]
There is a well-defined environmental service (e.g., specific changes in peak- or
dry-season stream flow at the outlet of a watershed) or a suitable proxy for this
service (e.g., [hectares] reforested). [2.] There is at least one buyer of this service or proxy. [3.] There is at least one seller as well. [4.] Transactions between
buyer(s) and seller(s) are voluntary. [5.] Payments are conditional on contracted
environmental services or proxies for same actually being supplied.”).
30 See generally Southgate & Wunder, supra note 29, at 497.
31 About REDD+, supra note 11.
32 Lindsey, supra note 16.
33 Forest Trends, The Katoomba Group, & UNEP, Payments for Ecosystem
Services: Getting Started a Primer 3 (2008), http://www.katoombagroup.org/
documents/publications/GettingStarted.pdf.
34 See id.
35 Id.
36 See id.
37 See Global Forest Resources Assessment, Food & Agric. Org. of the
United Nations 19 (2005), ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/A0400E/A0400E00.
pdf.
38 See The World Factbook: Greece, Cent. Intelligence Agency, https://www.
cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gr.html (last visited Nov.
5, 2010).
39 See State & County QuickFacts of New York, U.S. Census Bureau, http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36000.html (last updated Nov. 4, 2010).
40 See Gert Jan Nabuurs et al., Forestry in Climate Change 2007: Mitigation, IPCC Fourth Assessment Report 546 (2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-chapter9.pdf.
41 See About REDD+, supra note 11.
42 See Charlie Parker et al., The Little REDD+ Book, List of Proposals 1 (2009), http://www.globalcanopy.org/themedia/file/PDFs/LRB_lowres/
lrb_en.pdf (proving a list–Countries: Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS);
Australia; Brazil; Canada; Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN); China;
Colombia; Central African Forest Commission (COMIFAC); European Union
(EU); India; Indonesia; Japan; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Norway;
Panama; Tuvalu; USU; and Organizations: CATIE (Nested Approach); CCAP
(Dual Markets); CSERGE (Combined Incentives); EDF & IPAM & ISA (Compensated Reductions); Greenpeace (TDERM); HSI (Carbon Stores); IDDRI &
CERDI (Compensated Successful Efforts); IIASA Avoiding REDD Hot Air;
Joanneum Research (Corridor Approach); JRC (Incentive Accounting); TCG
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(Terrestrial Carbon); TNC (Integrated Incentives); WHRC (Stock-Flow with
Targets)).
43 See id. at 20.
44 See id. at 26-27.
45 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Annex A, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
46 See id. at art. 3(3) (“The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by
sources and removals by sinks resulting from direct human-induced land-use
change and forestry activities, limited to afforestation, reforestation and deforestation . . . .”).
47 See id. at art. 3(4) (“The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting
of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session or as soon as practicable
thereafter, decide upon modalities, rules and guidelines as to how, and which,
additional human-induced activities related to changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks in the agricultural soils and the landuse change and forestry categories shall be added to, or subtracted from, the
assigned amounts for Parties included in Annex I . . . .”).
48 See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Buenos Aires, Arg.,
Nov. 2-14, 1998, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fourth Session,
Decision 9/CP.4, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add.1 (Jan. 25, 1999), http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop4/16a01.pdf (addressing LULUCF specifically).
49 See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, The Hague, Neth.,
Nov. 13-25, 2000, Report of the Conference of the Parties on the First Part of
its Sixth Session, Decision 1/CP.6 Annex, Note by the President of the Conference of the Parties at its sixth session, Box C, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/2000/5/
Add.2 (Apr. 4, 2001) [hereinafter COP-6], http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
cop6/05a02.pdf (“Parties decide that for defining afforestation, reforestation and deforestation [forestry activities] the set of IPCC definitions shall be
applied.”).
50 See id. at Decision 1/CP.6 Box C. Land-use, Land-use change and forestry
(“Parties agree that for the implementation of Article 3.3 [of the Kyoto Protocol], ‘forest’ is defined in accordance with the FAO definition.”); see also The
Forest Resources Assessment Programme, Food & Agric. Org. of the United
Nations, http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/ae217e/ae217e00.htm (last visited
Feb. 3, 2010) (defining forests as “Land with tree crown cover (or equivalent
stocking level) of more than 10 percent and area of more than 0.5 hectares (ha).
The trees should be able to reach a minimum height of 5 meters (m) at maturity
in situ. May consist either of closed forest formations where trees of various
stories and undergrowth cover a high proportion of the ground; or open forest formations with a continuous vegetation cover in which tree crown cover
exceeds 10 percent. Young natural stands and all plantations established for
forestry purposes which have yet to reach a crown density of 10 percent or tree
height of 5 m are included under forest, as are areas normally forming part of
the forest area which are temporarily unstocked as a result of human intervention or natural causes but which are expected to revert to forest.”).
51 See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Marrakesh, Morocco,
Oct. 29-Nov. 10, 2001, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh
Session, Decision 11/CP.7 Annex, P 1(b)-(c), U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/2001/13/
Add.1 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter COP-7 Report–Part Two (Volume I)] http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a01.pdf; see also Conference of the Parties
Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, Can.,
Nov. 28-Dec. 10, 2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as
the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session, Decision
16/CMP.1 Annex, P 6, U.N. Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (Mar. 30,
2006) [hereinafter COP/MOP-1 Report-Part Two] http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2005/cmp1/eng/08a03.pdf.
52 Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Bali, Indon., Dec. 3-15,
2007, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session, Decision 2/CP.13, U.N Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008) [hereinafter COP-13 Addendum-Two] http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/
eng/06a01.pdf.
53 See id. at 1/CP.13 1(b)(iii).
54 See John M. Broder & Elisabeth Rosenthal, U.N. Official Says Climate Deal
is at Risk, N.Y. Times (Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/science/earth/21climate.html.
55 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 15th Conference of the Parties, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-19, 2009, Copenhagen
Accord, 2/CP.15.6, in Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken, U.N. Doc. FCCC/
CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010) [hereinafter COP-15 Addendum-Two]
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf.
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The Copenhagen Accord also provided “new and additional resources . . .
approaching USD 30 billion” during 2010 to 2012 on climate change mitigation approaches including REDD+ programs. See COP-15 Addendum-Two,
supra note 55, at 2/CP.15.6, 2/CP.15.8. During COP-15, REDD was discussed
in two bodies, SBSTA-31 and AWG-LCA-8. The REDD text recognized by
the Copenhagen Accord was from the SBSTA-31, which produced draft text
on the methodological issues of REDD. However, the Copenhagen Accord
did not include the AWG-LCA-8 draft text on policy approaches and positive
incentives of REDD. See, e.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 15th Conference of the Parties, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-19,
2009, Methodological Guidance for Activities Relating to Reducing Emissions
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the Role of Conservation,
Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks
in Developing Countries, Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological
Advice, Draft decision -/CP.15 (Advanced unedited version), http://unfccc.
int/files/na/application/pdf/cop15_ddc_auv.pdf (illustrating the SBSTA draft
text that would be incorporated into the Copenhagen Accord); United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 15th Conference of the Parties,
Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-19, 2009, Policy Approaches and Positive Incentives
on Issues Relating to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries; and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable
Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks in Developing Countries, Ad Hoc Working Group On Long-Term Cooperative Action
Under The Convention, Eighth session, Draft decision -/CP.15, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/L.7/Add.6 (Dec. 15, 2009) http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2009/awglca8/eng/l07a06.pdf (illustrating the deficiencies in the AWGLCA, which does not implement (1) target measures to stop deforestation, (2)
long-term finance commitments, (3) strong safeguards, (4) strong mitigation
tools to prevent leakage, or (5) discuss free, prior and informed consent by
indigenous peoples); COP-15 Addendum-Two, supra note 55 (illustrating the
incorporation of the SBSTA draft text but lack of incorporation of the AWGLCA draft text into the Copenhagen Accord).
The concern over these deficiencies were reinforced when over twenty thousand people and one hundred twenty-five countries attended The World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth hosted by
the government of Bolivia in April 2010. See Andres Schipani, Evo Morales’
Message to Grassroots Climate Talks – Planet or Death, Guardian (Apr.
21, 2010, 16:19 BST), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/apr/21/
evo-morales-grassroots-climate-talks. The World People’s Conference voiced
ardent concern over the developments occurring under the UNFCCC generally,
the definition of forests, and the progression of the market based REDD program. See, e.g., World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights
of Mother Earth, Cochabamba, Bol., Apr. 22, 2010, Proposal Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth, art. 3(2)(i) (2010), http://pwccc.wordpress.com/programa/ (“(2) Human beings, all States, and all public and private
institutions must: (i) establish precautionary and restrictive measures to prevent
human activities from causing species extinction, the destruction of ecosystems
or the disruption of ecological cycles”); see also World People’s Conference on
Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, Cochabamba, Bol., Apr. 22,
2010, Peoples Agreement (2010) http://pwccc.wordpress.com/support/ (“The
definition of forests used in the negotiations of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, which includes plantations, is unacceptable.
Monoculture plantations are not forests. Therefore, we require a definition for
negotiation purposes that recognizes the native forests, jungles and the diverse
ecosystems on Earth.” “We condemn market mechanisms such as REDD
(Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) and its versions + and + +, which are violating the sovereignty of peoples and their right
to prior free and informed consent as well as the sovereignty of national States,
the customs of Peoples, and the Rights of Nature.”).
57 See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Advance Unedited
Version, Draft decision -/CP.16 Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working
Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, III.C. [hereinafter COP-16 AWG-LCA] http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/
pdf/cop16_lca.pdf.
58 Id.
59 Id. at III.C.70.
60 See id. at III.C.71(a).
61 Id. at III.C.71(c).
62 Id. at III.C.72.
63 See id. at III.C.
64 See Richard Betts et al., Forests and Emissions: A Contribution to the
Eliasch Review 4 (2008) http://www.ibcperu.org/doc/isis/11467.pdf (indicating
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that there are uncertainties in both the estimated rate of deforestation and with
forest carbon stocks).
65 See Parker et al., supra note 42, at 21.
66 See R. DeFries et al., Tropical Deforestation and Climate Change: Chapter Three Monitoring Tropical Deforestation for Emerging Carbon Markets
35 (Paulo Moutinho & Stephan Schwartzman eds., 2005), http://www.edf.org/
documents/4930_TropicalDeforestation_and_ClimateChange.pdf.
67 See U.S. Gov’t. Accountability Office, Carbon Offsets: The U.S. Voluntary Market is Growing, but Quality Assurance Poses Challenges for
Market Participants 2-3 (2008), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081048.
pdf (reviewing the issues of additional, measurement, verification, and permanence); see also Jonathan L. Ramseur, Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for
Congress–The Role of Offsets in a Greenhouse Gas Emissions Cap-and-Trade
Program: Potential Benefits and Concerns 21 (2008), http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL34436.pdf (discussing the issue of leakage).
68 See id.
69 Jason Schwartz, Note, “Whose Woods These Are I Think I Know”: How Kyoto
May Change Who Controls Biodiversity, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 421, 426 (2006).
70 See Parker et al., supra note 42, at 21.
71 See id.
72 See U.S. Gov’t. Accountability Office, supra note 67, at 6-7.
73 Nat’l Comm’n on Energy Policy, Bipartisan Policy Ctr., Forging the Climate Consensus: Domestic and International Offsets 6 (2009), http://www.
bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NCEP%20Domestic%20and%20International%20Offsetsformatted.pdf.
74 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 45, at art. 3(3).
75 See generally id.
76 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Special Report:
Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry: Summary for Policymakers, vii
(2000), [hereinafter IPCC LULUCF Special Report] http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
special-reports/spm/srl-en.pdf.
77 Id. ¶ 16.
78 See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Ninth Session, Milan,
Italy, Dec. 1-12, 2003, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Ninth
Session, ¶ 8, Decision 19/CP.9, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.2 (Mar. 30,
2004) [hereinafter COP-9 Report, Part Two], http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
cop9/06a02.pdf.
79 Till Neef et al., Choosing a Forest Definition for the Clean Development
Mechanism 6-7 (Food & Agric. Org. of the United Nations, Forests and Climate Change Working Paper No. 4, 2006), http://www.fao.org/forestry/1128003f2112412b94f8ca5f9797c7558e9bc.pdf.
80 Id. at 3.
81 See id. at 5-6 (noting the variances in forest definitions among countries).
82 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 45, at art. 12.
83 U.S. Gov’t. Accountability Office, supra note 67, at 35.
84 Office of Air and Radiation, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Tools of the
Trade: A Guide to Designing and Operating a Cap and Trade Program for
Pollution Control, Glossary-3 (2003), http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/resource/
docs/tools.pdf.
85 Ramseur, supra note 67, at 21.
86 Office of Air and Radiation, supra note 84, at 3.
87 See COP-9 Report, Part Two, supra note 78, at -/CMP.1 Annex A.1.(e)
(defining leakage as “the increase in greenhouse gas emissions by sources
which occurs outside the boundary of an afforestation or reforestation project
activity under the CDM which is measurable and attributable to the afforestation or reforestation project activity”).
88 DeFries et al., supra note 66, at 35.
89 Carbon Sequestration in Agriculture and Forestry Frequent Questions, U.S.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/sequestration/faq.html (last updated
Jun. 22, 2010).
90 Id.
91 See id. (explaining how when trees reach maturity they are also saturated
at which point the tree must be maintained to maintain the saturation and thus
prevent the sequestered carbon from reentering the atmosphere).
92 Ramseur, supra note 67, at 20.
93 See Marcio Santilli et al., Tropical Deforestation and the Kyoto Protocol:
An Editorial Essay, in Tropical Deforestation and Climate Change 47, 50
(Paulo Moutinho & Stephan Schwartzman eds., 2005).
94 Office of Air and Radiation, supra note 84, at 3.
95 Roger A. Sedjo & Brent Sohngen, Carbon Credits for Avoided Deforestation 6 (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper, 2007), http://www.rff.org/
rff/Documents/RFF-DP-07-47.pdf.
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Cong. Budget Office, The Potential for Carbon Sequestration in the
United States 2 (2007), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/86xx/doc8624/09-12CarbonSequestration.pdf.
97 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 45, at art. 3(3), 3(4).
98 COP-6, supra note 49. See also Lavanya Rajamani, Re-Negotiating Kyoto:
A Review of the Sixth Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention
on Climate Change, 12 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 201, 223 (2001) (“At
COP-6, the Umbrella Group argued in favor of including additional activities
in the first commitment period. However, the [Alliance of Small Island States]
(AOSIS) and the European Union (EU) opposed it.”).
99 COP-7 Report–Part Two (Volume I), supra note 51.
100 COP-13 Addendum-Two, supra note 52, at 2/CP.13.11.
101 COP-15 Addendum-Two, supra note 55, at 4/CP.15.6.
102 COP-16 AWG-LCA, supra note 57, at III.C.
103 See COP-13 Addendum-Two, supra note 52, at 1/CP.13, ¶ 1(b)(iii) (“Policy
approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions
from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role
of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest
carbon stocks in developing countries”); COP-15 Addendum-Two, supra note
55, at 4/CP.15 (“We recognize the crucial role of reducing emission from deforestation and forest degradation and the need to enhance removals of greenhouse
gas emission by forests and agree on the need to provide positive incentives to
such actions through the immediate establishment of a mechanism including
REDD-plus, to enable the mobilization of financial resources from developed
countries.”); COP-16 AWG-LCA, supra note 57, at III.C (noting the inclusion of
the role of conservation and sustainable management of forests with REDD+).
104 Simon Eggleston & Nalin Srivastava, IPCC National Greenhouse Gas
Inventory Programme, AFOLU in the IPCC 2006 Guidelines (2008), http://
www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/presentation/LULUCF-AFOLU.pdf.
105 Revised 1996 Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (1997).
106 See generally Good Practice Guidance for Land Use, Land-Use Change
and Forestry, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, http://www.ipccnggip.iges.or.jp/public/gpglulucf/gpglulucf_contents.html (last visited Feb. 4,
2011).
107 See generally 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, Volume 4 Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use, Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/
vol4.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
108 Good Practice Guidance for Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry,
supra note 106.
109 About REDD+, supra note 11.
110 See Meine van Noordwijk et al., Reducing Emissions from All Land Uses
(REALU): The Case for a Whole Landscape Approach, ASB PolicyBrief 13,
(ASB Partnership for the Tropical Forest Margins, Nairobi), 2009, at 2, http://
www.asb.cgiar.org/pdfwebdocs/ASBPB13.pdf (defining the following “RED:
Reducing emissions from (gross) deforestation; only changes from ‘forest’ to
‘non-forest’ land cover types are included, and details depend very much on the
operational definition of ‘forest.’ REDD: RED and (forest) degradation, or the
shifts to lower carbon stock densities within the forest; details depend very much
on the operational definition of ‘forest’. REDD+: REDD and restocking within
and towards ‘forest’ (as specified in the Bali Action Plan); in some versions
REDD+ will also include peatlands, regardless of their forest status; details still
depend on the operational definition of ‘forest’” and defining REALU which
“includes REDD+ and all transitions in land cover that affect carbon storage,
whether peatland or mineral soil, trees-outside-forest, agroforests, plantations or
natural forests. It does not depend on the operation definition of ‘forest.’”).
111 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, supra note
107, at 1.5.
112 van Noordwijk et al., supra note 110, at 2.
113 See Nophea Sasaki, What are REDD, REDD+ and REDD++?, http://
nopheasasaki.net/papers/2010/nopheasasaki_REDD.pdf (“REDD++: This is to
prevent the conversion of low-carbon but high biodiversity forest lands (reaching minimum threshold of forest definition) for intensive agricultural cultivation
or other short-term benefit practices when high carbon-stock forests are guarded
for REDD+ benefits.”).
114 REALU: Reducing Emissions from All Land Uses, ASB, http://asb.cgiar.
org/content/realu-reducing-emissions-all-land-uses (last visited Jan. 3, 2011);
Reducing Emissions from All Land Uses (REALU), World Agroforestry Ctr.,
http://www.worldagroforestry.org/sea/vn/node/109 (last visited Jan. 3, 2011).
115 Neef et al., supra note 79, at 6; COP-9 Report-Part Two, supra note 78, at
19/CP.9 Annex F. Participation requirements, ¶ 8.
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See COP-9 Report-Part Two, supra note 78, at 19/CP.9 Annex F. Participation requirements, ¶ 8 (providing a flexible definition of forest: flexibility on
a forest definition with (a) minimum tree crown cover between 10 and 30 percent; (b) minimum land area between 0.05 and 1 hectare; and (c) minimum tree
height value between 2 and 5 meters).
117 Neef et al., supra note 79, at 3.
118 IPCC LULUCF Special Report, supra note 76, at 5.
119 Sinks Table Options Paper: Land-Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry
in Canada and the Kyoto Protocol, Env’t Can. 127 (1999) http://dsp-psd.
pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/M22-132-13-1999E.pdf.
120 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, supra note
107, at 1.5.
121 COP/MOP-1 Report-Part Two, supra note 51, at Decision 16/CMP.1 Annex
Definitions A(1)(a).
122 Id.
123 See Jean-Paul Lanly, Deforestation And Forest Degradation Factors
(2003), www.fao.org/docrep/article/wfc/xii/ms12a-e.htm (“There is no deforestation if the clearfelling is done on an area that is meant to be maintained as
a forest (as in the case of ‘temporarily unstocked’ forests); deforestation on the
other hand does exist–and this is actually the point of view of forest management–when the forest in question is cleared in order to be cultivated or abandoned for a long time, and if its regeneration cannot take place before several
decades have passed.”).
124 COP/MOP-1 Report-Part Two, supra note 51, at Decision 16/CMP.1 Annex
Definitions A(1)(a).
125 See generally Kyoto Protocol, supra note 45.
126 COP-6, supra note 49, at Decision 1/CP.6 Box C. Land-use, Land-use
Change and Forestry (“Parties agree that for the implementation of Article 3.3 [of
the Kyoto Protocol], ‘forest’ is defined in accordance with the FAO definition.”).
127 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, supra note
107, at 1.5.
128 Office of Air & Radiation, supra note 84, at 3.
129 Id.
130 About REDD+, supra note 11.
131 COP-9 Report-Part Two, supra note 78, at -/CMP.1 Annex A.1.(e) (defining
leakage).
132 Good Practice Guidance for Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry,
supra note 106, at 14.
133 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, supra note
107, at 1.5.
134 About REDD+, supra note 11.
135 COP-6, supra note 49, at Decision 1/CP.6 Box C. Land-use, Land-use
Change and Forestry.
136 Id.
137 See Parker et al., supra note 42, at 21; Office of Air & Radiation, supra
note 84, at 2-8; Carbon Sequestration in Agriculture and Forestry Frequent
Questions, supra note 89.
138 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, supra note
107, at 1.5.
139 See Parker et al., supra note 42, at 113 (classifying the following countries
as having high forest cover and low rates of deforestation (“HFLD”): Belize,
French Guiana, Gabon, Guyana, Peru, and Suriname).
140 See id. (classifying the following countries as having low forest cover and
low rates of deforestation (“LFLD”): Angola, Central African, Costa Rica,
Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, India,
Kenya, Laos, Madagascar, Mozambique, Nigeria, Philippines, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, and Vietnam).
141 COP-16 AWG-LCA, supra note 57, at III.C.72.
142 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, supra note
107, at 1.5.
143 See COP-6, supra note 49, at Decision 1/CP.6 Box C. Land-use, Land-use
Change and Forestry.
144 Sinks Table Options Paper, supra note 119, at 127, 132.
145 Id. at 127.
146 U.S. Climate Change Science Program, The First State of the Carbon
Cycle Report: The North American Carbon Budget and Implications for the
Global Carbon Cycle 32 (2007), http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/
sap2-2/final-report/sap2-2-final-all.pdf.
147 Id. at 140.
148 Jon Kusler, Climate Change in Wetland Areas Part II: Carbon Cycle
Implications, Acclimations, (Aug. 1, 1999), http://bluecarbonblog.blogspot.
com/1999/08/climate-change-in-wetland-areas-carbon.html.
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U.S. Climate Change Science Program, supra note 146, at XIII (defining
“‘North America’ as Canada, the United States of America (excluding Hawaii),
and Mexico”).
150 Id. at 143, 140 (noting that “estuarine wetlands and some freshwater mineral-soil wetlands rapidly sequester carbon as soil organic matter due to rapid
burial in sediments”).
151 Id. at 143.
152 Id. at XIII.
153 Id.
154 Lindsey, supra note 16.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Pimentel et al., supra note 16, at 1119.
158 Coe et al., supra note 16, at 1.
159 Lindsey, supra note 16.
160 Pimentel et al., supra note 16, at 1118.
161 About REDD+, supra note 11.
162 Claudia M. Stickler et al., The Potential Ecological Costs and Cobenefits of
REDD: A Critical Review and Case Study from the Amazon Region, 15 Global
Change Biology 2803, 2806 (2009).
163 Coe et al., supra note 16, at 1.
164 Id. at 1; Pimentel et al., supra note 16, at 1117; Lindsey, supra note 16.
165 Coe et al., supra note 16, at 1; Pimentel et al., supra note 16, at 1118-19;
Lindsey, supra note 16.
166 Stickler et al., supra note 161, at 2806.
167 Id.
168 Pimentel et al., supra note 16, at 1117.
169 Pimentel et al., Ecology of Soil Erosion in Ecosystems, 1 Ecosystems 416,
417 (1998).
170 Id.
171 Pimentel et al., supra note 16, at 1118.
172 See id. at 1117-18 (noting how steep slopes converted to agricultural use
often result in high erosion rates: Nigeria – flat slope gradient <1%, lost 2 tons
ha-1 year-1 versus a slope gradient ~12%, lost 221 tons ha-1 year-1; Philippines
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INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES
Fair and Free
trade.

The International Legal Studies Program is one of the top LL.M. programs in the country and
has been at the forefront of international legal education for more than 25 years. Our students
come from over 50 different countries to Washington, D.C. where they learn from leading
professors and practitioners and have the opportunity to intern with global organizations
and law firms.
The flexible curriculum includes eight different areas of specialization:
• International Business Law

intellec t ual
property.

• International Commercial Arbitration
• International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law
• International Trade
• International Environmental Law
• Gender and the Law
• Information Justice and Intellectual Property
• International Organizations
For more information, visit wcl.american.edu/ilsp or
contact llminfo@wcl.american.edu

international
environmental law.
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summer program
May 31 - June 17, 2011

The Environmental Law Summer Program offers a broad range of seminars on
international and domestic environmental law. The program engages law students
and practitioners from around the world in intensive training over a three-week
period, focusing on developing issues in environmental law. Participants learn from
expert practitioners from the U.S. Congress, EU and U.S. government agencies,
leading international law firms, and non-governmental organizations.
Courses Include:
Legal Implications of the Gulf Oil Spill
The Environmental Law Summer Program features a seminar that will analyze
the legal implications, both civil and criminal, of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in
the Gulf of Mexico. The course is taught by John Dupuy, assistant inspector general
in the Office of the Inspector General at the U.S. Department of the Interior.
sustainable
development.

Trade and Environment: A Joint Seminar with the OAS
From June 20-24, the Environmental Law Summer
Program and the Organization of American States
will be holding a joint seminar on Trade and
Environment. This five-day seminar concludes
with a day-long trade simulation.
For more information and to apply, visit
wcl.american.edu/environment/summer or
contact summerenvironment@wcl.american.edu
EO/AA University and Employer

